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RISK AND VISIBILITY IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
BY 
 
HUNG VU NGUYEN 
 
NOVEMBER 2011 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. S. Tamer Cavusgil, Co-Chair 
      Dr. Daniel C. Bello, Co-Chair 
 
Major Academic Unit: Marketing Department 
 
Working with international suppliers in global supply chains, manufacturing firms now are faced 
with substantial supplier risks which could be triggered by disruptions in either their suppliers or 
the supplier’s market. Reactive actions to the risks, however, have usually been shown to be 
inefficient and sometimes ineffective. In this dissertation, therefore, I develop a theoretical 
framework linking some key relationship-specific capabilities to supplier risk. My contention is 
that the capabilities, when developed, can help proactively mitigate the risk. Thus, the model in 
this study is grounded in the resource-based and the relational views. 
In this study, the survey method has been employed to collect data from 66 manufacturing firms 
in the United State who are sourcing from international suppliers. Procedural and statistical 
methods have been employed to guard against typical empirical issues including non-response 
bias, common method bias, and problems in validity and reliability of measurement instruments.  
xi 
 
Structural equation modeling with partial least squares was employed to test the model with 
bootstrapping to estimate t-values for the paths. The analysis results showed support for the 
model. 
A conclusion from the study is that visibility is the critical relationship-specific capability that 
needs to develop for buying firms to mitigate supplier risk proactively. This is because it may not 
be substitutable by other mechanisms like goodwill trust, and other capabilities, including 
absorptive capacity and IT integration, will only operate via visibility to influence risk 
performance. Moreover, visibility is a significant capability that helps mitigate risk regardless of 
the relationship duration between the buyer and the supplier and of the market conditions under 
which the supplier is working.  
This study thus adds to the risk literature with discussions of supplier risks. Nuances have also 
been added to the resource-based and relational views by developing the theoretical relationships 
among the identified capabilities and by examining the contextual conditions under which the 
relationships are working to mitigate supplier risk. Managers from both sides of a dyadic 
relationship may benefit from the study by utilizing the tools and the study results to monitor and 
mitigate supplier risk.  
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Research Background 
Risks in supply chains or networks have recently increased in significance and have become a 
topic of interest for scholarly research as well as for company practice. Indeed, severe and costly 
disruptions have been documented at different companies in various industries including Boeing 
and General Motors (Blackhurst et al 2005), Dell, Toyota, and Ericsson (Chopra & Sodhi 2004), 
Sony and Nike (Hendricks & Singhal 2005a), Apple (Zsidisin, Melnyk, & Ragatz 2005), and 
Bosch (Wagner & Bode 2006), to name a few.  
The consequence of such disruptions can be economically devastating. For example, in the 
recent case of the Boeing 787 project for the Dreamliner, a glitch in a small supplier for Boeing 
was pointed out as the culprit for approximately ten billion dollars of loss to the airplane 
manufacturer (Gates 2008; Greising & Johnsson 2007; Wallace 2008). While one-time 
disruptions of this kind may be costly, these disruptions may trigger adverse repercussions even 
for a longer term that will deteriorate company performance in terms of the persistent declines in 
sales growth and stock returns (Hendricks & Singhal 2005a, 2003, 2005b). Costly to reverse and 
lingering, such negative effects for a company have shown to take months to several years to 
address, if they can ever be remedied (Hendricks & Singhal 2003; Knight & Pretty 1996). 
Simply put, the damages to a buying firm from supply failures may be severely disruptive and 
sticky, and they may be troubling to the company beyond the simple proportion of an operational 
mishap. 
In working with suppliers, especially foreign ones, therefore, manufacturing firms now are faced 
with substantial supplier disruption risks. Such risks increase because manufacturers tend to 
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depend on suppliers more and more. Considering more than 50% of manufacturers’ budget is 
allocated to procuring input from suppliers (Joshi 2009; Wagner & Bode 2006), a typical 
manufacturer today is more in “the assembling business than in the business of producing the 
components required to create the end product” (Joshi 2009, p. 133). Adding to such risk, the 
failure rates of suppliers worldwide have reportedly swung up by 30% in the recent years due to 
the current economic crisis. (McKinsey & Company Operations Extranet 2010). As the 
economic downturn continues, the supplier risks for buying firms will not diminish but likely 
keep increasing.    
From the managerial point of view, the practical research question is what can a buying firm do 
to mitigate the supplier risk? It has been recently noted that managers in buying firms have not 
had an adequate answer to the question (Byrne 2007; Knemeyer, Zinn, & Eroglu 2009). Firms 
have been very reactive rather than proactive to the risks. Such corrective actions to the damages, 
however, have usually been ineffective and wasteful (Hendricks & Singhal 2005a, 2003, 2005b). 
A more precise and important question for the managers then is what can a buying firm do 
proactively? In another words, how can a buying firm act before a disruption occurs to prevent or 
at least mitigate the potential for substantial damages? 
However, such a question remains open. The academic view on the supplier risk is still limited as 
the research on supplier risk has usually been descriptive and prescriptive in nature. On the other 
hand, there is a burgeoning stream of modeling research which addresses only one or several 
types of disruptions in supply chains separately and usually in experimental environments (see 
Snyder et al. 2010 for a review). Additionally, scant behavioral research in the field has mostly 
focused on the outcomes of the risk (e.g.Lee & Padmanabhan 1997; Lee, Padmanabhan, & 
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Seungjin 2004; Zsidisin & Ellram 2003). Thus there seems to be a gap in behavioral studies on 
supplier risks with regards to disruptions.  
1.2. Research Questions 
Motivated by the gap in the research stream, the objective of this study is to identify the key 
factors that can help mitigate supplier risk proactively. To achieve this, the current study 
endeavors to answer several key research questions.  
The first question that needs to be answered is what is supplier risk? This question can be broken 
down into several more specific questions. In particular, I would like to understand what is the 
nature of supplier risk? It is important to understand the nature of the risk before one can 
mitigate it proactively. In a similar vein, it is important to understand how supplier risk is 
created. Understanding the process of risk creation is important in order to identify the potential 
factors that can mitigate the risk. 
The second question is how and why should managers mitigate the supplier risk in a proactive 
way? In particular, what factors can managers control to mitigate the supplier risk? And what 
theoretical views can one draw on to explain factors that help mitigate the supplier risk? 
Through the investigation process, three information-based capabilities can be identified as the 
factors that can mitigate supplier risk proactively. My next research questions thus would be 
what is the nature of the information-based capabilities, which include visibility, absorptive 
capacity, and information technology (IT) integration? And how could they be facilitated each 
other in influencing supplier risk? 
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The last question that this dissertation endeavors to answer is how can the links among the 
capabilities and to supplier risk change? In another word, I would like to understand what would 
be the moderators to the relationships? Related to this question, I would seek to identify potential 
control variables that should be included in the model to rule out potential spurious relationships. 
1.3. Contributions of the Study 
This thesis work purports to make several important contributions to inter-firm literature. First, I 
add to the literature on supplier risk by creating a clear conceptualization of supplier risk and by 
identifying the key antecedents to the risk. In particular, the concept of supplier risk here is 
subjective in nature. This is important because if one is to mitigate the risk proactively, one 
needs to evaluate the risk before its management. Moreover, I identify some key information-
based capabilities that can be linked to supplier risk. Such capabilities are actionable factors that 
managers can control for and thus can develop to mitigate supplier risk. The overall theoretical 
framework developed for this paper is presented in Figure 1-1.   
Second, I add to the resource-based and relational view literature by linking relationship-specific 
capabilities to perceived supplier risk. As widely posited and tested in various literatures, 
capabilities and resources qualified for some certain conditions could result in a firm’s 
competitive advantage (Barney 1991). In this work, three relationship-specific capabilities have 
been identified. Consideration of the relationship-specific capabilities is important because the 
valuable resources may not and should not be limited to the ones within a firm. Instead, the 
resources or capabilities can reside in inter-organizational settings in various forms including 
dyadic and network types (Dyer & Singh 1998). 
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Information-based 
Capabilities 
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Outcomes 
Environment Factors 
Absorptive 
Capacity 
IT Integration 
Supplier’s 
Market 
Dynamism 
Goodwill Trust 
Visibility 
Perceived 
Supplier Risk 
Figure 1-1. A Framework for Supplier Risk 
 
Third, I provide a more nuanced picture for the resource-based and relational views by 
identifying the configuration of capabilities under which they would influence supplier risk. In 
particular, absorptive capacity and IT integration will operate via visibility to mitigate supplier 
risk. The configuration of the capabilities here is important because despite the importance of the 
capabilities like absorptive capacity and IT integration, the primary source for risk mitigation is 
visibility. Such distinction between the capabilities could help explain why firms who are 
inefficient in leveraging their absorptive capacity and IT integration could not improve risk 
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performance. Thus it demonstrates different ways that capabilities could contribute to 
performance, with an emphasis on visibility. 
Fourth, I provide a better picture for the pathways that lead to supplier risk by examining several 
moderators. The moderators identified here include supplier’s market dynamism and buyer’s 
goodwill trust. Thus I can also contribute to the literature on market dynamism and inter-firm 
trust and the contextual effects they may have on other capability-performance relationships. 
Finally, from a managerial perspective, this paper makes practical contributions by developing 
and testing the measurement instruments for supplier risk and visibility. Managers in the buying 
firm can utilize the reliable and valid instruments developed in this paper to monitor and mitigate 
supplier risk. 
1.4. Scope and Boundary Conditions of the Study 
The model in this dissertation is shaped by its scope and boundary conditions. In particular, this 
study aims to examine one key link in the global supply chains, namely the link between 
manufacturing firms and their key international suppliers. Even though important, the 
investigation into other links in the chain such as the ones between first-tier and higher-tier 
suppliers is not taken in this study. 
Moreover, for practical purposes, I only examine the model from the manufacturing firm 
perspective. Dyadic data is always desirable but very difficult to obtain, especially for the 
relationships between a buying firm and its foreign partner.  
It also should be noted that, in an empirical study of this kind, there is always a possibility of 
missing independent variables in a model. After thoroughly reviewing the literature, I attempt to 
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reach a balance between parsimony and breadth of antecedents. Thus the model in this 
dissertation includes the representative independent and control variables. High scores of 
explained variance for the dependent variables in the model can provide an evidence of less 
potential for missing important independent variables.  
Finally, this study employs a survey technique and psychometric multi-item data analysis which 
is cross-sectional in nature. This technique is appropriate given the fact that the purpose of this 
study is to examine perception of buying firm managers. Other techniques such as experiment, 
quasi-experiment, and/or secondary data design, however, can be used in future research to 
triangulate and validate results from this study.  
1.5. Organization of the Study 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter II, I provide a review of the key 
concepts in the model. Theoretical frameworks for the model are also presented in this chapter. 
Chapter III presents a development of the model hypotheses. Relationships in the main model 
will be discussed first. Next I discuss the potential moderating effects on the main model 
relationships. Chapter IV will follow with discussions on methodology and hypothesis analyses. 
In this chapter, I present the sampling design, data collection process, and instrument 
development. The chapter concludes with the measurement and structural model analysis results. 
Chapter V concludes this dissertation with a discussion of the hypothesis testing results and 
implications from the study. I conclude chapter V with a discussion of limitations and respective 
recommendations for the directions for further research related to this topic. 
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CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
This chapter provides a literature review for the key concepts in the model. I will start with the 
dependent variable, supplier risk. Next, other concepts including visibility, absorptive capacity, 
and IT integration will be discussed. The chapter concludes with examination of the moderation 
variables: supplier’s market dynamism and goodwill trust. 
2.1. Supplier Risk 
In this study, perceived supplier disruption risk (hereafter perceived supplier risk) refers to the 
buyer’s expectation of probable disruption on the supplier’s side that causes loss to the buyer due 
to unavailability of a sourced item. The failure of having the item may be due to disruptions 
which are attributed to either the supplier internals or to the business environment of the supplier. 
Note that because a buying firm may buy different items from one supplier, we limit the level of 
analysis at the firm level to one particular regularly-purchased critical item. To better delineate 
the concept, in the following sections I will elaborate on the general concept of organizational 
risk and clarify our focus on the subjective rather than the objective risk. Next I identify the key 
components of perceived risk and the possible triggers of supplier risk. I conclude the section by 
reviewing literature on supplier risk with suggestions for potential antecedents of the risk. 
2.1.1. Definition of Risk 
The task of defining organizational risks has been deceptively simple in the literature. Different 
scholars have adopted different definitions of risks (Khan & Burnes 2007; Yates & Stone 
1992b). Conceptually these definitions have fallen into two categories: (1) variation in 
distribution of outcomes or performance; and (2) potential losses or general threats or hazards. 
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The first approach to risk definition could be traced back to classical decision theory (e.g. Arrow 
1965; Pratt 1964). Under this perspective, risk is “most commonly conceived as reflecting 
variation in the distribution of possible outcomes, their likelihoods, and their subjective values”  
(March & Shapira 1987, p. 1404) or variability (Jemison 1987). A riskier choice involves having 
a higher variance in outcomes while keeping the expected outcome constant. Under this 
perspective, therefore, the attitude toward risk could be classified as risk-taking, risk-neutral, or 
risk-averse based on the choice among options of the same return but with different outcome 
variances. This conceptualization of risk has been adopted most widely in finance where risk is 
considered volatility in outcomes and sometimes in other literature such as international business 
(cf. Miller 1992).  
However, the problem with this conceptualization is that, in practice, managers do not usually 
view risks in this way. In a seminal article, March and Shapira reported survey results with 
American, Canadian, and Israeli managers and found several interesting discrepancies between 
the managerial perspective and the classical theoretical definition of risk (March & Shapira 
1987). Two most notable points have been made. First, managers did not treat variance with 
positive outcomes as risk. They only focus on the negative outcomes. This observation matches 
with earlier criticisms on risk as total variation (e.g. Markowitz 1952) and has led to models 
based on semi-variance (e.g. Coombs 1983; Fishburn 1977), which is often termed downside risk 
(Das & Teng 2001). Second and more interesting, risk was not processed by managers by 
explicit consideration of statistical probability outcomes. Instead, while uncertainty is considered 
an important component of risk, managers also focus on the potential harm and damage from 
subjective perspective. For them, the risk represents “amount to lose (or expected to be lost) than 
in terms of moments of the outcome distribution” (March & Shapira 1987, p. 1407). This 
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observation was also supported by a recent grounded theory research where supply risk was 
viewed not only by potential disruptive events to the supply but also their negative impacts on a 
buyer (Zsidisin 2003). These survey results have impacted the later conceptualization of risk, 
especially in scientific disciplines other than finance and insurance (Khan & Burnes 2007; Peck 
2006). 
Possibly cultivated on the above results, later researchers in various disciplines have adopted 
similar conceptualizations of risk which could often be traced back to Yates and Stone (1992b). 
Under this stream of studies, risk refers to the “possibility of loss” or potential losses (Yates & 
Stone 1992b, p. 4). This definition of risk is in line with research in various disciplines including 
political science (e.g. Kobrin 1979), consumer behavior (e.g. Dowling 1986; Dowling & Staelin 
1994), purchasing firm behavior (e.g. Mitchell 1995; Zsidisin, Ragatz, & Melnyk 2005), and 
supply chain/networks (e.g. Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 2010; Hallikas et al 2004; Zsidisin & 
Ellram 2003).  
In short, definitions of risk may be context-dependent (Spekman & Davis 2004). For the purpose 
of this study, I refer to risk as expectation of potential loss. This definition is based on the 
following reasoning. First, as we will examine risks from purchasing managers’ perspective, 
adopting this definition, which stemmed from the manager’s perspective, is justifiable. Second, 
the definition has been usually adopted in organizational buying and supply chain literature 
which is also our context of study (e.g. Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 2010; Zsidisin 2003). Defining 
risk as possibility of loss rather than the variation as in the classical decision theory, therefore, is 
well justified. 
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2.1.2. Objective versus Subjective Risk 
While risk could be viewed as possibility of loss, the debate over the nature of risk about whether 
risk is objective or subjective has not been resolved (Khan & Burnes 2007). On one hand, risk 
could be viewed as objectively calculated based on full knowledge of different outcomes and 
their probabilities (Das & Teng 2001). On the other hand, risk could be viewed from the decision 
maker’s perspective and considered subjective in nature (Dowling 1986; Mitchell 1995). To 
many social scientists, risk cannot be objective because a decision maker may only consider 
several outcomes rather than the whole distribution of outcomes (March & Shapira 1987). He is 
boundedly rational (Williamson 1991). Moreover, even with full knowledge of potential losses, 
interpretation of the likelihood of outcomes occurring and the degree of losses due to the 
outcomes is still inherently subjective (Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 2010; Yates & Stone 1992b). 
What outcome is considered positive by some can be considered negative by others (Yates & 
Stone 1992b). As some scholars noted, the debate over the nature of risk may represent the 
tension between measuring risk ex ante or ex post (Jemison 1987) or could be boiled down to a 
question of to what extent does the past determine the future (Khan & Burnes 2007). 
Because I will examine risk from the manager’s perspective, I take the latter view and consider 
risk as subjective (i.e. perceived risk). Additionally, we usually deal with risk perception rather 
than objective risk when it comes to the decision maker’s behaviors (Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 
2010; Spekman & Davis 2004). Executives also usually base their decisions on a feel of overall 
risk (Shapira 1995) or managers describe projects in terms of overall riskiness (Yates & Stone 
1992a). Thus studying perceived risk, rather than objective one, is important in organizational 
behavioral science and relevant in this particular context.      
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2.1.3. Key Components of Perceived Risk 
There are two components of perceived risk that have been commonly accepted in literature, 
namely uncertainty and adverse consequence (Dowling 1986; Yates & Stone 1992b; Zsidisin, 
Melnyk, & Ragatz 2005). The first component of perceived risk, uncertainty, has been 
represented in some form of likelihood function. Such likelihood can be estimated, subjectively 
assigned, or obtained from statistical models. However, all come to the same result since the 
differences are not in the concept of future likelihood of events but the ways that future is 
assigned various probabilistic weights. In this study, I take the view that perception of 
uncertainty of future states is expressed as a degree from one extreme where there is no basis to 
establish knowledge about probabilities and outcome to the other extreme with complete 
knowledge (Mitchell 1995; Zsidisin 2003). The second component, the adverse consequence, 
represents the magnitude of losses to an organization. There may be different types of losses 
incurred by an organization including financial, performance, psychological, physical, social, 
and time losses (Dowling 1986; Mitchell 1995). 
The question of how these two components will work together to become the overall risk has not 
been answered unanimously. A group of scholars often use the multiplicity of the two 
components because the absence of either one may eliminate risk (cf. Dowling 1986). For others, 
however, the two components are formative (e.g. Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 2010; March & 
Shapira 1987). This is because some theorists note the difficulty in equating the risk of high 
probability and low magnitude loss with the one of low probability and high magnitude (Ellis, 
Henry, & Shockley 2010). Thus, they suggest that the likelihood of outcomes and their values 
enter into calculations of risk independently rather than as their products (March & Shapira 
1987). Still, others consider the two components to be independent and postulate that they would 
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be considered in two successive stages of assessment (Yates & Stone 1992a), where the 
likelihood of an event occurring may be evaluated first before an assessment of the impact of the 
event occurring is made. In fact, a recent survey by Zsidisin with supply chain managers seems 
to support this third view because the managers in the survey seemed to consider supply risk first 
as the possibility of an incident associated with inbound supply and then as its outcomes 
resulting in losses to the buyer (cf. Zsidisin 2003).  
Concurring with the third view, definition of perceived supplier risk in this study focuses more 
on the possibility of unavailability of sourced item than its resulting losses. Thus the concept of 
perceived risk here may bear a close relationship with the concepts of fear (Mitchell 1995), lack 
of confidence (Christopher & Lee 2004), and the feeling of uncertainty, discomfort, and/or  
anxiety (Dowling & Staelin 1994) over the availability of sourced item. Our definition here also 
matches with definition of risk in various literatures including international business (e.g. 
Mascarenhas 1982; Werner, Brouthers, & Brouthers 1996), consumer behavior (e.g. Dowling & 
Staelin 1994), and especially in supply chain management, the context of this study (e.g. Chopra 
& Sodhi 2004; Harland, Brenchley, & Walker 2003; Tang 2006a). 
2.1.4. Triggers of Perceived Supplier Risks 
The supply chain literature has provided different taxonomies/typologies of risks in supply 
chain/network (e.g. Chopra & Sodhi 2004; Hallikas, Virolainen, & Tuominen 2002; Spekman & 
Davis 2004). In general, risks in supply chain could be classified into demand risks and supply 
risks if we take a manufacturer as the dividing position in a supply chain. This study focuses on 
the supply side, and more specifically in the relationship between a buying firm and one of its 
suppliers (i.e. supplier risk), rather than on the demand side. 
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Within the supply side, however, there may be different types of risk. For the purpose of this 
paper, I adopt a recent classification of supply risks by Spekman and Davis (2004) which is 
based on the triggers of risk. Under this classification, risks include (1) business disruption risk, 
where disruptions are from the events such as failures by the suppliers and/or in logistic 
operations; (2) exogenous disruption risk, where disruptions are from events such as natural 
disasters and political changes that impact supplier performance in providing inputs to the 
buying firm; (3) opportunism risk, where risk comes from opportunistic behaviors by the 
suppliers; (4) system security risk, where the risk arises from activities which cause problems in 
system security; and (5) social corporate risk, where risk is rooted in the actions by suppliers that 
taint the social responsibility image or reputation of the buying firm. This dissertation develops a 
theoretical framework with regards to the first two types of risk triggers. However, note that for a 
purchasing firm, major disruptions to its supplier will only matter when they influence the supply 
to the firm. In another words, the exogenous disruptions to the supplier could only become a risk 
to the buyer when they cascade the effects via the supplier onto the buyer (Wagner & Bode 
2006). We, therefore, can combine the two risk triggers for a common supplier risk.   
Various internal and external types of disruptions have been recorded in literature (e.g. Chopra & 
Sodhi 2004; Hallikas, Virolainen, & Tuominen 2002; Zsidisin & Ellram 2003). Table 2-1 
provides a summary for different types of supplier risks identified in literature. In particular, for 
example, risks due to business disruption events may come from the failures of suppliers and/or 
in logistic performance that may cause a supplier delays or breakdowns in providing goods and 
services to the buying firm. Any problems in flows of goods/materials, information, and money 
between a buying firm and its suppliers could result in these risks (Spekman & Davis 2004). 
Different supplier failures have been identified in the literature, including inability of suppliers to 
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deal with volumes and mixed requirement changes resulting in a stock-out from suppliers; 
inability of suppliers to meet with technological development in the market; quality-related risks 
from failures of suppliers to maintain capital equipment or damages that occur in transit or lack 
of supplier training in quality principles and techniques; price increase risk when suppliers 
increase good price due to the increase in price of supply inputs or currency fluctuations; logistic 
risks from problems in shipping, transportation, or delivery performance leading to delays or 
breakdown in focal firm operation; and failures of suppliers due to their financial instability or 
insolvency or as they are vertically integrated by a direct competitor of a focal firm (Hallikas, 
Virolainen, & Tuominen 2002; Kleindorfer & Saad 2005; Spekman & Davis 2004; Wagner & 
Bode 2008, 2006; Zsidisin 2003; Zsidisin & Ellram 2003). 
A more recently noticeable category of risk triggers is major exogenous disruptions. Different 
major triggers have been recorded in the literature, including natural catastrophic disasters such 
as volcanoes, tsunamis, earthquakes, and fires. They may also include major political and social 
events such as labor disputes, war, terrorism, and political changes (e.g. Chopra & Sodhi 2004; 
Kleindorfer & Saad 2005; Knemeyer, Zinn, & Eroglu 2009; Kobrin 1979; Tang 2006a, 2006b; 
Wagner & Bode 2008, 2006; Zsidisin, Melnyk, & Ragatz 2005; Zsidisin, Ragatz, & Melnyk 
2005). These major disruption events are exogenous events which may occur to a supplier. For a 
buying firm, the critical issue is if such events can cascade their effects on the firm via impacting 
its suppliers. 
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Table 2-1. Triggers of Supplier Risk 
Categories Risk Sources/Triggers Articles/Authors 
Risks due to 
Business 
Disruption 
Events 
Volumes and mixed requirement change risks that lead 
to possible stock-out from suppliers. 
(Zsidisin & Ellram 2003) 
(Kleindorfer & Saad 2005) 
(Zsidisin 2003) 
(Spekman & Davis 2004) 
Technological change risk that is due to the inability of 
suppliers to meet with technological development to 
provide the needed item. 
(Zsidisin & Ellram 2003) 
(Wagner & Bode 2006) 
(Wagner & Bode 2008) 
(Kleindorfer & Saad 2005) 
(Zsidisin 2003) 
(Spekman & Davis 2004) 
Quality-related risks include failure of suppliers to 
maintain capital equipment, damage that occurs in transit, 
and lack of supplier training in quality principles and 
techniques. 
(Zsidisin & Ellram 2003) 
(Wagner & Bode 2006) 
(Wagner & Bode 2008) 
(Kleindorfer & Saad 2005) 
(Zsidisin 2003) 
(Spekman & Davis 2004) 
Price increase risk because of market changes such as 
increase in price paid for supplier inputs and currency 
fluctuations. 
(Zsidisin & Ellram 2003) 
(Wagner & Bode 2006) 
(Wagner & Bode 2008) 
(Hallikas, Virolainen, & 
Tuominen 2002) 
(Kleindorfer & Saad 2005) 
(Chopra & Sodhi 2004) 
(Zsidisin 2003) 
(Spekman & Davis 2004) 
Logistics risk due to problems in shipping, transportation, 
or distribution methods and lead time, delivery 
performance. 
(Zsidisin & Ellram 2003) 
(Hallikas, Virolainen, & 
Tuominen 2002) 
(Kleindorfer & Saad 2005) 
(Zsidisin 2003) 
(Spekman & Davis 2004) 
Other supplier business risks: various events that affect 
the continuity of the supplier and result in the temporary 
or permanent perturbation or termination of the buyer–
supplier relationship. Example: financial instability of 
suppliers and when a supplier is vertically integrated by a 
direct competitor of the customer firm. 
(Wagner & Bode 2006) 
(Wagner & Bode 2008) 
(Kleindorfer & Saad 2005) 
(Zsidisin 2003) 
(Spekman & Davis 2004) 
Risk due to 
Exogenous 
Disruption 
Events 
Natural disruption risks: difficult to predict but when 
occur will have immediate and significant impacts on 
performance such as natural disasters and other 
catastrophic events. 
(Zsidisin, Melnyk, & Ragatz 
2005) 
(Zsidisin, Ragatz, & Melnyk 
2005) 
(Wagner & Bode 2006) 
(Wagner & Bode 2008) 
(Kleindorfer & Saad 2005) 
(Tang 2006b) 
(Knemeyer, Zinn, & Eroglu 2009) 
(Chopra & Sodhi 2004) 
Political risks from political events such as government 
acts or constraints put on firms. 
(Kobrin 1979) 
(Kleindorfer & Saad 2005) 
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2.2. Gap in Supplier Risk Literature 
Literature on supplier risk in supply chains has been strong on descriptive and prescriptive 
accounts.  For example, a substantial number of articles described or prescribed risk management 
process (see for example Giunipero & Eltantawy 2004; Hallikas et al 2004; Khan & Burnes 
2007; Knemeyer, Zinn, & Eroglu 2009; Manuj & Mentzer 2008). The common format for all the 
articles is to start with descriptions of risk in supply chains and then recommended different 
strategies for mitigating the risk. On the other hand, there have been an increasing number of 
modeling papers on disruption risk in supply chain (see Snyder et al 2010 for a review). Though 
useful, such papers usually address only one or several types of disruptions, and some of these 
have been conducted in an experimental setting. Thus there is a gap in behavioral studies on 
supplier risks and risks in supply chain with regards to disruptions.  
Within this research stream, there is scant empirical evidence from behavioral studies on the 
outcomes of risk rather than on why and how the perception of risk is developed (Ellis, Henry, & 
Shockley 2010). Some examples include Zsidisin and Ellram (2003),who found that perceived 
supplier risks could result in purchasing firms engaging in different types of risk mitigation 
strategies. When a purchasing firm perceives high risk from its supplier, it invests more in 
behavior-based strategies including implementing supplier certification and quality management 
programs, developing target costing with suppliers, and launching different supplier development 
programs (Zsidisin & Ellram 2003). It has also been found that lack of confidence in the supply 
chain could result in excessive buffering activities by all players, resulting in inefficiency along 
the chain (Lee & Padmanabhan 1997; Lee, Padmanabhan, & Seungjin 2004; Lee, Padmanabhan, 
& Wang 1997). And finally, perceived supplier risk has been found to associate with higher 
search activities for alternative suppliers (Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 2010).  
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In fact, Ellis et al. (2010) could be the only exception that provided some initial evidence on 
several factors that lead to perceived supplier risks with regards to disruptions. The explained 
variance for this model, however, is relatively low (nearly 12 percent for the uncertainty 
component of risk) and two factors that were found to be related to the uncertainty component of 
risk are technological uncertainty and market thinness. These factors are environmental or 
structural factors that a firm may not be able to control. So far, no actionable factors that a buyer 
can develop and control have been identified to mitigate the risk proactively.  
To fill in the gap, in this dissertation I examine some key information-based capability factors 
that explain the development of perceived supplier risks at the organizational level. The logic 
here is that if we are to mitigate supplier risk proactively, we need to identify some key 
actionable factors that help mitigate the risk. Such key factors should be information-related 
because risk is about uncertainty. Moreover, if disruption risk could be considered an indicator of 
performance (i.e. reverse of high performance), capabilities can be linked to risk under the 
resource-based or relational views (Barney 1991; Dyer & Singh 1998), which I’ll discuss in 
more detail in the next section. 
2.3. Theoretical Framework for Supplier Risk 
In order to examine our model under the resource-based view (RBV) and relational view, one 
assumption needs to be made: disruption risk is a reverse indicator of performance. In another 
words, high risk of disruptions should mean the likelihood of high performance will be low. This 
assumption can be justified given the recent empirical evidence. In particular, in a series of 
empirical studies, Henricks and Singhal examined several hundreds of supply chain disruptions 
reported in the Wall Street Journal and Down Jones News Service (Hendricks & Singhal 2005a, 
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2003, 2005b). They found that the companies experiencing minor to major disruptions in supply 
chain faced with significant declines in sales growth, stock return, and shareholder wealth. 
Moreover, such effects tended to linger for a long time, at least two years after the disruptions. 
These findings are also consistent with previous findings that the impact of a disruption on 
shareholder wealth was a sharp decrease of almost eight percent, and a recovery time, if possible, 
was at least 50 trading days (Knight & Pretty 1996). Thus, as an indicator of performance, risk 
could be examined under the RBV and relational view to identify its link to some key 
resources/capabilities. 
This dissertation establishes itself in the tradition of RBV and the relational view. In particular, I 
view sources of competitive advantage as the resources and/or capabilities that a firm possesses. 
Different from the traditional neo-classical economic view, the assumption behind my thesis 
rests on the RBV contention that firm resources may be heterogeneous and immobile (Barney 
1991; Wernerfelt 1984). Therefore resource and capability differentials between firms lead to 
different levels of risk exposure. As the RBV postulates, I argue that sustainability of risk 
performance of a company (as a source of competitive advantage) is driven by its resources and 
capabilities that meet some key conditions including: valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-
substitutable (Barney 1991). Thus three supply network capabilities examined in this study, 
absorptive capacity, IT integration, and visibility, determine and sustain competitive advantage 
for a firm to the extent that they can meet the above conditions. This view parallels the central 
theoretical lens in the marketing and inter-firm literature under which researchers examined the 
links between market-based assets and capabilities (e.g. Day 1994; Hunt & Morgan 1995; 
Srivastava, Fahey, & Christensen 2001; Srivastava, Shervani, & Fahey 1998) and supply chain 
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capabilities (e.g. R. Klein & Rai 2009; Wu et al 2006) in terms of marketing, financial, and 
relationship-specific performance.  
More importantly, I propose that the sources for competitive advantages not only lie in the 
resources and capabilities developed within a firm but also in those that are embedded in a 
dyadic or network relationship of the firm (Dyer & Singh 1998). Extended from the original 
RBV which recognized firm-specific barriers to imitation and advocated for firms to control the 
critical resources (Barney 1991; Wernerfelt 1984), I see the resources and capabilities as being 
enabled by value-adding initiatives facilitated by inter-firm routines under the relational view 
(Dyer & Singh 1998). Thus the dyadic and network capabilities, including absorptive capacity, 
IT integration, and visibility, are relationship-specific capabilities, which are enabled and natured 
in a trading-partner relationship that can result in high performance in terms of low supplier risk 
for a buying firm. This view parallels the theoretical perspective in various recent inter-firm 
studies (cf. R. Klein & Rai 2009). 
The relational view is particularly applicable here because the concept of supplier risk in this 
study is examined within a relationship between a buyer and a seller. Moreover, as discussed in 
the previous sections, the key element of our concept of supplier risk is uncertainty, which is 
information-related. Thus the natural logic is to identify the information-based capabilities that 
can be linked to supplier risk, three of which are of particular interest and have recently been 
stressed in inter-firm literature: visibility, absorptive capacity, and IT integration. In the next 
sections, I discuss each of the capabilities in more detail.        
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2.4. Visibility 
Visibility is an important relationship-specific information-based capability. Even though this 
concept has been a popular buzzword the term remains elusive, especially in supply chain 
literature (Barratt & Oke 2007). Recently, researchers have been calling for a better 
understanding of the concept (e.g. Wang & Wei 2007) and an untangling of its workings in 
practice (e.g. Straub et al 2002; Wang & Wei 2007). In particular, this concept has usually been 
used interchangeably with other popular notions such as information sharing (Barratt & Oke 
2007; Swaminathan & Tayur 2003) and transparency (Lamming, Caldwell, & Harrison 2004; 
Lamming et al 2001). The visibility concept in this dissertation is built on an emerging concept 
of transparency (Lamming, Caldwell, & Harrison 2004; Lamming et al 2001) that goes beyond 
but takes information sharing as a baseline prerequisite. Thus in the following sections, I 
introduce the concept of visibility, its attributes and information content, and a review of 
literature related to the concept for its potential antecedents and outcomes. 
2.4.1. Visibility Definition and Attributes 
In our discussion, a buyer’s visibility into its supplier (hereafter visibility) refers to the extent to 
which a focal buying firm is able to access timely, accurate, and relevant information about its 
supplier’s operational and strategic issues. We maintain that visibility is a key relationship-
specific capability of the organization and is distinct from information sharing because of the 
following attributes.  
First, extant literature in inter-organizational studies has stressed the importance of sharing 
information among partners to resolve conflict and enhance performance (e.g. Frazier et al 2009; 
R. Klein & Rai 2009; Wu et al 2006). Information sharing here has usually been understood as 
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“the degree to which each party in a channel relationship discloses information to facilitate the 
other party’s activities” (Heide & Miner 1992, p. 275). The visibility concept in this dissertation 
benefits from this stream of literature and requires information exchange as a baseline 
prerequisite. This is because for a firm to have access to the partner’s information, the 
information needs to be shared and obtained from its external sources. 
It should be noted that the concept of visibility here does not focus on the mechanistic flows of 
information sharing but the outcome of such flows, which is the access that the firm have to its 
partner’s information. Thus I will not consider the flow characteristics in a more mechanistic 
view, such as bi-directional versus unidirectional, formal versus informal, direct influence versus 
indirect influence, and frequency of contacts among inter-firm members (Mohr, Fisher, & Nevin 
1999; Mohr & Nevin 1990). Instead, the concept of visibility here only stresses the degree of 
access that a firm has over its partner’s information. This is because even though important and 
sometimes inevitable, the flows of information from a trading partner may not be the only 
determinant of the access to the partner’s information (Frazier et al 2009; Frishammar & Sven 
Åke 2005). 
The second attribute of visibility is transparency, an emerging concept that underlines and 
sometimes supplants visibility. Transparency in supply relationships has appeared in several 
works by Lamming and his co-authors (Lamming, Caldwell, & Harrison 2004; Lamming et al 
2001). Under this perspective, transparency is defined as “the creation, nurture, and delivery of 
value, for the benefit, and thus continued existence, of both parties” (Lamming et al 2001, p. 7). 
The critical point that makes the transparency an attribute of visibility is the requirement for 
information efficacy. This is because transparency here does not assume perfect access to 
information and knowledge. In fact, perfect clarity may never exist, and too much information 
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may limit transparency (Lamming, Caldwell, & Harrison 2004). Empirical evidence has already 
showed that too much information may lead to the problem of information overload (e.g. Gosain, 
Malhotra, & El Sawy 2004). Transparency therefore requires that the partners exchange only the 
relevant information which, and more importantly, is needed for mutual benefits. The mutual 
benefits here are considered within the realm of partners’ abilities to create, nurture, and deliver 
values for their customers rather than solely focusing on cost. 
For the above reasons, in this study I argue that for partners to obtain benefits from information 
and knowledge, visibility requires information to be both potentially accessible and content-wise 
efficacious. In particular, the concept of visibility in this dissertation focuses on three regularly-
examined efficacious elements: accuracy, relevance, and timeliness (e.g. Hult et al 2006; Kim, 
Cavusgil, & Calantone 2006; Mohr & Sohi 1995), which have seemed to be relatively easily 
discerned by business managers.   
2.4.2. Information Content of Visibility 
Extant literature has examined different types of information shared among trading partners. 
Some authors even attempt to categorize distinctive types of information that would be shared 
among the partners at different degrees (e.g. Hultman & Axelsson 2007; Wareham et al 2005), 
thus possibly resulting in different types of visibility. To date, however, the distinction of such 
categories lacks empirical support. For example, Hultman and Axelsson (2007) built on the 
works of Lamming et al. (2004; 2005; 2001) and some case studies to propose a typology of 
transparency including cost transparency, supply transparency, organizational transparency, and 
technological transparency. This typology, however, may not be generalizable because (1) it is 
not theory-based and is built on case studies of only two Swedish manufacturing firms, and (2)  
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the main focus of the typology is on “descriptions of transparency enabled by information 
technology” (Hultman & Axelsson 2007, p. 627) even though the authors claimed that it could 
be applicable to transparency in general. It should be noted that while important, IT is not the 
only channel for communication. In fact, non-IT communication channels, including face-to-
face, has been shown to be more effective in exchanging complex and hard-to-codify knowledge 
(e.g. Bresman, Birkinshaw, & Nobel 2010). Thus this typology needs to be exposed to further 
empirical testing to confirm its usefulness 
Similarly, even though built on extant theories, the framework by Wareham et al. (2005), which 
proposed two types of information shared, including strategic and operational, has not been 
tested empirically. As noted by the authors, operational information includes data that can be 
related to specific process or transaction pertinent to the planning and execution of operations 
(Wareham et al 2005). For example, operational data pertains to the process of deploying input 
resources to produce products and services including production, capacity, and inventory 
schedules and plan (e.g. R. Klein & Rai 2009; Noordewier, John, & Nevin 1990). Strategic 
information, on the other hand, is usually characterized by a longer term perspective and could 
span cognition about the external environment, scarce and valuable resources, and other 
capabilities (Wareham et al 2005). Example includes information such as cost structure and 
margins (e.g. R. Klein & Rai 2009; Lamming et al 2001), firm competitive positioning, and 
planned actions in the market (e.g. R. Klein & Rai 2009). However, the authors also 
acknowledged that even though two types of information can be used in managerial decision 
making in different manners, “the difference between the two is often a function of aggregation 
where operational data can be combined to form strategic data” (Wareham et al 2005, p. 207). 
The distinction between the two thus may not be discernable by practicing managers. Moreover, 
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this framework was exposed to only one case study by the authors and therefore has not yet been 
proved for their generalizability.  
Thus in this study, I examine both types of information, strategic and operational, as they are 
theory-based concepts. The distinction between the two and thus the resulting difference between 
two possible types of visibility, however, will be subjected to empirical evidence.  
In short, visibility in this dissertation includes two key attributes: the access of information 
regarding a trading partner and the efficacy of the information obtained. I examine both 
operational and strategic types of information when measuring visibility. The next section 
discusses a theoretical framework for examining the outcome and antecedents of visibility.  
2.4.3. Theoretical Framework for Visibility 
Information sharing and visibility have been studied under different theories in vertical inter-firm 
studies, including the channel literature (e.g. James C. Anderson & Narus 1990; Bello, Chelariu, 
& Zhang 2003; Frazier et al 2009; Griffith, Myers, & Harvey 2006; Heide & Miner 1992; 
McEvily & Marcus 2005; Noordewier, John, & Nevin 1990) and supply chain studies (e.g. 
Gustin, Daugherty, & Stank 1995; Kim, Cavusgil, & Calantone 2006; R. Klein & Rai 2009; Lee 
& Padmanabhan 1997; Lee, Padmanabhan, & Seungjin 2004; Lee, Padmanabhan, & Wang 1997; 
Lee, So, & Tang 2000; Sahin & Robinson 2002, 2005; Wareham et al 2005; Wu et al 2006; Zhou 
& Benton Jr 2007). Under these streams of research, the presence of information sharing or 
exchange is considered to facilitate better relationships, enhance cooperation (James C. 
Anderson & Narus 1990), improve  joint-problem solving (McEvily & Marcus 2005), eliminate 
the agency problems (Griffith, Myers, & Harvey 2006), and as a result, enhance competitive 
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advantages such as superior purchasing performance (Noordewier, John, & Nevin 1990) and 
economic performance (Bello, Chelariu, & Zhang 2003; Bello & Gilliland 1997). 
In addition to the above conflict resolving view of information sharing, the supply chain 
literature also recognizes the importance of information sharing in enhancing operations and 
working of the chain or network structure. In this stream of studies, information is considered to 
be instrumental to reducing variability, integrating the structure, and enhancing efficiency. With 
those goals in mind scholars stressed the importance of making information available to all 
parties in a supply network (Wareham et al 2005). The information could be the demand 
information that downstream parties share with upstream partners (Lee & Padmanabhan 1997; 
Lee, Padmanabhan, & Seungjin 2004; Lee, Padmanabhan, & Wang 1997; Lee, So, & Tang 2000) 
or supply information including inventory and cost structure that suppliers share with 
downstream parties (Sahin & Robinson 2002, 2005). Sharing upstream and downstream 
information provides multiple benefits for the relationship including mitigating bullwhip effect 
in supply chain (Lee & Padmanabhan 1997; Lee, Padmanabhan, & Seungjin 2004; Lee, 
Padmanabhan, & Wang 1997; Lee, So, & Tang 2000), facilitating success of logistic system 
integration (Gustin, Daugherty, & Stank 1995), reducing total costs for better supply chain 
performance (Sahin & Robinson 2002, 2005), and enhancing market and operational 
performance for the whole chain (Wareham et al 2005).  
Table 2-2 provides a summary of the representative articles examining information sharing and 
visibility. It should be noted that no articles up to present examined visibility for a firm into its 
partner. Moreover, most empirical studies to date have been dealing with the concept of 
information sharing. Only recent theoretical advances have discussed the concept of transparency 
and visibility (Lamming, Caldwell, & Harrison 2004; Lamming et al 2005; Lamming et al 2001) 
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but empirical evidence has not shed much light on the concept. Thus this study adds to the inter-
firm literature by examining the relationship-specific concept of visibility in its links to supplier 
risk and other capabilities. Two streams of research with their theoretical perspectives are 
particularly applicable to visibility here. In particular, one line of research has focused on the 
consequences of visibility. In the second, antecedents to visibility can be explored.  
On the outcome side, sharing information among partners has long been recognized as an 
important part of prominent theories for dyadic relationships. The marks of cooperative 
information exchange and sharing can be seen in theories that include dependence theory 
(Pfeffer & Salancik 1978), agency theories (Bergen, Dutta, & Walker Jr 1992; Eisenhardt 1989), 
the resource-based view (Barney 1991; Wernerfelt 1984), and the relational view (Dyer & Singh 
1998). Considering the link between visibility and risk, the final two theoretical views, which 
have been widely applied more recently, can be drawn on.  
In particular, under the resource-based view, possession of information from a trading partner 
can help a firm gain competitive advantage because such information is valuable and can help 
the firm reconfigure its operation for the best performance (Barney 1991; Wu et al 2006). Such 
information is usually sensitive and proprietary and thus the possession of it is difficult to 
imitate. Gaining access to a supplier’s information therefore may help a buying firm obtain 
competitive advantage by lowering risk from the supplier. More importantly, such capability (i.e. 
visibility) may only be developed within a relationship. Such relationship-specific capability thus 
can result in the relational rents (Dyer & Singh 1998) which are accrued only to the partners in a 
relationship, beyond the ones that any single firm could obtain alone (Dyer & Nobeoka 2000). 
Thus reduction in supplier risk is the relational rent that I examine in this dissertation.  
28 
 
 
 
 
Table 2-2. Representative Articles Examined Information Sharing and Visibility 
Level of 
Analysis 
Terms/ 
Aliases of 
Construct 
Efficacy of 
Information 
Examined 
Content of 
Information 
Examined 
Definition and Dimensions Antecedents/ Outcomes Representative 
Authors, Year 
Information 
Sharing at 
Chain/ 
Network 
Level 
Information 
availability 
No Operational The degree to which information is available 
or exchanged within a distribution system. 
Lead to 
Success of logistic system 
integration 
(Gustin, Daugherty, 
& Stank 1995) 
Information 
Sharing 
No Operational Information shared among upstream to 
downstream. The focus is on sharing demand 
information to upstream partners. 
Lead to 
Lower bullwhip effects 
(Lee & 
Padmanabhan 
1997; Lee, 
Padmanabhan, & 
Seungjin 2004; 
Lee, Padmanabhan, 
& Wang 1997; Lee, 
So, & Tang 2000) 
Information 
Sharing 
N/A Operational 
 
The timing and specific data shared ranged 
from only sharing the immediate 
replenishment order to sharing all POS, 
inventory, and cost data along the supply 
chain. 
Lead to 
Higher Supply Chain 
Performance (reduce costs) 
(Sahin & Robinson 
2002, 2005) 
Information 
Sharing 
No Operational 
Strategic 
The availability of information shared within 
network including two separate types: 
- Strategic information is typically 
characterized by a longer temporal 
perspective and is not related to specific 
process operations. 
- Operational Information Sharing includes 
data that can be related to the planning or 
execution of a specific process or transaction. 
Lead to  
- Market Performance 
- Operational Performance 
(respectively) 
 
(Wareham et al 
2005) 
Information 
Sharing at 
Focal Firm 
Level 
Information to 
supplier 
N/A Operational Information provided to supplier. Lead to  
Higher Purchasing 
performance 
(Noordewier, John, 
& Nevin 1990) 
Monitoring of 
supplier 
No Operational  Leads to  
Higher Purchasing 
performance 
(Noordewier, John, 
& Nevin 1990) 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
Level of 
Analysis 
Terms/ 
Aliases of 
Construct 
Efficacy of 
Information 
Examined 
Content of 
Information 
Examined 
Definition and Dimensions Antecedents/ Outcomes Representative 
Authors, Year 
Information 
Sharing at 
Focal Firm 
Level 
(continued) 
Information 
Sharing 
No Operational 
Strategic 
The degree to which each party discloses 
information that may facilitate the other 
party’s activities (Heide & Miner 1992, p. 
275). 
Leads to  
Better joint-problem 
solving and acquisition of 
competitive capabilities. 
(McEvily & 
Marcus 2005) 
(Heide & Miner 
1992) 
Sharing of 
information  
N/A N/A The sharing of generalized information about 
the firm, its product, and its customers 
Anteceded by 
Commitment 
Lead to  
Problem Solution 
(Griffith, Myers, & 
Harvey 2006) 
Strategic 
information 
flow 
No Strategic The flow of information from:  
buyer to supplier 
supplier to buyer 
Anteceded by 
Focal firm’s Trust, 
Dependence, IT 
customization 
Lead to 
Higher Buyer and Supplier 
Relationship-specific 
Performance 
(R. Klein & Rai 
2009) 
Distributor 
Sharing of 
Strategic 
Information 
No Strategic Strategic information is processed and 
retained data within a distributor organization 
that have implications for firms’ long-range 
decision making including external and 
internal information. 
Sharing of strategic internal 
information is 
anteceded by 
Distributor trust, 
Dependence Asymmetry 
favoring distributor, 
Specific investment by 
distributor and by supplier. 
 
Sharing of strategic 
external information is 
anteceded by 
Dependence Asymmetry 
favoring distributor, 
Specific investment by 
distributor and by supplier. 
(Frazier et al 2009) 
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Level of 
Analysis 
Terms/ 
Aliases of 
Construct 
Efficacy of 
Information 
Examined 
Content of 
Information 
Examined 
Definition and Dimensions Antecedents/ Outcomes Representative 
Authors, Year 
Visibility at 
Channel/ 
Chain/ 
Network 
Level 
 
 
Information 
Exchange 
Yes N/A Formal and informal sharing of meaningful 
and timely information between firms.  
Information Exchange is a dimension of 
Relationalism (MacNeil 1980) and therefore 
measured at the expectation/norms level. 
Anteceded by 
Manufacturer’s dependence 
and other dyadic 
antecedents, 
Leads to  
Channel Performance 
(James C. 
Anderson & Narus 
1990; Bello, 
Chelariu, & Zhang 
2003; Heide & 
John 1992) 
Information 
Exchange 
No IT system Information exchange refers to the ability of a 
firm to share knowledge with its supply chain 
partners in an effective and efficient manner. 
The focus here, however, is on information 
system as a whole. 
Lead to  
Marketing and Financial 
Performance 
(Wu et al 2006) 
adapted from (Amit 
& Schoemaker 
1993; Bharadwaj 
2000; Collis 1994) 
Transparency Yes Operational 
Strategic 
 
The creation, nurture, and delivery of value, 
for the benefit, and thus continued existence, 
of both parties. 
Transparency is achieved through two-way 
exchange of sensitive data for specific 
purposes of improvements in the dyad itself. 
Customers usually ask suppliers for 
information about process factors, largely 
represented by costs (as proxies for process 
times, physical space allocation, management 
superstructure, communications requirements, 
etc.) 
Anteceded by 
Interdependence rather than 
trust,  
Leads to  
higher performance 
(competitive advantage or 
created values) 
(Lamming, 
Caldwell, & 
Harrison 2004; 
Lamming et al 
2005; Lamming et 
al 2001) 
Information 
exchange 
Yes IT system The sharing of knowledge with channel 
partners to serve downstream customers 
effectively and efficiently. Such knowledge 
would include any changes in the business 
environment, such as market and customer 
preferences.  
Dimensions of information exchange include 
timeliness, accuracy, efficacy, completeness, 
and credibility of information. 
Anteceded by  
IT System Integration and 
Advancement 
Lead to 
Responsiveness, 
Coordination, and Market 
Performance 
(Kim, Cavusgil, & 
Calantone 2006) 
Supply chain 
visibility 
Yes Operational The extent to which actors within a supply 
chain have access to or share information 
which they consider as key or useful to their 
operations and which they consider will be of 
mutual benefit. 
The information needs to be accurate, trusted, 
timely, current, useful, and in-a-readily-usable 
format. 
Anteceded by Information 
Sharing  
Leads to  
Enhanced Performance  
(Barratt & Oke 
2007) 
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Level of 
Analysis 
Terms/ 
Aliases of 
Construct 
Efficacy of 
Information 
Examined 
Content of 
Information 
Examined 
Definition and Dimensions Antecedents/ Outcomes Representative 
Authors, Year 
Visibility at 
Channel/ 
Chain/ 
Network 
Level 
(continued) 
Information 
Visibility 
Yes Operational 
 
The degree to which supply chain partners 
have on-hand information related to both 
demand and supply for planning and control 
management. Two dimensions are measured: 
reliability and timeliness of information. 
Anteceded by 
Relational Governance and 
Virtual (IT) Integration 
Leads to 
Supply Chain Offering 
Flexibility 
(Wang & Wei 
2007) 
Information 
Sharing 
Yes Operational 
 
Higher order constructs of information 
content (manufacturing and customer), info 
sharing tech support, and quality of info 
sharing. 
Lead to 
Effectiveness of Supply 
Chain Practices (JIT) 
(Zhou & Benton Jr 
2007) 
 
* N/A: not available or not applicable 
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On the antecedent side of visibility, a second stream of research examined different factors that 
could lead to information sharing and visibility. Contrary to the perspective of neoclassical 
economics, this stream of research started with the assumption that information is imperfect and 
access to information is limited and costly in the real world (Stiglitz 2000). Thus many of the 
classical economic results require adjustments (Stiglitz 2000). In particular, when the simplifying 
assumption of perfect information is removed, the economic treatment and analysis of 
information becomes formidable. Such a challenge starts from non-tradable nature of 
information that in turn makes it hard to be priced in the market. Unlike other goods, information 
presents many characteristics of public goods as non-exclusive and non-rivalrous. That means it 
is usually difficult to exclude others from benefits of the information and it is not depletable with 
use (Stiglitz 2000). Under these conditions marginal cost of information approaches to zero with 
which free riding problem arises. Moreover information sharing is irreversible because when 
information is shared, it could not be taken back (Lamming, Caldwell, & Harrison 2004; 
Lamming et al 2005). These complications present big challenges in analyzing appropriation of 
returns to investment in information and knowledge (Stiglitz 2000) and the motivation for one to 
share information with others. Thus this stream of research has pointed to the challenges in 
transferring knowledge and information and thus the cost side of gaining visibility.   
Under this stream of research, two sides of antecedents to information sharing have been 
theorized. On the softer side, social and human factors have been evoked. As information sharing 
involved a sender and a receiver in its process, such factors include the characteristics of the 
sender and the receiver as well as their relationship environment. For example, such factors 
include the sender’s capability to interpret and transfer the information or knowledge, the 
receiver’s capability to interpret and absorb the information, and the relationship sentiment over 
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their relationship (Szulanski 1996; von Hippel 1994). On the harder side, however, more 
mechanistic or vehicular factors are involved. Research under this stream, for example, usually 
evoked factors related to channels for transferring information (e.g. Mohr & Nevin 1990) and IT 
systems or environment for information exchange (e.g. Tippins & Sohi 2003; Wu et al 2006). 
Because visibility involves access to the information to be shared from a partner, to represent the 
two sides I examine absorptive capacity and IT integration as the antecedents to visibility in this 
dissertation. I turn to the discussions on each concept next. 
2.5. Absorptive Capacity 
On the softer side of antecedents to visibility, absorptive capacity in this dissertation can be 
defined as the ability of a firm to value and assimilate the external knowledge and information 
related to its trading partner. In this case, it is the ability of the buying firm to absorb knowledge 
and information regarding its supplier. The following sections will be discussions on the concept 
definition and its components. 
2.5.1. Absorptive Capacity as a Relationship-Specific Construct 
Most studies related to absorptive capacity have cited and defined it with regard to the original 
definition by Cohen and Levinthal (cf. Zahra & George 2002). Under this stream of research, the 
concept of absorptive capacity can be defined as a firm’s ability “to recognize the value of new, 
external knowledge, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (W. M. Cohen & Levinthal 
1990, p. 128). This definition, however, may contain in itself at least two components which are 
distinctive (cf. Zahra & George 2002). The first component includes the ability to value and to 
assimilate external knowledge (W. M. Cohen & Levinthal 1990; Lane & Lubatkin 1998). This 
component, however, does not guarantee the ability to exploit the knowledge acquired for 
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innovative products and services (Zahra & George 2002). The second one captures this latter 
aspect and is a function of the abilities to transform and exploit (Zahra & George 2002) or 
simply apply the new knowledge to commercial end (W. M. Cohen & Levinthal 1990). These 
two components are distinctive but may correlate with each other because the former can be seen 
as an antecedent to the latter (Zahra & George 2002). 
The concept of absorptive capacity in this dissertation focuses on the first component of 
recognizing the value and assimilating external knowledge and information. Focusing on this 
component is appropriate because we do not examine innovation outcomes in this study which 
has usually been associated with the second component of absorptive capacity (e.g. George et al 
2001). Moreover, while absorptive capacity has been widely studied and linked to various 
performance outcomes, the studies have usually reflected a firm’s capacity to apply received 
knowledge to the commercial ends (i.e. the second component) with disproportionately less 
attention paid to the capacity to value and assimilate the knowledge (i.e. the first component) 
(Zahra & George 2002). 
It should also be noted that the construct of absorptive capacity in this dissertation is a 
relationship-specific one. I argue that a firm may work with different trading partners under 
different environments or at least at different stages of a relationship. Thus it may have better 
absorptive capacity toward one partner than the others. Conceptualizing absorptive capacity as 
specific to a relationship or trading partner will be more accurate. The definition of absorptive 
capacity in this dissertation thus bears similarity with the concept of relative rather than the 
absolute absorptive capacity (Rebolledo, Halley, & Nagati 2009). 
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2.5.2. Dimensions of Absorptive Capacity 
While researchers seem to agree on the definition of absorptive capacity, different dimensions of 
the capacity have been proposed and operationalized. For example, in innovation studies, 
research and development (R&D) spending has usually been used as a proxy for absorptive 
capacity (e.g. W. M. Cohen & Levinthal 1990; George et al 2001). The argument is that firms 
spend on R&D are usually better able to use externally available information and technical 
change within an industry is often closed linked to a firm’s R&D activities (W. M. Cohen & 
Levinthal 1990). Other authors invoked the same absorptive capacity definition by Cohen and 
Levinthal but operationalized the construct differently depending on their research context. For 
example, in an alliance study, Lane and Lubatkin proposed that absorptive capacity of a student 
firm will depend on the relevance of the new knowledge, the similarity of student firm’s and 
teacher firm’s structures, and shared research communities (Lane & Lubatkin 1998). In a joint-
venture study, Lyles and Salk, on the other hand, focused on the flexibility of international joint 
venture structure when studied the absorptive capacity the ventures (Lyles & Salk 2007). 
To be consistent with the original concept of absorptive capacity, I focus on two dimensions of 
absorptive capacity which built on the original conceptualization by Cohen and Levinthal (1990). 
First, a key dimension of absorptive capacity is prior knowledge. The knowledge may include 
both the basic skills and most recent knowledge of scientific or technological development (W. 
M. Cohen & Levinthal 1990). The more diverse the prior knowledge a firm has, the more likely 
that the new knowledge will be relevant to it. Past experience may also define the locus of a 
firm’ knowledge search, and therefore influences the development of future knowledge 
acquisition capabilities (Zahra & George 2002). Therefore, when the prior knowledge is 
valuable, firms will rely on this knowledge to conduct business operations (Petersen, Pedersen, 
36 
 
 
 
& Lyles 2008). Second, a firm’s absorptive capacity will also depend on its individual members’ 
absorptive capacity (W. M. Cohen & Levinthal 1990). Investment in the development of 
individual employee’s absorptive capacity, therefore, will determine the organizational capacity. 
Above of all, it is this investment in employee training that could help each individual employee 
to better acquire and assimilate new knowledge (Phan et al 2006; Zahra & George 2002).  
These two dimensions may not be so distinctive because prior knowledge of an organization may 
also be a function of the prior knowledge of its employees. Thus both of the dimensions could be 
examined when measuring absorptive capacity. The dimensions examined here also match with 
the concept of potential absorptive capacity by Zahra and George as they could represent both 
the abilities to acquire and to assimilate new knowledge from external sources (cf. Zahra & 
George 2002).  
The importance of absorptive capacity as a capability has been noted in various fields of 
management including strategic management, technology management, international business, 
and organizational economics (George et al 2001; Zahra & George 2002), explaining 
organizational phenomena at multiple levels of analysis and invoking different theories including 
the organizational learning, industrial economics, resource-based view, and dynamic capabilities 
(see Zahra & George 2002 for a review). The contention under this stream of research is that 
firms with high absorptive capacity can reduce the cost of valuing and assimilating external 
knowledge for achieving better performance. Thus we have reasons to believe that a buyer firm 
with high absorptive capacity can reduce the cost of valuing and assimilating information and 
knowledge from its supplier, thus enhancing visibility into the supplier.  
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2.6. IT Integration 
On the mechanistic side of antecedents to visibility, I examine the construct of IT integration. 
This construct as an important relationship-specific capability has been well studied in literature. 
The next section thus briefly discusses the concept.  
Information technology (IT) has long been touted as an important potential resource that could 
help provide firms with higher performance and competitive advantage (e.g. Jean, Sinkovics, & 
Cavusgil 2010; Swafford, Ghosh, & Murthy 2008). Various IT based constructs have been 
studied, including external IT integration or virtual integration (e.g. Grover & Saeed 2007; Wang 
& Wei 2007), internal IT integration (e.g. Swafford, Ghosh, & Murthy 2008; Ward & Zhou 
2006), IT alignment and advancement (e.g. Wu et al 2006), and electronic integration (Jean, 
Sinkovics, & Cavusgil 2010). In this dissertation, I focus on IT integration, which could be 
defined as the extent of compatibility of IT systems that enable partners’ common operations and 
collaboration. The IT systems may contain both the hardware and the software systems of the 
two trading partners. In this study, the partners are a buyer and its supplier for a particular item 
sourced. Thus our definition matches with the concepts of external IT integration, virtual 
integration, between-firm IT integration, or electronic integration (Grover & Saeed 2007; Jean, 
Sinkovics, & Cavusgil 2010; Ward & Zhou 2006)1.  
The inter-firm literature has shed light on the importance of IT integration to multiple 
performance results. For example, IT integration has been proven to help firms successfully 
apply the practices of postponement (Hoek 1998) and just-in-time strategies (Ward & Zhou 
2006); enhance supply chain capabilities, including the ability to coordinate and exchange 
                                                          
1
 The concept of IT integration here is at an aggregate rather than a more granular level as might be conceptualized 
by others (e.g. Rai, Patnayakuni, & Seth 2006) 
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information of high quality (Kim, Cavusgil, & Calantone 2006; Wu et al 2006); flexibility 
(Swafford, Ghosh, & Murthy 2008; Wang & Wei 2007); result in shorter customer lead time 
(Ward & Zhou 2006); and facilitate the cooperativeness and monitoring activities among 
partners (Jean, Sinkovics, & Cavusgil 2010).  
The theoretical reasoning for all the above links is that IT integration is an important resource 
that may help reduce the cost of transferring information among the partners involved (Hoek 
1998) and therefore facilitate the partners in reconfiguring their operations for better 
performance. Thus we have reasons to believe that for a buying firm, IT integration with its 
supplier can help it gain better visibility into the supplier. 
2.7. Potential Moderators: Supplier’s Market Dynamism and Goodwill Trust 
A model would be more robust when we examine the moderators or contextual influences on the 
model relationships. As a buyer working with its supplier will usually have to evaluate not only 
the internal environment of the relationship but also the external one, we have reasons to believe 
that the environment may affect the relationships between variables in our model. Drawn on 
extant literature, in this dissertation I examine two moderators as the environmental context for 
the relationships in the model: supplier’s market dynamism and goodwill trust. Both have well 
been discussed in the inter-firm literature. In the next section, therefore, I briefly discuss 
supplier’s market dynamism first. Next will be a discussion of goodwill trust of a buyer on its 
supplier. 
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2.7.1. Supplier’s Market Dynamism 
The external environment where the supplier is working may directly influence the ability of the 
supplier to make sense of its environment and thus its respective strategies and behaviors. 
Indirectly, the environment can influence the ability of the buyer to make sense of the 
information and knowledge about its supplier. In this dissertation, I examine supplier’s market 
dynamism which I refer to here as the degree of unanticipated changes in the supplier’s external 
environment (cf. Bello & Gilliland 1997). High degree of supplier’s market dynamism lowers 
the ability of the firm partners to predict future contingencies in the external environment 
surrounding it (Bello & Gilliland 1997). Our definition matches with the concepts of external 
uncertainty-volatility (S. Klein, Frazier, & Roth 1990) and the environment unpredictability 
(Rindfleisch & Heide 1997). For example, Klein et al. distinguished volatility dimension of 
external uncertainty with diversity and refers volatility to “the extent at which the environment 
changes rapidly and allows a firm to be caught by surprise” (S. Klein, Frazier, & Roth 1990, p. 
200). Other authors also stressed the changes with unpredictability nature of the construct (e.g. 
Rindfleisch & Heide 1997). 
Market dynamism is one of the key constructs in transaction cost analysis perspective (cf. 
Williamson 1993; Williamson 1991). Under this view, market dynamism has been attributed to 
giving rise to the adaptation problems (see Rindfleisch & Heide 1997 for more details) because 
under such volatile environment, firms are unable to predict future, making it difficult for them 
to plan and write contingent contracts (Bello & Gilliland 1997). Volatile environment therefore 
could lead to higher transaction costs, resulting in firms to favor internal integration (S. Klein, 
Frazier, & Roth 1990) and prevent exporting firms to flexibly adapt to changes (Bello & 
Gilliland 1997). Thus we have reasons to believe that supplier’s market dynamism may influence 
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the paths to visibility because information is imperfect and obtaining it will entail transaction 
costs (Lamming, Caldwell, & Harrison 2004; Lamming et al 2001; Stiglitz 2000).      
2.7.2. Goodwill Trust 
Trust could be an important relational construct that represents not only the motivations for 
exchange parties but also the relational environment governing their relationship (McEvily, 
Perrone, & Zaheer 2003). In this dissertation, I focus on buyer’s goodwill trust, which could be 
defined as the buying firm’s beliefs and expectations that its supplier will exhibit intentions and 
actions that are in good faith (cf. Das & Teng 2001). 
The notion of trust here is examined from the trustor’s perspective (i.e. buyer) toward the 
intentions and behaviors of the trustee (i.e. supplier). It is important to note that I only focus on 
trust at the attitudinal level. In fact, trust has been studied in literature at different levels 
including belief or expectation (e.g. Lui & Ngo 2004; Morgan & Hunt 1994; Nooteboom, 
Berger, & Noorderhaven 1997), intentional level (e.g. Ganesan 1994; Mayer, Davis, & 
Schoorman 1995; McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer 2003), and behavioral level (e.g. Moorman, 
Zaltman, & Deshpande 1992; Robson, Katsikeas, & Bello 2008). However, while trust at the 
belief and intention levels may not be separable, they are distinguishable from the behavioral 
level. This is because, on the one hand, as Moorman et al. put it “if one believes that a partner is 
trustworthy without being willing to rely on that partner, trust is limited” (Moorman, Zaltman, & 
Deshpande 1992, p. 315). Morgan and Hunt, therefore, acknowledge that “willingness to rely 
should be viewed as an outcome…of trust” but proposed that willingness is unnecessary or 
redundant in the definition of trust because “one could not label a trading partner as ‘trustworthy’ 
if one were not willing to take actions that otherwise would entail risk” (Morgan & Hunt 1994, p. 
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23). On the other hand, intentional trust may lead to behavioral trust but cannot be inferred from 
the trust behaviors alone. Actions of trust could depend on other reasons than trust intention such 
as the trustor’s dependence on the trustee (Lui & Ngo 2004; Nooteboom, Berger, & 
Noorderhaven 1997). Thus belief and intentional trust should be considered together as 
attitudinal and separate from behavioral trust. 
Inter-firm literature has touted trust as an important organizing principle (cf. McEvily, Perrone, 
& Zaheer 2003) . The organizing principle here can be understood as the logic by which 
information is gathered, disseminated, and interpreted within and between organizations and 
behaviors and routines are selected to coordinate actions (McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer 2003; 
Zander & Kogut 1995). McEvily et al. (2003) integrated works on inter-firm trust and proposed 
that like other organizational principles such as clan, market, and hierarchy (Ouchi 1979), trust 
could represent the way of solving problems related to interdependence and uncertainty. This is 
because trust could influence organizing through two causal pathways: structuring and 
mobilizing. For example, trust can shape the stable and enduring interaction patterns within and 
between organizations. Trust can also mobilize resources or motivate actors to contribute, 
combine, and coordinate resources for collective purposes.  
Thus, trust has been found to lead to different positive organizational outcomes including, for 
example, less conflict, more satisfaction, and higher commitment to the relationship with trading 
partners (James C. Anderson & Narus 1990; Mohr & Spekman 1994; Morgan & Hunt 1994), 
lower probability of loss when dealing with a partner (Nooteboom, Berger, & Noorderhaven 
1997), lower likelihood to switch trading partner (Saparito, Chen, & Sapienza 2004), higher 
performance in an alliance or trading relationships (Katsikeas, Skarmeas, & Bello 2009; Robson, 
Katsikeas, & Bello 2008). As a moderator, goodwill trust has also been found as a substitute for 
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contractual control to enhance performance satisfaction in architect-contractor partnership (Lui 
& Ngo 2004). For the above reasons, it may be logical to suspect that goodwill trust may be able 
to substitute visibility as an important organizing principle to mitigate supplier risk.  
In summary, this chapter provided a literature review for the constructs in our model. For the 
main model, perceived supplier risk has been discussed as the dependent variable that needs to 
be explained. Three information-based capabilities including visibility, absorptive capacity, and 
IT integration then were discussed. Two potential moderators also included in the model are 
supplier’s market dynamism and goodwill trust. The resource-based view and relational view 
have been discussed as the overall framework bonding all the links together. Next chapter will 
discuss each pathway in the model in more details to formulate hypotheses.  
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CHAPTER III. MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
The conceptual and operational model in this dissertation takes the resource-based view and 
relational view as the overarching theoretical lens. In particular, in this model, I provide the links 
between information-based capabilities including absorptive capacity, IT integration, and 
visibility to performance as perceived supplier risk. My overall perspective is that a buying firm 
who develops the relationship-specific capabilities can mitigate supplier risk better.  
Moreover, adding to the nuance of the theoretical view, I posit the pathways via visibility which 
absorptive capacity and IT integration will operate to influence perceived supplier risk. I also 
examine contextual effects on the relationships in the model with two potential moderators: 
supplier’s market dynamism and goodwill trust. Thus this chapter will start with the main model 
relationships. Next I discuss and hypothesize the contextual effects on the main model. This 
chapter is concluded with some discussion on control variables for the model. 
3.1. Main Model 
3.1.1. Visibility and Perceive Supplier Risks 
As discussed earlier, previous literature has linked some structural or environmental factors to 
perceived supplier risk (e.g. Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 2010). I add to the resource-based and 
relational view literature by positing that visibility could be the key information-based capability 
that helps reduce perceived supplier risk. In particular, I posit that visibility is the key to reduce 
the uncertainty element of the supplier risk. This is because two mechanisms may operate here. 
First, a buyer with a high degree of supplier visibility will have accurate, updated, and relevant 
information and knowledge of both the supplier’s operational and strategic issues. Thus it has the 
44 
 
 
 
ability to predict and then act proactively against potentially disruptions from its supplier. Access 
to both types of information is critical for reducing supplier risk. For example, operational 
information may concern the deployment of input resources such as inventory and production 
plan. Having an updated and accurate access to the information could help the buying firm 
optimize input resources by streamlining buffers and resource allocation (R. Klein & Rai 2009) 
to guard against the possibility of supply disruption from the supplier. Similarly, the strategic 
information from its supplier involves issues such as the financial status, margin and cost 
structures, and competitive positioning of the supplier. Such accurate information, when 
accessed in a timely manner, can help the buying firm reconfigure its resources and coordinate 
operational activities to match with potential strategic changes (R. Klein & Rai 2009). Thus the 
buying firm can lower the possibility of being caught up with surprising changes from the 
supplier and its market environment. Therefore, having access to the operational and strategic 
information, the buying firm would be able to know what is happening, and more importantly, 
what may happen. The degree of uncertainty over the item supply from its supplier thus will 
decrease as a buyer has higher visibility into its supplier.  
The above line of argument could be supported by some anecdotal empirical evidence in 
literature. For example, Lee et al. (1997; 2004) found that shared internal data from its partner 
could help a firm in a supply chain better able to forecast inventory levels. Sharing operational 
information, therefore, may help reduce potential operational problems in supply chain 
(Wareham et al 2005). On the other hand, sharing strategic information could enhance supply 
chain flexibilities (Wang & Wei 2007) because as relevant information is acquired in a timely 
manner, firms in the chain could adapt to changes in the environment and changes from other 
partners. 
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Second, high supplier visibility may provide good bases for control ability or at least the illusion 
of control (Das & Teng 2001). This is because having visibility into operational and strategic 
information of the supplier could facilitate a buying firm to monitor supplier outputs and to 
understand the processes, resources, and capabilities of the supplier. Such process knowledge 
and output measurability are necessary for implementing output and behavior controls (Ouchi 
1979). In its turn, the ability to control output and behaviors will reduce the uncertainty over the 
item supply because it would be perceived easy now to apply safeguarding tactics (Stump & 
Heide 1996) and it creates the sense of confidence (Christopher & Lee 2004). Thus high 
visibility into its supplier will reduce uncertainty over item supply by providing good bases for 
control. 
This line of argument has been supported by some empirical evidence. For example, Mohr et al. 
(1996) found that collaborative communication between channel members are positively 
associated with the uses of control by manufacturers over their dealers. McEvily and Marcus 
(2005) found that information sharing between exchange partners enhances their abilities to 
jointly control problems which may arise. Corroborating the above arguments and evidence, I 
formally hypothesize that: 
H1: For a buying firm, Visibility into its supplier will reduce Perceived Supplier Risk. 
In its turn, visibility can be realized by two other information-based capabilities: absorptive 
capacity and IT integration. Absorptive capacity represents the softer side of antecedents to 
visibility. IT integration, on the other hand, represents the mechanistic side. I discuss each one 
next. 
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3.1.2. Absorptive Capacity and Visibility 
A buying firm with higher potential absorptive capacity is more able than others to value and 
assimilate external knowledge (cf. W. M. Cohen & Levinthal 1990; Lane & Lubatkin 1998). I, 
therefore, posit that buyer’s potential absorptive capacity may give rise to the buyer’s supplier 
visibility into its supplier. This is because absorptive capacity lowers the cost of valuing and 
assimilating supplier’s information and knowledge. In particular, each dimension of absorptive 
capacity as discussed could enhance the supplier visibility as follow. 
First, one premise of absorptive capacity is that the firm has prior related knowledge to value and 
assimilate new knowledge (W. M. Cohen & Levinthal 1990). As learning is cumulative, the 
learning efficiency is greatest when the object to learn is related to what is already known 
(Petersen, Pedersen, & Lyles 2008). Learning is usually much more difficult in novel domains 
(W. M. Cohen & Levinthal 1990). A buyer firm with substantial prior related knowledge about 
the supplier and the supplier’s business environment, therefore, are more able to absorb relevant 
and updated knowledge from the supplier whether it is operational or strategic. Thus a buying 
firm with prior related knowledge over its supplier will have higher visibility into the supplier. 
Empirically, Petersen et al. (2008) found that the degree that a firm could rely on prior 
knowledge when doing business in a foreign market is negatively associated with the knowledge 
gap between what the firm has and what is needed for accomplishing foreign business venture in 
the market. 
Second, absorptive capacity may depend on the prior investment in individual absorptive 
capacities (W. M. Cohen & Levinthal 1990). Such investment effort could be measured by 
investment in training the firm’s employees (Phan et al 2006). As the employees are equipped 
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with better abilities to learn new knowledge via training, they could overcome the barriers to 
knowledge transfer (Simonin & Özsomer 2009). Investment in training employees, therefore, 
may facilitate a buying firm to acquire knowledge regarding the supplier’s business issues such 
as the supplier’s resources, capabilities, and its strategic position. Such updated knowledge may 
also help the buyer’s employees interpret new operational information from the supplier in a 
more accurate, relevant, and timely manner. Thus the updated operational and strategic 
knowledge transferred from a supplier can be absorbed easily if a buying firm invested 
adequately in its employees.  
Empirically, it has been found that capacity to learn and investment in training are positively 
related to knowledge acquisition by an affiliate firm from its foreign parent (Lyles & Salk 2007). 
Investment in training employees was also found to facilitate knowledge acquisition by a firm’s 
employees from their joint-venture partner (Phan et al 2006). Corroborating the above arguments 
and evidence, therefore, I formally hypothesize that:  
H2: For a buying firm, Absorptive Capacity will increase Visibility into its supplier. 
3.1.3. IT Integration and Visibility 
On the mechanistic side, IT integration with a supplier can also enhance buyer’s visibility into 
the supplier. This is because information technology could be utilized to lower costs in external 
search, monitoring, and distribution of information (Hoek 1998). Thus IT integration lowers the 
cost of transferring information and reduces the needed time for sharing information from the 
supplier. In particular, when trading partners integrate with each other electronically, their IT 
systems are aligned (Wu et al 2006), providing them with common supporting operations to 
exchange the standardized and institutionalized information faster and more efficiently (Wang & 
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Wei 2007). Thus IT integration will smooth out the flow of active information within and across 
firms (Wu et al 2006) and therefore could encourage partners to share information which may 
have not been available (Wang & Wei 2007). In its turn, sharing information faster and more 
efficiently provides firm partners with necessary condition to be efficient in gathering accurate, 
relevant, and updated information  (Kim, Cavusgil, & Calantone 2006). Therefore, IT integration 
could make the flow of goods transparent (Hoek 1998) and enhance visibility into its supplier. 
Empirically, it has been found that interfirm system integration could lead to better quality of 
information exchanged (Kim, Cavusgil, & Calantone 2006). IT alignment was also found to 
facilitate supply chain to increase the amount of information exchange (Wu et al 2006). More 
recently, it has been found in the international inter-firm setting that electronic integration helps 
customer monitor the supplier output and behaviors (Jean, Sinkovics, & Cavusgil 2010). 
For the above theoretical reasons and empirical evidence, I posit that IT integration could 
increase supplier visibility. Formally, I hypothesize that:  
H3: For a buying firm, IT Integration with its supplier will increase Visibility into its supplier. 
It should be noted that the above arguments and empirical evidence related to IT integration may 
only be applicable to explicit and codified information (Nonaka 1994) that would be shared from 
the supplier to its buyer. While important, the application of IT in integrating partner operations 
requires the information to be structured, codified (R. Klein & Rai 2009), standardized, and 
institutionalized to be transferred in a cost-effective manner (Wang & Wei 2007). In fact, all the 
empirical studies regarding IT integration reported above operationalized information exchange 
or monitoring only in terms of the structured and codified information (cf. Jean, Sinkovics, & 
Cavusgil 2010; Kim, Cavusgil, & Calantone 2006; Wu et al 2006). For this reason, the effect of 
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IT integration on visibility may be limited compared to the influence of absorptive capacity. In 
general, IT integration only influences visibility by providing a good channel for transferring 
standardized and codified information. 
3.1.4. Mediation Role of Visibility 
Literature employing the resource-based or relational views usually does not clarify which 
capabilities or resources may be more important than the others. However, such distinction is 
important because some capabilities may only operate via the others in influencing performance 
(Zahra & George 2002). Thus the former capabilities only provide the necessary, not the 
sufficient, conditions for gaining higher performance. The latter capabilities will play the key 
role in achieving competitive advantage. Identifying and testing the configuration of capabilities 
and resources under which some capabilities will operate via the others in influencing 
performance therefore are important to explain why some firms even with high 
capabilities/resources may not obtain higher competitive advantage. The theoretical and practical 
focus thus would be on the mediation capabilities which would help explain better differential 
performances among firms.  
In this dissertation, absorptive capacity and IT integration are positioned as the information-
based capabilities that may influence perceived supplier risk but only indirectly and via visibility. 
Thus I emphasize the role of visibility as the key capability that would help mitigate supplier risk 
proactively. This is because absorptive capacity and IT integration only provide the necessary 
conditions for the buyer to receive knowledge and for supplier to transfer information via 
reducing the costs of absorbing and transferring the knowledge or information, respectively. It is 
the visibility, which is the outcome of such information receiving and transferring, that will 
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determine the perceived supplier risk. This argument parallels the logic for the distinction 
between potential absorptive capacity and realized absorptive capacity in influencing innovation 
outcomes (cf. Zahra & George 2002). Similarly, IT alignment is posited to only influence supply 
chain capabilities which in turn will impact the chain performances (Wu et al 2006). Thus to test 
this line of argument empirically, I formally hypothesize: 
H4a. For a buying firm, Visibility into its supplier will mediate the relationship between its 
Absorptive Capacity and Perceived Supplier Risk. 
H4b. For a buying firm, Visibility into its supplier will mediate the relationship between the 
firms’ IT Integration and Perceived Supplier Risk.     
3.2. Moderation 
In this dissertation, I explored the moderation role of two environmental factors: supplier’s 
market dynamism and goodwill trust. In particular, I suspect that supplier’s market dynamism 
will moderate the relationship between absorptive capacity and visibility. Goodwill trust, on the 
other hand, may moderate the relationship between visibility and perceived supplier risk. I 
discuss each one next. 
3.2.1. Supplier’s Market Dynamism as Moderator 
A volatile environment results in higher transaction costs (S. Klein, Frazier, & Roth 1990). 
Given the fact that information exchange and obtaining visibility entail costs, the environment 
dynamism may influence the pathways that lead to visibility. I posit that supplier’s market 
dynamism may weaken the relationship between absorptive capacity and visibility. This is 
because such dynamic environment may dampen the cost-saving effects of absorptive capacity 
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for valuing and assimilating supplier’s knowledge and information. This line of argument could 
be explored from both sides of trading partners.    
From the supplier side, when a supplier is working under a highly dynamic environment, its 
ability to make sense of the environment is reduced. This is because such volatile environment 
makes it harder for the firm to predict future (S. Klein, Frazier, & Roth 1990) and anticipate all 
the relevant future contingencies (Bello & Gilliland 1997). The supplier, therefore, will face with 
difficulties in making long-range plans and decisions (Bello & Gilliland 1997). It may be better 
for the firm then to create structures for sequential and adaptive decision making (S. Klein, 
Frazier, & Roth 1990). The adaptive nature for strategic decisions from the supplier then makes 
it harder for the supplier to integrate information and knowledge before transferring to the buyer 
in an accurate and timely manner.  
From the buyer side, compared to a less dynamic environment, high dynamism in the supplier’s 
external environment will make the previous knowledge by the buyer less relevant and related. 
Moreover, training for the buyer’s employees is also more likely to be obsolete and irrelevant. 
Highly dynamic environment thus usually disrupts the routinization necessary for shared 
understandings between distant trading partners (Bello & Gilliland 1997). Thus under such 
circumstance, it is difficult for buyer firm to develop routines to capture the external information 
from its supplier (Anand & Ward 2004).  
We can expect, therefore, that the supplier’s market dynamism will hamper the effect of its 
buyer’s absorptive capacity to realize its visibility into the supplier. Formally I hypothesize that: 
H5. For a buying firm, the Supplier’s Market Dynamism will negatively moderate the 
relationship between Absorptive Capacity and Visibility such that when Supplier’s Market 
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Dynamism is high, the positive relationship between Absorptive Capacity and Visibility will be 
weaker, compared to when Supplier’s Market Dynamism is low. 
Note that, however, I do not posit the moderating effect of supplier’s market dynamism on the 
relationship between IT integration and visibility. This is because the effect of IT integration on 
visibility is realized via reducing the cost of transferring information and knowledge. The 
supplier’s market condition, while it may influence the cost of integrating and absorbing 
information, may not have a significant effect on this kind of transferring cost. The market 
condition therefore may not moderate the relationship between IT integration and visibility.   
3.2.2. Goodwill Trust as Moderator 
Goodwill trust is the second moderator that may have an effect on our model relationships. In 
this dissertation, I posit that goodwill trust may substitute for visibility and thus reduce the effect 
of visibility on perceived supplier risk. This happens because of the following mechanisms. 
First, a firm who trusts its partner may have less fear of being exploited (Geyskens et al 1996; 
Gilliland & Bello 2002). A buying firm trusting its supplier thus may be free of concerns over 
opportunistic intention and behaviors by the partner (Katsikeas, Skarmeas, & Bello 2009). Even 
when disruptions may occur then, the trusting buyer may believe its supplier will act on its 
behalf to reduce the potential damaging effect of such disruptions on the buyer. Therefore, when 
trust is high, visibility may not be necessary for a buyer in forecasting and predicting what may 
happen to prevent potential risks from its supplier. Empirically, Morgan and Hunt (1994) found 
that attitudinal trust of retailer on its supplier enhances the perception that the retailer is able to 
predict the consequences of decisions to be made and the confidence in those decisions when 
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working with its supplier. Thus buyer’s goodwill trust may substitute visibility in enhancing its 
perceived ability to forecast and then to act against disruptions. 
Second, trust and formal control may act as the substitute to each other in mitigating supplier 
risk. This is because trust could be considered as the informal control while contract as the 
formal one which covers potential contingencies (R. Klein & Rai 2009). Firms with high trusting 
beliefs on their partners usually reduce or eliminate the necessity for covering all contingencies 
(R. Klein & Rai 2009). Goodwill trust, therefore, usually reduce the need to install contractual 
safeguarding mechanisms against opportunism (Lui & Ngo 2004). In the same vein, I posit that a 
trusting firm may have the sense of better control ability over its supplier because safeguarding 
mechanisms are not necessary. Thus high trust may make visibility less necessary in this regard. 
Goodwill trust, therefore, may substitute for visibility in providing control ability or a sense of it 
to mitigate supplier risk. Empirically, in the contractor partnership setting, Lui and Ngo (2004) 
found that goodwill trust actually could substitute for contractual control to influence cooperative 
outcomes.  
Corroborating the above lines of arguments and empirical evidence, we have reasons to believe 
that goodwill trust can substitute visibility for mitigating supplier risk. Formally, I hypothesize 
that: 
H6. For a buying firm, Goodwill Trust will negatively moderate the relationship between 
Visibility and Perceived Supplier Risk such that when Goodwill Trust is high, the negative 
relationship between Visibility and Perceived Supplier Risk will be weaker, compared to when 
Goodwill Trust is low. 
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A summary of the hypotheses for the model in this dissertation can be found in Figure 3-1. To 
control for potential spurious effects I also include control variables for both perceived supplier 
risk and visibility when testing the model which I will discuss next. 
3.3. Control Variables 
Benefiting from previous theoretical arguments and empirical studies, I include several control 
variables in the model. In particular, for visibility as the dependent variable, I include supplier’s 
market dynamism as a control variable. This is because the supplier’s market dynamism may 
increase the transaction costs in general (S. Klein, Frazier, & Roth 1990) and the buyer’s cost of 
accessing information regarding the supplier in particular. Thus high supplier’s market 
dynamism may reduce the buyer’s visibility into its supplier. 
For perceived supplier risk as the dependent variable, I control for supplier’s market dynamism, 
buyer’s goodwill trust, relationship duration, and supplier’s substitutability. First, supplier’s 
market dynamism may increase perceived supplier risk because it makes the potential of 
disruptions from the market more likely. These possible disruptions in turn may affect the 
supplier and thus highlights the possibility of disruptions from the supplier. Empirically, Ellis et 
al. found that technological uncertainty increases the probability of disruptions from a supplier 
(Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 2010). 
Second, the mere fact that a buying firm has been working with its supplier for a long time may 
already mean that the relationship is worth continuing and that the supplier may be reliable in 
providing the needed item to the buyer. Thus relationship duration may reduce the perceived 
supplier risk. 
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H5 (-) H6 (+) 
H2 (+) 
H3 (+) 
H1 (-) 
Absorptive 
Capacity 
IT Integration 
Supplier’s 
Market 
Dynamism 
Goodwill Trust 
Visibility 
Perceived 
Supplier Risk 
Notes: 
- Expected sign for the hypotheses in the brackets. 
- Signs in the bracket for the hypotheses about 
moderating effects are for the interaction term. 
- Hypotheses 4a and b are for meditational effect and 
not presented here. 
- Control variables are not presented here. 
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Third, buyer’s goodwill trust may help reduce perceived supplier risk. This is because trust in a 
partner may act as the informal control over the partner and enhance the perception of ability to 
predict the partner’s intention and behaviors. Empirically, a firm’s trust on a partner has been 
found to lower probability of loss when dealing with the partner (Nooteboom, Berger, & 
Noorderhaven 1997). Trust was also found to enhance the perceived ability of a firm to predict 
the consequences of its decisions to be made and the confidence in those decisions when 
working with its partner (Morgan & Hunt 1994). 
Finally, supplier’s substitutability is included to as a control variable for perceived supplier risk. 
In the previous study, Ellis et al. (2010) found that the number of alternative suppliers for a 
particular item to the buyer reduces the probability of disruptions from the supplier. Thus I 
include this variable as a control variable to be consistent with previous findings for the 
comparison purpose. 
In short, this chapter elaborated on the relationships in the model. In the first section, I discussed 
and formally hypothesized the relationships among absorptive capacity, IT integration, and 
visibility in their paths to supplier risk. In the later section, I posited the potential moderating 
effects of supplier’s market dynamism and goodwill trust on the relationships in the main model. 
Control variables were included in the model to prevent the potential of interpreting spurious 
effects. In the next chapter, I discuss the methodology and model analysis and the results for the 
hypotheses formalized in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER IV. INSTRUMENT DEVELOPMENT AND MODEL TESTING 
To test the structural model, reliable and valid instruments must be developed. The instrument 
measures include (1) Absorptive Capacity; (2) IT Integration; (3) Supplier’s Market Dynamism; 
(4) Goodwill Trust; (5) Visibility; and (6) Perceived Supplier Risk. All the instruments except 
Visibility are adapted from previous articles in the field. Since there have been no validated 
measures used in the literature for the construct of visibility in this dissertation, the measure for 
the construct is newly developed in this study. The development of all the instruments followed 
three steps: (1) item generation; (2) expert review; and (3) a large-scale survey analysis.  
4.1. Item generation 
The objective of this step is to generate the needed items for the construct by extensively 
reviewing the literature. The measurement items should cover the domain of the construct 
measured (Churchill Jr 1979; Moore & Benbasat 1991). To generate measurement items for each 
construct in the study, prior research was extensively reviewed and an initial list of potential 
items was compiled. The objective here was to generate as many different items as possible to 
measure the constructs based on their definitions. Except for the construct of Supplier’s Market 
Dynamism, which has been measured in extant literature by seven-point semantic scale, other 
constructs are measured with seven-point Likert scale with one as Strongly Disagree and seven 
as Strongly Agree. Items for the constructs were generated as reflective because the constructs 
are theorized to lead to the relevant items (Jarvis et al 2003). The construct items were generated 
as follows. 
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4.1.1. Absorptive Capacity 
Measurement items for the construct of absorptive capacity were generated based on the 
conceptualization of the construct (W. M. Cohen & Levinthal 1990; Zahra & George 2002). The 
items are adapted from the item pool in previous articles (Petersen, Pedersen, & Lyles 2008; 
Phan et al 2006). It should be noted that these items tap into domain of the capacity to value and 
assimilate knowledge from a supplier which is related to the potential rather than the realized 
absorptive capacity (Zahra & George 2002). 
4.1.2. IT Integration 
Measurement items for IT integration were generated based on its original conceptualization of 
the construct (Powell 1992; Wu et al 2006). Items for the construct are adapted from the items in 
Wu et al. (2006) which tap into the alignment of computer systems of two partners in a channel 
which comprises the potential for the partners’ IT integration. The items were adapted for this 
dissertation to take the buyer’s view in the relationship with its supplier. 
4.1.3. Supplier’s Market Dynamism 
Measurement items for the construct of supplier’s market dynamism were generated based on 
item pool from articles with similar concepts such as external uncertainty (S. Klein, Frazier, & 
Roth 1990), market dynamism (McGinnis & Kohn 1993), and market volatility (Bello & 
Gilliland 1997). The items were adapted to tap into the dynamism degree of the market 
surrounding the supplier. 
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4.1.4. Goodwill Trust 
Measurement items for the construct of goodwill trust were generated and adapted based on its 
conceptualization as benevolence (Katsikeas, Skarmeas, & Bello 2009; R. Klein & Rai 2009) or 
goodwill trust (Das & Bing-Sheng 1998; Das & Teng 2001). The items for the construct were 
adapted from item pool in previous articles (Katsikeas, Skarmeas, & Bello 2009; R. Klein & Rai 
2009) to tap into the concept of trust from a buyer on its supplier. 
4.1.5. Visibility 
Measurement items for the construct of visibility were newly generated for this study because 
there have been no validated items in previous articles that fully capture the construct domain. 
As noted in previous section, extant articles instead have operationalized the construct of 
information sharing (e.g. Heide & Miner 1992; McEvily & Marcus 2005; Noordewier, John, & 
Nevin 1990) or information flows (e.g. R. Klein & Rai 2009) or measured the quality of logistic 
information (e.g. Hult et al 2006; Zhou & Benton Jr 2007). Thus in this dissertation, new items 
were generated to tap into both operational and strategic domain of information exchanged and 
three elements of information efficacy including accuracy, relevance, and timeliness.  
4.1.6. Perceived Supplier Risk 
Measurement items for the construct of perceived supplier risk were generated based on its 
definition and conceptualization which tap into the domain of the supplier risk due to disruptions 
on the supplier’s side. Items for the construct were adapted from the item pool in previous 
articles (Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 2010; Wagner & Bode 2008, 2006; Zsidisin & Ellram 2003). 
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In summary, for the six constructs, 50 items have been generated (see Appendix A). The items 
then were subjected to an extensive review from academic and industrial experts before large-
scale surveys for a quantitative analysis. 
4.2. Expert Review 
After measurement items were created through rigorous and extensive review of literature, the 
common pool of items together with their definitions were provided to academic and industrial 
experts to pre-assess the content or face validity of the measures (Churchill Jr 1979). Experts 
provided feedbacks and suggestions for wording and relevance of the items used for each 
construct through an iterative process. The objective here was to ensure the content validity of 
the constructs and to use as few items as possible so that they still cover adequately the domain 
of the constructs with minimum redundancy. Still, new items were added when necessary. All 
the measurement items were followed through this process even though most of them have been 
used and adapted from validly and reliably established scales in extant literature. 
The final questionnaire can be found in Appendix A. In the beginning of the survey 
questionnaire, respondents are directed to think about one of the key international suppliers and a 
key item that they are sourcing from the supplier. Respondents are told to note down the key 
item before they could continue the survey. For all the questions in the survey, respondents are 
reminded of the key supplier and the key item that they are referring to in the beginning. 
Questions are arranged in the questionnaire so that independent variables will be measured 
before the dependent variables and easy and less sensitive questions will be asked first. The 
questionnaire concludes with some questions about demographics and any further comments 
from the respondents.  
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4.3. Quantitative Analysis of Measurement 
4.3.1. Sampling Design 
Respondents should have knowledge and experience in working with an international supplier 
and their firms’ operation and performance. Thus the target respondents are senior buyers or 
managers (e.g. CEOs, presidents, vice presidents, directors, or managers) for manufacturing 
firms in the U.S.  whose job responsibilities are in the area of purchasing, procurement, and 
supply chain management. To achieve a greater generalizability, 11 different SIC codes are 
covered as in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1. SIC Code for Survey 
SIC Industries 
200 Food & kindred products 
250 Furniture and fixtures 
270 Printing and publishing 
280 Chemicals and allied products 
300 Rubber & misc. plastic products 
340 Fabricated metal products 
350 Machinery, except electrical 
360 Electric/electronic equipment 
370 Transportation equipment 
380 Instruments & related products 
390 Misc. manufacturing industries 
A list of 5,000 addresses was obtained from the database of Institute for Supply Management 
(ISM), a prestigious association of professionals in the area of supply chain management from 
different industries across the U.S. Under its new policy, however, ISM only provided the post 
mailing list. No emails or phone numbers were provided for direct contacts.  
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4.3.2. Data Collection 
To increase the potential participation rate, 5,000 post mails were sent to the respondents inviting 
them to participate in the survey with either option: (1) taking the survey using paper-based 
questionnaire or (2) taking the survey online. Respondents are promised to have a summary of 
the result reports on procurement risk as a token of appreciation for their time and cooperation. 
In fact, we prefer the survey to be administered online because the Internet not only increases the 
richness of information but also enhances the reach of information (Laudon & Laudon 2009). 
The purpose of using Web survey is to reach as many respondents as possible and to retrieve as 
much information as possible in short time (Crawford et al 2002). The survey is sponsored by 
Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER) at Georgia State University.  
The whole process of data collection was carried out for six months from February 2011 to 
August 2011. In total, 121 agreed to take the survey online and thus provided their email 
addresses. Only nine agreed to take the survey off-line (i.e. using paper-based questionnaire). 
The effective sampling frame thus is 130. Among the 5,000 sent out, about 213 post mails were 
returned with no existing addresses or the respondents had moved. Nine responded to refuse to 
participate because they already retired or their firms do not source from outside the U.S.  
Given the fact that respondents are managers at high level and working with international 
suppliers, they are usually very busy and working around the clock. To improve the completion 
rate, two rounds of emails were sent to invite respondents to complete the survey. In the first 
round, 121 respondents were sent emails with reminders two or three times a week to participate 
online. The nine respondents who prefer taking the survey off-line were sent the paper-based 
questionnaires with pre-posted return envelops. About seven respondents after reading the 
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invitation emails responded that they are no longer in the procurement position or not sourcing 
outside the U.S. After four months, the second round of survey was launched. In the second 
round, all the respondents who haven’t responded or haven’t completed the survey in the first 
round were sent a reminder by post mails. As in the first round, in the second round, respondents 
who prefer taking the survey online were sent reminders two or three times a week. 
In total, we have 90 respondents who started the survey among which 64 completed online and 
two completed off-line. 24 respondents started the survey but did not complete it. The effective 
response rate is thus 69 percent while the effective completion rate is 50 percent. Some sample 
characteristics are provided in Table 4-2. 
Table 4-2. Sample Characteristics 
  
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Relationship Duration (Years) 66 0.25 40 9.72 8.28 
Firm Size (Number of employees) 66 9.00 400000 20844.77 57156.33 
Percentage of firm's total procurement 
budget allocated for the key supplier 65 0.00 60 9.26 11.09 
Total firm’s sales last year (USD millions) 61 0.00 100000 6849.63 15842.77 
Several sample characteristics should be noted. For example, all respondents are holding the 
position of high-level managers related to procurement and/or supply chain including, for 
example, vice president of supply chain management, senior buyer, purchasing director, global 
strategic sourcing director, purchasing director, etc. Moreover, on average, respondents have 
been working with the key supplier almost ten years and about nine percent of the buyer’s total 
procurement budget has been allocated to its key supplier last year. It should be noted that the 
key international suppliers that our respondent firms are sourcing from come from different 
regions worldwide including Europe (e.g. EU, France, Germany, Belgium, Ukraine), Asia (e.g. 
China, India, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia), non-U.S. America (e.g. Mexico, Canada, Chile, 
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Brazil), and Australia and New Zealand. The buying firm size ranges from 9 to 400,000 
employees with the average of 20,845 employees worldwide. 
After further examining the firm size distribution, however, two firms were found to be of 
extraordinarily big in size with 200,000 and 400,000 employees, outside the three standard 
deviation of the sample mean of the firm size. Including the two firms in the sample may distort 
the analysis result. Thus we can exclude the two big firms and do the analyses on the final 
sample of 64. To test for robustness, however, the model with the sample of 66 is tested later to 
compare the results. Analysis results in the following sections are reported for the sample of 64. 
4.3.3. Non-Response Bias 
ISM did not provide emails, phone numbers, or any other firm’s characteristics of the sampling 
frame. Thus we could not contact its client firms personally to assess nonresponse bias. 
Nevertheless, tests indicate that nonresponse bias is not likely an issue with our data. To do 
these, the sample was divided into two batches by the median of the response point of time. Then 
I compare means of firm characteristics between the early and late batches of the survey 
responses (Armstrong & Overton 1977). As a result, I detected no differences across these 
batches regarding the buyer-supplier relationship duration, firm size, percentage of firm's total 
procurement budget allocated for the key supplier, and firm’s sales last year even at the 0.1 
conservative significance level (see Table 4-3). Thus it could be inferred that nonresponse bias is 
unlikely to be a significant issue in this study. 
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Table 4-3. Non-Response Bias Test 
  
 Compared Variables 
Early Response Late Response ANOVA 
Mean N Std.  Mean N Std.  F Sig. 
Relationship Duration 
(Years) 8.73 31 8.41 11.81 31 7.935 2.21 0.14 
Firm Size (Employees) 9564.88 32 15699.37 14677.47 32 27568.365 0.83 0.37 
Percentage of firm's total 
procurement budget 
allocated for the key 
supplier 
7.23 32 7.10 11.63 31 14.097 2.47 0.12 
Total firm’s sales last 
year (USD millions) 4247.78 29 7366.24 6366.97 29 12822.091 0.60 0.44 
4.3.4. Measurement Validity and Reliability 
Before testing the structural model, steps are taken to check (1) reliability; (2) discriminant 
validity; and (3) convergent validity of the measures. The typical approach to assess reliabilities 
is to use Cronbach’s α with threshold of 0.7 (Nunnally & Bernstein 1994). However, Cronbach’s 
α is based on the restricted assumption of equal importance of all indicators. Following Hair et 
al. (1998), the composite reliability (CR) and average variance extracted (AVE) of multiple 
indicators of construct are also used to assess reliability of a construct. AVE is greater than 0.5 
and CR is greater than 0.7 imply that the variance by trait is more than by error components 
(Hair et al 1998). Items were deleted if it reduces the reliability of the construct and when it is 
theoretically sound to do so. Results for Cronbach’s α, CR, and AVE for the finalized items are 
reported in Table 4-6. 
To test the discriminant validity of the constructs, I run exploratory factor analysis for the 
construct items. The analysis result showed that all the items load cleanly on their components. 
On overall, their loadings on the supposed components are larger than the loadings on other 
components provide evidence for discriminant validity. Cross-loading items were deleted if it is 
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theoretically sound to do so. The final factor analysis result is provided on Table 4-4.  It should 
also be noted that the items for strategic and operational visibility load on one common factor, 
providing evidence that there may not be separate constructs of operational and strategic 
visibility as some might theorize, at least in our data sample of U.S. manufacturing firms. 
To further test for discriminant validity, I also compare inter-construct correlations with the 
square root of average variance extracted (AVE) which indicates the percentage of overall 
variance in the indicators captured by the latent construct (Hair et al 1998). Those comparisons 
support discriminant validities for the measurement items in this study with square root of the 
AVE for each construct measure exceeding correlations between the construct and other 
constructs as we could see in Table 4-5. 
Finally, convergent validity is an assessment of the consistency in measurements across different 
operationalization. Following Fornell and Larcker (1981), I use AVE greater than 0.5 as the 
threshold to confirm the convergent validity. Loadings of the items on the construct which is 
equal or greater than 0.7 and significant also provide evidence for convergence validity of the 
construct measures (Hair et al 1998). Items with low loadings were deleted if it is theoretically 
sound to do so. Final results for item loadings are provided on Table 4-6, providing evidence for 
convergent validity of the construct items. The final item inter-correlations are provided in the 
Appendix B. 
4.3.5. Common Method Bias 
For a single-informant and cross-sectional study like this one, common method bias could be a 
problem. To guard against such bias, steps have been taken ex ante and ex post (Podsakoff et al 
2003).  
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Table 4-4. Exploratory Factor Analysis Result 
Measurement Items (after purification) Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 
We commit resources to acquire new knowledge from our 
key supplier. 0.05 0.20 0.80 0.11 -0.23 0.04 
We commit resources to understand our key supplier's 
processes. -0.04 0.35 0.67 -0.18 -0.38 0.12 
We invest in training our employees to make better use of 
knowledge of our key supplier. 0.22 0.17 0.81 -0.16 0.01 0.04 
My firm’s IT system is compatible with our key supplier’s 
IT system. 0.90 0.07 -0.02 -0.09 -0.10 0.04 
My firm’s IT system is aligned with our key supplier’s. 0.91 0.14 0.11 -0.05 -0.05 0.14 
My firm and our key supplier have invested in our IT 
systems to make them interoperable. 0.91 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.11 
Both my firm and our key supplier work together to 
integrate our IT systems. 0.92 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.07 
IT advances for supply chain communication system are 
well aligned between my firm and our key supplier in 
order to achieve the best supply chain performance. 
0.82 0.15 0.07 -0.05 -0.09 0.07 
Supplier Environment -Stable:Volatile 0.06 -0.13 0.02 0.92 0.16 -0.06 
Supplier Environment -Certain:Uncertain -0.07 -0.11 -0.06 0.92 0.09 -0.15 
Supplier Environment -Predictable:Unpredictable -0.08 0.11 -0.10 0.79 0.20 -0.02 
We believe that our operational information about our key 
supplier is accurate. 
0.16 0.51 -0.09 -0.17 -0.08 0.62 
Overall, information regarding our key supplier’s 
operations is available to us in a timely manner. 
0.06 0.62 0.24 -0.01 -0.24 0.53 
The operational information we have about our key 
supplier is useful to improve our performance. 
0.28 0.68 0.28 -0.09 0.03 0.09 
We have a good understanding of the resource and 
capabilities of our key supplier. 0.10 0.76 0.15 -0.02 -0.32 0.18 
We believe that the strategic information we have about 
our key supplier is accurate. 0.11 0.81 0.14 -0.01 -0.19 0.21 
The strategic information we have about our key supplier 
is relevant to our business. 0.03 0.89 0.14 -0.03 -0.14 0.18 
If our firm required assistance, our key supplier would do 
its best to provide it. -0.02 0.09 -0.09 -0.15 -0.20 0.86 
Our key supplier is interested in our firm’s well-being, not 
just its own. 0.18 0.20 0.22 -0.07 -0.04 0.85 
In times of difficulty (e.g. shortages), our key supplier has 
“gone out on a limb” for us. 0.16 0.23 0.08 0.02 -0.12 0.83 
Our key supplier does not have strong controls for 
unexpected events. -0.12 -0.17 -0.22 0.17 0.60 -0.30 
Our key supplier is not capable of providing the key item 
with consistent quality. -0.02 -0.24 -0.05 0.12 0.86 -0.10 
Our key supplier has the technological capability to ensure 
stability in the supply of the key item (reverse). -0.03 -0.18 -0.21 0.35 0.73 -0.13 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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Table 4-5. Inter-Construct Correlations 
  Mean Std. Absorptive 
Capacity 
IT 
Integration 
Supplier’s 
Market 
Dynamism 
Goodwill 
Trust 
Visibility Perceived 
Supplier 
Risk 
Relation-
ship 
Duration 
Supplier’s 
Substi- 
tutability 
Absorptive 
Capacity 4.76 1.44 0.841        
IT Integration 2.64 1.58 0.199 0.901       
Supplier’s 
Market 
Dynamism 
3.42 1.42 -0.215 -0.091 0.899      
Goodwill Trust 5.2 1.44 0.256 0.239 -0.204 0.898     
Visibility 5.12 1.08 0.529 0.299 -0.190 0.564 0.818    
Perceived 
Supplier Risk 3.01 1.11 -0.499 -0.168 0.427 -0.402 -0.521 0.840   
Relationship 
Duration 9.63 8.28 0.231 0.107 -0.210 0.163 0.206 -0.417 1.000  
Supplier’s 
Substitutability 4.34 1.61 0.187 0.140 -0.203 -0.050 0.114 -0.123 0.148 1.000 
* Number in diagonal is square root of average variance extracted (AVE) 
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Table 4-6. Measurement Items – Reliability and Validity 
Construct Items Loading Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
(α) 
Composite 
Reliability 
(CR) 
Average 
Variance 
Explained 
(AVE) 
Theoretical Explanatory Variables 
Absorptive Capacity: With regards to the key supplier, how would you agree with the 
following statements? (Likert Scale 1-7)   0.796 0.879 0.708 
- We commit resources to acquire new knowledge from our key supplier. 0.858       
- We commit resources to understand our key supplier's processes. 0.894       
- We invest in training our employees to make better use of knowledge of our key supplier. 0.766       
IT Integration: With regards to the key supplier, how would you agree with the following 
statements? (Likert Scale 1-7)   0.943 0.956 0.813 
- My firm’s IT system is compatible with our key supplier’s IT system. 0.897       
- My firm’s IT system is aligned with our key supplier’s. 0.939       
- My firm and our key supplier have invested in our IT systems to make them interoperable. 0.900       
- Both my firm and our key supplier work together to integrate our IT systems. 0.902       
- IT advances for supply chain communication system are well aligned between my firm and 
our key supplier in order to achieve the best supply chain performance. 0.868       
Visibility: Please answer the following questions with regard to the key supplier and the key 
item. (Likert Scale 1-7)   0.899 0.923 0.669 
- We believe that our operational information about our key supplier is accurate. 0.711       
- Overall, information regarding our key supplier’s operations is available to us in a timely 
manner. 0.857       
- The operational information we have about our key supplier is useful to improve our 
performance. 0.716       
- We have a good understanding of the resource and capabilities of our key supplier. 0.841       
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Construct Items (continued from previous page) Loading Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
(α) 
Composite 
Reliability 
(CR) 
Average 
Variance 
Explained 
(AVE) 
- We believe that the strategic information we have about our key supplier is accurate. 0.863       
- The strategic information we have about our key supplier is relevant to our business. 0.899       
Perceived Supplier Risk: With regard to the key supplier and the key item, to what extent 
would you agree with the following statement? (Likert Scale 1-7)   0.776 0.858 0.605 
- Our key supplier is not capable of providing the key item with consistent quality. 0.854       
- Our key supplier has the technological capability to ensure stability in the supply of the key 
item (reverse). 0.880       
- Our key supplier does not have strong controls for unexpected events. 0.783       
Control Variables 
Market Dynamism: How would you describe the business environment in the key supplier’s 
territory with regard to the key item? (7-point Semantic Scale)   0.790 0.878 0.706 
Stable – Volatile 0.942       
Certain – Uncertain 0.941       
Predictable – Unpredictable 0.809       
Goodwill Trust: Your perception of the key supplier? (Likert Scale 1-7)   0.881 0.926 0.807 
If our firm required assistance, our key supplier would do its best to provide it. 0.883       
Our key supplier is interested in our firm’s well-being, not just its own. 0.905       
In times of difficulty (e.g. shortages), our key supplier has “gone out on a limb” for us. 0.907       
Relationship Duration: How long has your firm been buying from this key supplier? (in 
years) N/A* N/A N/A 1 
Supplier’s Substitutability: How substitutable is the key supplier of the key item to your 
firm? N/A* N/A N/A 1 
N = 64 
* Single item 
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In particular, ex ante methods to guard against common method bias include using different 
types of measures across constructs and different scale types for key construct measures; 
improving wordings of items to ensure their clear meanings and protect respondent anonymity; 
and making distinction between independent and dependent variables by measuring them in 
different sections (Podsakoff et al 2003). In fact, in addition to Likert scales, semantic scale was 
used for Supplier’s Market Dynamism. Moreover, for control variables, we use ratio scale to 
measure relationship duration. Some of the data for buying firm’s size were triangulated with 
data from their websites. All the above methods were used to prevent potential common method 
bias to the study before the surveys were launched. 
Ex post, a partial correlation procedure was employed by including a marker variable (Lindell & 
Whitney 2001). A marker variable is theoretically unrelated to one or more of the other variables 
in the study (Griffith & Lusch 2007; Lindell & Whitney 2001). In this study, buying firm’s 
market dynamism is included as the marker variable. Theoretically, this construct should have 
nothing to do with the constructs related to the firm’s supplier. Thus we should expect no 
significant correlations between this construct and other variables in the main model. 
Table 4-7. Common Method Bias Test 
 Main Model 
Variables 
Absorptive 
Capacity 
IT 
Integration 
Perceived 
Supplier Risk 
Visibility 
Buying Firm’s 
Market Dynamism 
Pearson 
Correlation -0.078 -0.158 0.175 -0.056 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.540 0.213 0.167 0.663 
 N 64 64 64 64 
As expected, I found no significant correlation even at the conservative 0.1 level between buying 
firm’s market dynamism and any of the variables in our main model (see Table 4-7). This result 
further provides evidence that common method bias is not likely a problem in this study. 
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4.4. Structural Model Analysis  
After testing and purifying the measurement items, I employ structural equation modeling 
(SEM), which allows for modeling multiple interdependent relationships, to test the model (J. C. 
Anderson & Gerbing 1988). Instead of using the covariance-based SEM, however, I use partial 
least squares (PLS), a component-based SEM, because this research is in a more exploratory 
phase as theories in the field are still primitive. Thus, a data set that is not the result of long-term 
measurement development processes and includes a mix of both primary and secondary data like 
one in this study may perform acceptably in PLS, while it may produce unacceptable results in 
the covariance-based SEM (David Gefen, Rigdon, & Straub 2011). Moreover, PLS has no 
distributional assumptions and does not require proportionality constraints on the observed 
variables (David Gefen, Rigdon, & Straub 2011). Additionally, the component-based SEM 
maximizes the explained variance of the endogenous variables (Chin 1998; D. Gefen, Straub, & 
Boudreau 2000), which allows us to understand how much variance is explained for the 
dependent constructs of Visibility and Perceived Supplier Risk. 
As part of the PLS procedure, the bootstrapping technique is used to generate t-value estimates. 
The bootstrapping represents a nonparametric approach for estimating the precision of PLS path 
estimate (Chin 1998). Under this approach, M samples are created by sampling with replacement 
from the original dataset of N (i.e. 64 in this study). Paths then are estimated for each sample. A 
distribution of the estimates from M samples is created for the path’s t-value calculation. 
To test the model with PLS, I use SmartPLS 2.0 (Ringle, Wende, & Will 2005). In this study, M 
bootstrapping of 200, 500, and 1,000 have been used. The results are similar. The follow results 
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are reported for M of 500. All the tests for the main model, mediation, and moderation can be 
done with the SmartPLS 2.0. 
4.4.1. Main Model Test 
Results for the main model could be found in Table 4-8. All the hypotheses for the main model 
are supported. In particular, hypothesis 1 posited that visibility would reduce the perceived 
supplier risk. I found that the path from visibility to perceived supplier risk is negative (-.358) 
and significant at 0.01 level (t-value = 2.702). Thus hypothesis 1 is strongly supported. 
Hypothesis 2 posited that absorptive capacity will enhance visibility. I found that the path from 
absorptive capacity to visibility is positive (.475) and significant at 0.01 level (t-value = 4.601). 
Thus hypothesis 2 is strongly supported. 
Hypothesis 3 posited that IT integration will enhance visibility. I found that the path from IT 
integration to visibility is positive (.198) but only significant at 0.05 level (t-value = 2.298). Thus 
hypothesis 3 is supported. 
As noted, I include several other variables in the model to control for spurious effects. In 
particular, for visibility as the dependent variable, I found that supplier’s market dynamism is 
negatively associated with visibility (-.070) but the relationship is not significant (t-value =.553). 
For the perceived supplier risk as the dependent variable, I found that supplier’s market 
dynamism and relationship duration are associated with perceived supplier risk with the path 
estimates of .285 and -.269 as expected, respectively. The paths are significant at 0.05 and 0.01 
levels, respectively (t-value = 2.474 and 3.377 respectively). However, the path from goodwill 
trust to perceived supplier risk, even though negative as one might expect (-.097), is not 
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significant (t-value = .827). Supplier’s substitutability is also not significantly related to 
perceived supplier risk either (0.011; t-value = .109). 
Table 4-8. PLS Results for Control Variable Only, Theoretical Only, and Full Models  
  
Control Variable 
Only Model 
Theoretical Variable 
Only Model Full Model 
Independent 
Variables Visibility 
Perceived 
Supplier 
Risk 
Visibility 
Perceived 
Supplier 
Risk 
Visibility 
Perceived 
Supplier 
Risk 
Theoretical Variables 
      
Absorptive Capacity     0.490**   0.475**   
t-value     5.664   4.601   
IT Integration     0.201*   0.198*   
t-value     2.487   2.298   
Visibility       -0.552**   -0.358** 
t-value       5.453   2.702 
Control Variables 
      
Supplier’s Market 
Dynamism -0.242 0.296**     -0.070 0.285* 
t-value 1.316 2.568     0.553 2.474 
Relationship Duration   -0.300**       -0.269** 
t-value   3.258       3.377 
Supplier’s 
Substitutability   -0.033       0.011 
t-value   0.300       0.109 
Goodwill Trust   -0.297**       -0.097 
t-value   2.745       0.827 
R-square 6% 38% 32% 27% 32% 46% 
* significant at 0.05 level 
    ** significant at 0.01 level 
    N = 64; Bootstrapping = 500 
    
In terms of R2, 32 percent of variance in visibility has been explained by absorptive capacity, IT 
integration, and supplier’s market dynamism and the model explained 46 percent of variance for 
perceived supplier risk. Such relatively high R2s are in the moderate to substantial ranges for 
social science studies (Chin 1998; J. C. Cohen, Jacob; Cohen, Patricia; West, Stephen G; Aiken, 
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Leona S; 2003), providing evidence for the model good fit. Moreover, compared to the control-
variable-only and theoretical-variable-only models, the full model provided higher explained 
variance for the dependent variable (38%, 27%, and 46%, respectively), providing further 
evidence for a good fit of the full model (see Table 4-8). 
4.4.2. Mediation Test 
To provide support for the hypothesized mediation effects, I employ the logic of mediation 
testing proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986). In particular, three conditions are required for 
mediation: (1) the independent variable is significantly related to the mediator variable; (2) the 
mediator variable is significantly related to the dependent variable; and (3) the relationship 
between the independent variable and the dependent variable is reduced when both the 
independent variable and mediator are considered. In our model, the independent variables are 
absorptive capacity and IT integration. The mediator is visibility. And the dependent variable is 
perceived supplier risk. It should be noted that I keep all the control variables in our mediation 
tests. The test results are provided in Table 4-9. 
In particular, the test results seemed to meet and satisfy these three conditions as we compared a 
direct effect model where only absorptive capacity is linked to perceived supplier risk with the 
model where the mediator visibility is also included. The relationships between absorptive 
capacity and perceived supplier risk turned from significant (-.338; t-value = 3.495) into non-
significant (-.224; t-value = 1.764) when the mediator is considered, thereby satisfying Baron 
and Kenny’s condition three. Absorptive capacity is significantly linked to visibility (i.e. 
condition one) and visibility is significantly associated with perceived supplier risk (i.e. 
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condition two) (see Table 4-9). Visibility then could be considered the full mediator between 
absorptive capacity and perceived supplier risk. Hypothesis H4a thus supported. 
Table 4-9. Mediation Test Results 
Independent Variables 
Perceived Supplier Risk as Dependent Variable 
Without-Mediator 
Model 
With-Mediator 
Model 
Full-Mediation 
Model 
Main Model Variables 
Absorptive Capacity -0.338** -0.246   
t-value 3.495 1.764   
IT Integration -0.008 0.019   
t-value 0.087 0.468   
Visibility   -0.242* -0.358** 
t-value   1.972 2.702 
Control Variables 
Supplier’s Market 
Dynamism 0.260* 0.264** 0.285* 
t-value 2.444 2.631 2.474 
Relationship Duration -0.250** -0.243** -0.269** 
t-value 2.669 2.84 3.377 
Supplier’s 
Substitutability 0.020 0.034 0.011 
t-value 0.215 0.38 0.109 
Goodwill Trust -0.218 -0.109 -0.097 
t-value 1.894 0.868 0.827 
* significant at 0.05 level 
** significant at 0.01 level 
N = 64; Bootstrapping = 500 
However, the relationship between IT integration and perceived supplier risk is not significant 
whether we include visibility or not (-0.008; t-value = .087 and .019; t-value = .468, 
respectively). Thus IT integration may have no effect on perceived supplier risk directly or 
indirectly. Instead, IT integration only influences visibility (see Table 4-9). Hypothesis H4b 
therefore is not supported. 
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To further validate our data analysis here for mediation effects, I employed Sobel’s tests on the 
indirect effects (Shrout & Bolger 2002; Sobel 1982). In particular, the standard errors of indirect 
effects will be calculated based on the following formula: 
sab = 
   	 
where sab is standard error of an indirect effect, a and b are direct effects of independent variable 
on the mediator and of the mediator on dependent variable, respectively, with their respective 
standard errors of sa and sb. The 95% confidence intervals for the indirect effects then can be 
calculated based on the formula: confidence bounds = ab 
 sab z.975. A confidence interval that 
does not cover zero provides supports for the significance of the indirect effect (i.e. meditational 
effect) (Shrout & Bolger 2002).  
Test results provided on table 4-10 further supported our mediation effect analyses. In particular, 
the indirect effect of absorptive capacity on perceived supplier risk via visibility is significantly 
different from zero, supporting for H4a. The indirect effect of IT integration on perceived 
supplier risk via visibility, however, is not significantly from zero. H4b, thus, is not supported. 
Table 4-10. Sobel's Tests on Indirect Effects 
  
  
Path 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
95% confidence interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Absorptive Capacity -> Visibility (a) 0.475 0.105 0.270 0.680 
Visibility -> Perceived Supplier Risk (b) -0.358 0.124 -0.601 -0.114 
Absorptive Capacity's Indirect Effect (a*b) -0.170 0.070 -0.307 -0.033 
IT Integration -> Visibility (c) 0.198 0.083 0.036 0.360 
Visibility -> Perceived Supplier Risk (d) -0.358 0.124 -0.601 -0.114 
IT integration's Indirect Effect (c*d) -0.071 0.039 -0.146 0.005 
N = 64; Bootstrapping = 500 
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4.4.3. Moderation Test 
To do the moderation tests, items were standardized to remove nonessential collinearity between 
the interaction terms and the independent variables (J. C. Cohen, Jacob; Cohen, Patricia; West, 
Stephen G; Aiken, Leona S; 2003) and to ensure the interaction constructs have items of the 
same scale unit. The standardized items then are multiplied to create items for the moderation 
constructs. Results for the moderation tests are provided on Table 4-11, 4-12, and 4-13. The 
results provide supports for Hypothesis 5 but not for Hypothesis 6. 
Table 4-11. Supplier's Market Dynamism as Moderator for Absorptive 
Capacity on Visibility 
Independent Variables 
Paths to Visibility 
Model 1 Model 2 
Absorptive Capacity 0.475** 0.426** 
t-value 4.601 4.269 
IT Integration 0.198* 0.203* 
t-value 2.298 2.554 
Supplier’s Market Dynamism -0.070 -0.166 
t-value 0.553 1.552 
Absorptive Capacity X Supplier's Market 
Dynamism   -0.319* 
t-value 
  2.487 
R-square 32% 42% 
* significant at 0.05 level 
** significant at 0.01 level 
N = 64; Bootstrapping = 500 
In particular, hypothesis 5 posited that supplier’s market dynamism will moderate the 
relationship between absorptive capacity and visibility such that the higher the market 
dynamism, the weaker the positive relationship between absorptive capacity and visibility. Thus 
we should expect the path estimate for the interaction term is significant and with the opposite 
sign to the path estimate for the independent variable. I tested this by adding the interaction term 
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between absorptive capacity and supplier’s market dynamism (see Table 4-11). I found that 
before adding the interaction term, the effect of absorptive capacity is positive and significant 
(Model 1). After adding the interaction term, the effect of absorptive capacity is still positive and 
significant (Model 2). As expected, the interaction term effect on visibility is negative and 
significant at 0.05 level (Model 2) (-.319; t-value = 2.487). R2 for visibility increases from 32 
percent to 42 percent after adding the interaction term, about 10 percent more variance 
explained. Thus, hypothesis 5 is supported. 
To further aid in interpretation of moderation, simple equations for the interaction effects are 
plotted for three values of the moderator: the mean, one standard deviation below the mean, and 
one standard deviation above the mean. If the lines are parallel, there are no interactions since the 
value of dependent variable corresponds to the value of the independent variable at a constant 
rate (i.e. equal slopes) across all values of the moderator. In contrast, if the lines are not parallel, 
there is an interaction (J. C. Cohen, Jacob; Cohen, Patricia; West, Stephen G; Aiken, Leona S; 
2003). The simple plots for the moderation effects of supplier’s market dynamism on the 
relationship between absorptive capacity and visibility are showed in Figure 4-1.  
The plots seemed to show that there is moderation effect of supplier’s market dynamism because 
the slope turns from very steep to less steep and almost parallel to the horizontal axis when 
supplier’s market dynamism takes the values from low to high. The slopes at the mean and one 
standard deviation below the mean values of supplier market’s dynamism look steep and not 
parallel to the horizontal axis. Thus, this provides further supports for hypothesis 5. 
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Figure 4-2. Simple Slopes for Visibility on Absorptive Capacity at Different Values of 
Supplier’s Market Dynamism 
To test for our suspicion that supplier’s market dynamism, while moderating the relationship 
between absorptive capacity and visibility, will not affect the one between IT integration and 
visibility, a similar model where the interaction term between IT integration and supplier’s 
market dynamism is added (see Table 4-12). As expected, the path from the interaction term of 
IT integration and supplier’s market dynamism to visibility, even though also negative (-.214), is 
not significant (t-value = 1.469). It provides support for our argument that supplier’s market 
dynamism may not moderate the relationship between IT integration and visibility. 
Simple equations plotted for this moderation equations can be found in Figure 4-2. The lines do 
not seem to parallel but the slopes look pretty flat and are not clearly different from each other. 
Thus there may be no moderation effect here or the effect is not significant (Table 4-12). 
High 
Low High 
Z is the standardized 
score of supplier’s 
market dynamism. 
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Table 4-12. Supplier's Market Dynamism as Moderator for IT 
Integration on Visibility 
Independent Variables Paths to Visibility Model 1 Model 2 
Absorptive Capacity 0.475** 0.483** 
t-value 4.601 4.562 
IT Integration 0.198* 0.166 
t-value 2.298 1.715 
Supplier’s Market Dynamism -0.070 -0.096 
t-value 0.553 0.781 
IT Integration X Supplier's Market 
Dynamism   -0.214 
t-value   1.469 
R-square 32% 37% 
* significant at 0.05 level 
** significant at 0.01 level 
N = 64; Bootstrapping = 500 
 
 
Figure 4-2. Simple Slopes for Visibility on IT Integration at Different Values of Supplier’s 
Market Dynamism 
High 
Low High 
Z is the standardized 
score of supplier’s 
market dynamism. 
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Hypothesis 6 posited that goodwill trust will moderate the relationship between visibility and 
perceived supplier risk such that the higher the goodwill trust, the weaker the negative 
relationship between visibility and perceived supplier risk. Thus we should expect the interaction 
term’s path is significant and with the opposite sign to the path from visibility to perceived 
supplier risk. The test result is provided in Table 4-13. 
Table 4-13. Goodwill Trust as Moderator for Visibility on Perceived 
Supplier Risk 
Independent Variables 
Paths to Perceived Supplier 
Risk 
Model 1 Model 2 
Visibility -0.358** -0.239 
t-value 2.702 1.909 
Goodwill Trust -0.097 -0.090 
t-value 0.827 0.686 
Visibility x Goodwill Trust   0.222 
t-value   0.778 
Supplier’s Market Dynamism 0.285* 0.365** 
t-value 2.474 3.397 
Relationship Duration -0.269** -0.259** 
t-value 3.377 3.124 
Supplier’s Substitutability 0.011 0.017 
t-value 0.109 0.171 
R-square 46% 49% 
* significant at 0.05 level 
** significant at 0.01 level 
N = 64; Bootstrapping = 500 
As we could see from the Table 4-13, the path from visibility to perceived supplier risk is 
negative and significant before adding the interaction term (Model 1) and is still negative but 
only almost significant after we added the term (Model 2). The interaction term between 
visibility and goodwill trust is positively associated with perceived supplier risk as expected 
(.222) but not significant (t-value = .778). R2 only increases from 46 percent to 49 percent after 
83 
 
 
 
adding the interaction term (3 percent more variance explained for perceived supplier risk). Thus 
hypothesis 6 is not supported. 
In the same vein, simple equations are plotted for the moderation effect of goodwill trust on the 
relationship between visibility and perceived supplier risk (Figure 4-3). Even though the lines 
seem to cross (i.e. different slopes), the slope differences are not so clear and in fact not 
significant (Table 4-13). Thus the analysis results do not support hypothesis 6. 
  
Figure 4-3. Simple Slopes for Perceived Supplier Risk on Visibility at Different Values of 
Goodwill Trust 
 
4.4.4. Robustness Test 
As mentioned earlier, our data sample includes two firms of extraordinary big size which may 
influence the analysis result. Thus I excluded the two firms when doing the analyses above. To 
test if data from the two firms may change the above analysis result, the two firms are included 
High 
Low 
High 
Z is the standardized 
score of goodwill trust. 
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back for testing and comparing results. Analysis results showed that including the two big firms 
actually did not change our results significantly (see tables on the Appendix C). Results for the 
main model are almost the same with all the significant paths as expected, compared to the 
results for the sample without the two firms. 
Compared to the analysis of the sample of 64, there is only a minor difference for the results of 
testing the main model. That is the path from visibility to perceived supplier risk is still 
significant, but only at the .05 level (instead of the 0.01 level as in the sample of 64 firms). Thus, 
these results provide evidence that our model test results may be robust to different firm size.  
In short, this chapter provides details for item generation process, survey, and model testing. A 
summary of the model testing results and hypotheses can be found in Figure 4-4 and in Table 4-
14. In general, analysis results provided supports for our model. In the next chapter, I’ll discuss 
the analysis results, theoretical and practical implications for this study, limitations, and 
directions for further research. 
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Table 4-14. Summary of Hypothesis Testing 
Hypotheses Relationships Supported 
H1 For a buying firm, Visibility into its supplier will reduce Perceived Supplier Risk. Yes 
H2 For a buying firm, Absorptive Capacity will increase Visibility into its supplier. Yes 
H3 For a buying firm, IT Integration with its supplier will increase Visibility into its supplier. Yes 
H4a 
For a buying firm, Visibility into its supplier will mediate 
the relationship between its Absorptive Capacity and 
Perceived Supplier Risk. 
Yes 
H4b 
For a buying firm, Visibility into its supplier will mediate 
the relationship between the firms’ IT Integration and 
Perceived Supplier Risk. 
No 
H5 
For a buying firm, the Supplier’s Market Dynamism will 
negatively moderate the positive relationship between 
Absorptive Capacity and Visibility such that when 
Supplier’s Market Dynamism is high the relationship 
between Absorptive Capacity and Visibility will be 
weaker, compared to when Supplier’s Market Dynamism 
is low. 
Yes 
H6 
For a buying firm, Goodwill Trust will negatively 
moderate the negative relationship between Visibility and 
Perceived Supplier Risk such that when Goodwill Trust is 
high the relationship between Visibility and Perceived 
Supplier Risk will be weaker, compared to when 
Goodwill Trust is low. 
No 
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Notes:  
* significant at .05 level. 
** significant at .01 level. 
t-values are in brackets. 
Control variables are not shown in 
the figure. 
Figure 4-4. Model Testing ResultsFigure 3-3. Model and Hypotheses 
R2 = 32% R2 = 46% 
.198* 
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CHAPTER V. DISCUSSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
This dissertation started with two key observations that (1) firms in the supply chain have been 
becoming more connected than ever and (2) disruptions have occurred more and more frequently 
in the global supply chains. As a result, firms in the supply chain may suffer from the potential 
ripple effects of disruptions. For a manufacturing firm, the disruption risks from its suppliers, 
especially the international ones, thus become prominent and need urgent attention. Dealing with 
the risks reactively (i.e. after they have occurred) is usually costly and sometimes ineffective. 
Thus, in this dissertation, I developed a model that links the key capability factors to help 
mitigate perceived supplier risk. The model delineated the configuration of information-based 
capabilities in mitigating supplier risk with the emphasis on visibility. Using data from U.S. 
manufacturing firms who partner with international suppliers, all the hypotheses in the model 
have been tested with adequate degree of rigor. In the following sections, hypothesis testing 
results for the model will be discussed. Next, I discuss the theoretical and practical implications 
from the paper results. Finally, limitations of the paper will be discussed with the respective 
recommendations for future research. 
5.1. Model Result Discussions 
In this section, I will discuss the results of the hypothesis testing, what arguments they supported, 
and how they are different or similar to previous results in extant literature. Hypotheses for the 
main model will be discussed first. Moderation hypotheses will be discussed next with some 
explanations offered for the non-significant finding of goodwill trust as moderator. 
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Almost all the hypotheses in the main model are supported. In particular, hypothesis 1 which 
posited that visibility will help reduce perceived supplier risk is strongly supported. This 
provides evidence for the arguments that visibility into its supplier (1) will help enhance the 
forecasting ability of the buying firm for possible disruptions from the supplier and thus (2) may 
enhance the control ability or at least the sense of control for the buying firm over its 
international supplier. The uncertainty component of perceived risk therefore will be reduced. 
This result is consistent with the fragmented evidence from previous articles. For example, it is 
consistent with the findings by Lee et al (1997; 2004) that internal data shared from its partner 
could help a firm in a supply chain better able to forecast inventory levels and thus lower the 
bullwhip effect risk in supply chains. 
It is important to note that hypothesis 1 is supported even after other variables have been 
controlled for. In particular, four other variables have been included as the covariates including 
supplier’s market dynamism, supplier substitutability, goodwill trust, and relationship duration. 
Thus, compared to a previous model (i.e. Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 2010), my model provides 
much higher explained variance for the construct of perceived supplier risk. While the model in 
Ellis et al. (2010) explained nearly 12 percent for the variance of supplier risk, the one in this 
study explained almost 46 percent. This is because the model in this dissertation extended the 
previous model in Ellis et al. (2010) by adding some key important variables including visibility, 
supplier’s market dynamism, and long-term relationship (cf. Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 2010). In 
fact, the 46 percent explained variance falls within the range from moderate to substantial for 
social science research (Chin 1998). That provides further evidence that visibility is an important 
concept that needs including, together with several other variables, when examining perceived 
supplier risk.  
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Several control variables for perceived supplier risk should be noted. First, in the model, I found 
that supplier’s market dynamism and relationship duration are significantly associated with 
perceived supplier risk. While the former is consistent with the finding by Ellis et al. (2010), the 
latter has not been considered in previous research. These findings, even though are not in my 
main thesis, are interesting. This is because supplier’s market dynamism is still positively 
associated with perceived supplier risk even in the presence of other variables including visibility 
and relationship duration. This may be explained by the fact that even though visibility could 
provide the sense of control and forecast ability for the buying firm, there are still uncertainty 
elements which come from the external environment (i.e. the supplier’s market) that the buying 
firm may not be able to forecast and control for. Such elements may be the black swans which 
are disproportionately high-impact, hard-to-predict, and rare events that blind-sight the 
managers. (Seville et al 2008; Taleb 2007).  
Similarly, relationship duration was found to have a significant negative relationship with 
perceived supplier risk even in the presence of visibility and supplier’s market dynamism. It is 
possible that the mere fact of working with the supplier for a long period of time is an evidence 
for lower possibility of disruptions from the supplier. The suppliers with disruptive history may 
have been cut off or changed by the buying firm as the relationship matures. All in all, further 
research is worthwhile for the relationships between visibility and other control variables with 
perceived supplier risk.  
Second and interestingly, I did not find a significant relationship between supplier 
substitutability and perceived supplier risk. This is in contrast with the finding by Ellis et al. 
(2010) that the degree to which a buying firm has a limited number of alternative sources of 
supply to meet a need has a positive relationship with the probability of supplier disruption. In 
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fact, Ellis et al. (2010)  offered two possible mechanisms for the positive relationship: (1) lock-in 
and (2) reduced information flow. They argued that because a buyer has fewer alternatives, the 
relationship with its supplier will be subjected to opportunism and the information flows will be 
limited. These lines of argument, however, may not hold if we consider one particular 
relationship. In particular, in a cooperative relationship where a buyer could gain high visibility 
into its supplier, for example, the fact that it has fewer alternatives may not have a simple linear 
relationship with the opportunism nor may it reduce information flow. In contrast, as the number 
of suppliers a buyer has increases to a very high level, the supply base may become too complex 
to deal with, increasing the supply risk (Choi & Krause 2006). Thus this relationship may not be 
linear or simple as we thought and may require further research. 
Next, hypotheses 2 and 3 link the potential information-based capabilities to visibility. I found 
supports for both hypotheses. In particular, hypothesis 2 based on the argument that because a 
buying firm with higher potential absorptive capacity is more able than others to value and 
assimilate external knowledge (cf. W. M. Cohen & Levinthal 1990; Lane & Lubatkin 1998). 
This is because absorptive capacity depends on investments in individual absorptive capacity. 
Trained and adequately equipped employees in the buying firm then can learn easily to overcome 
the barriers to knowledge transfer and therefore absorb the knowledge and information from its 
supplier faster and easier. Thus firms with higher absorptive capacity may have higher visibility 
into its supplier. The supported result for this hypothesis is consistent with previous studies. For 
example, Lyles and Salk found that capacity to learn and investment in training are positively 
related to knowledge acquisition by a firm from its partner (Lyles & Salk 2007). Similarly, in 
international joint-venture context, Phan et al. (2006) found that investment in training 
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employees will facilitate knowledge acquisition by the employees from their joint-venture 
partner. 
In the same vein, I found supports for hypothesis 3, which posited the positive relationship 
between IT integration and visibility. This hypothesis was founded on the argument that IT 
integration and alignment between partners’ systems provide the firms with common supporting 
operations to exchange information. Thus IT integration will smooth out the flow of active 
information within and across firms (Wu et al 2006), facilitating a buying firm to gain 
information of good quality from its partnering supplier. The empirical finding for this 
hypothesis is consistent with the findings in previous articles where researchers found IT 
integration lead to better quality of information exchanged (Kim, Cavusgil, & Calantone 2006) 
or IT alignment facilitates supply chain to increase the amount of information exchange (Wu et 
al 2006). 
One of the main theses in this study is that visibility is a key capability via which other 
capabilities will operate to mitigate perceived supplier risk. Thus hypotheses 4a and b posited 
that visibility will mediate the relationships between potential capabilities such as absorptive 
capacity and IT integration with perceived supplier risk. Our data analysis provided supports for 
hypothesis 4a but not 4b. This finding is interesting because while important, the capabilities 
such as absorptive capacity and IT integration will not operate well without visibility to gain the 
needed income. On the one hand, absorptive capacity may influence the risk outcome but only 
via visibility. IT integration, on the other hand, may have no effects on the risk outcome directly 
or indirectly. IT integration only has its influence on visibility. Thus absorptive capacity and IT 
integration will only provide the necessary, not sufficient, conditions for mitigating supplier risk. 
Making the distinction and the configuration of the capabilities are also important as it helps 
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explain why some buying firms may perceive very high risk from its suppliers even though they 
have similar absorptive capability and degree of IT integration. This line of argument parallels 
the distinction between potential and realized absorptive capacity (Zahra & George 2002) or the 
roles of IT alignment versus supply chain capability (Wu et al 2006), which have not been tested 
empirically. This study could be the first to test such line of argument. In short, the above 
hypotheses provided supports for our main model with the central thesis that some key 
information-based capabilities in their bundles can support and leverage each other to mitigate 
supplier risk proactively.  
The last two hypotheses, which explored the contextual conditions for the main model, found 
mixed support. In particular, hypothesis 5 posited that the influence of absorptive capacity on 
visibility will be weakened when the supplier’s market is highly dynamic. This is because a 
dynamic environment surrounding the supplier will make it difficult to make sense of the 
environment. The supplier therefore may not be able to transfer the needed information to the 
buyer even it is willing to do so. Moreover, the buyer will find it training knowledge for 
employees become obsolete very fast. As a result, under such dynamic environment, firms with 
even high absorptive capacity may not be able to turn it into high degree of visibility into its 
supplier. Data analysis results provided support for this hypothesis.  
Interestingly, supplier’s market dynamism was found not to moderate the relationship between 
IT integration and visibility. An explanation could be offered for this finding. This is because 
when two firms have established their system integration, the information transferred via the 
system is standardized and institutionalized. The market conditions thus may have been taken 
into account or they may not disrupt the information transfer process. This finding, however, 
may not necessarily mean that the effect of IT integration on visibility is more important because 
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it is less context-dependent, compared to absorptive capacity. In fact, a post-hoc analysis in the 
sample of 64 firms found that the effect size of absorptive capacity on visibility is about 30 
percent while the effect size of IT integration is only about five percent. Moreover, only 
absorptive capacity was found to have an indirect effect on perceived supplier risk. The finding 
here thus may only mean that absorptive capacity is more difficult for a buying firm to develop 
as it is context-dependent but when adequately invested it can fruitfully lead to higher visibility 
into it supplier for mitigating supplier risk, compared to IT integration. 
In the last hypothesis, I argued for a possible substitutability of visibility and goodwill trust for 
each other in mitigating perceived supplier risk. This is because goodwill trust could act as an 
informal control and therefore can substitute for visibility in mitigating risk. Our data analysis, 
however, found no significant relationship between the interaction term and perceived supplier 
risk even though the effect sign is positive as expected. Further examination of the arguments 
and data provides some possible explanations for this. 
First, the argument that goodwill trust can act as the substitute for visibility may not be valid, at 
least for the sample of the firms in the United States in this study. The notion that trust is “not a 
naïve faith where people take for granted the reliability…of their counterpart based on decision 
made in the distant past” (McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer 2003, p. 99) makes trust fragile and not 
enough to substitute for visibility. In another word, firms still need to periodically process 
information and clues about their counterparts to assess a situation. “Trust requires intermittent 
information processing because it is an intrinsically social organizing principle” (McEvily, 
Perrone, & Zaheer 2003, p. 99). Due to the limitations of sample size and dimensions of trust 
measured, however, further discussions or interpretation for this finding may be misleading. 
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Second, non-significant findings of the moderation effect should always be checked if they can 
be attributed to the problems in the measurement and data sampling. In this study, however, the 
construct of goodwill trust seems to be measured adequately with good reliability and validity. 
Caution, however, may be taken with the small sample size because it may prevent us from 
finding a significant relationship for the interaction term. In fact, the interaction term is a second-
order term. Finding an effect for such high-order terms thus usually requires a larger sample size 
than for low-order term. A sample size of only 64 or 66 thus may restrict the range, preventing us 
from finding a significant relationship (J. C. Cohen, Jacob; Cohen, Patricia; West, Stephen G; 
Aiken, Leona S; 2003). Together with other hypotheses supported, this testing result provides 
implications theoretically and practically which I would discuss next. 
5.2. Theoretical Implications 
This dissertation makes several contributions to theories of supplier risk, resource-based view 
and relational view, and the inter-firm trust literature. First, the concepts of risk in general and 
perceived supplier risk in particular have been clearly explicated. In this dissertation, the concept 
of supplier risk is conceptualized as a subjective and relationship-specific construct. In another 
words, the supplier risk to a buyer has to be considered within their particular relationship. A 
buyer may be sourcing one item from several suppliers. The buyer’s perceived supplier risks thus 
may be different toward different suppliers. This is important because how a firm perceives its 
particular supplier will determine the behaviors or strategies that the firm may have toward the 
particular partner.  
Second, this study contributes to the literature of resource-based view and the relational view 
(Barney 1991; Dyer & Singh 1998). In particular, the model in this dissertation posited a 
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relationship between relationship-specific capabilities and perceived supplier risk. Findings in 
this study confirm the view that a buying firm’s capabilities, such as absorptive capacity, IT 
integration, and visibility, when developed, can help it mitigate the supplier risk, thus improving 
the relationship-specific performance for the buying firm when dealing with its supplier. A 
frequently disruptive supply chain is costly for a buying firm (Hendricks & Singhal 2005a, 
2005b) and thus lowers the firm’s performance. In fact, a post-hoc analysis in this study 
confirmed the assumption that perceived supplier risk can be considered a reverse of 
relationship-specific performance. The correlation between perceived supplier risk and a scale of 
relationship-specific performance (R. Klein & Rai 2009) is negatively high and significant (r = - 
.534, significant at 0.01 level). 
Third, and more importantly, this study adds to the capability discussion of the resource-based 
and relational views (Barney 1991; Dyer & Singh 1998; Wernerfelt 1984). For example, a 
nuance to those views is the way that capabilities may facilitate each other in mitigating risk. The 
general views on resource and capabilities usually state that the resources and/or capabilities, 
when developed and when they meet several conditions, could lead to high performance or 
competitive advantage for a firm. Few attempts have been made to clarify the configurations and 
mechanisms under which capabilities could result in higher performance. In this paper, I made a 
distinction between absorptive capacity and IT integration with visibility with the emphasis on 
the latter in risk mitigation. This is important because absorptive capacity and IT integration can 
only operate via visibility to result in higher performance outcome with regards to supplier risk. 
Findings from this study confirmed this argument. 
In another way, a nuance has been added to the views by examining the contextual conditions 
under which capabilities will operate. In particular, I have argued and found that the condition 
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surrounding a supplier may facilitate or hamper the effect of absorptive capacity on visibility but 
have no influence on the relationship between IT integration and visibility. Such contextual or 
boundary conditions are important to understand when a relationship may work or may not work. 
Similarly, I argued for the moderating effect of goodwill trust on the relationship between 
visibility and perceived supplier risk even though I did not find support for this argument with 
the data sample in this study. 
In fact, the non-significant findings for the moderation effect of goodwill trust could be a 
contribution to the literature of trust, at least for its dimension of benevolence or goodwill. This 
is because findings in this study seem to demonstrate that trust, and more particular the goodwill 
trust, may be fragile and should not considered a naïve faith (McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer 2003). 
While important, trust alone is not enough and may need to be complemented by other important 
organizing principles such as visibility. The fact that visibility has significant (negative) 
relationship with supplier risk even when other variables have been controlled, while goodwill 
trust does not, seems to direct to the critical role of visibility in a buyer-supplier relationship, 
rather than trust. Again, further extrapolation can be misleading and dangerous given the 
limitations of sample size and the dimensions of trust examined in this study, issues that I will 
discuss in the limitation and future research section. 
5.3. Practical Implications 
Given the recent disruptions in multiple supply chains and the global economic crisis, a study on 
factors that could help mitigate supplier risks proactively is in urgent need. This study provides 
several implications which can be classified into two categories: implications for buyers and for 
suppliers. 
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For buying firms who are dealing with international suppliers, this study suggested that a key 
capability that needs to be developed to mitigate supplier risks proactively is visibility. A buying 
firm thus may want to ensure it gets the information from its supplier accurately, relevantly, and 
in a timely manner. The information here should include not only the operation activities but the 
strategies and technological knowledge. Lacking visibility into its supplier is similar to 
conducting business blindly with the supplier. Those who lack visibility are vulnerable and when 
disruptions occur they have to try to resolve the damages by costly remedies. The losses accrued 
by Boeing recently with its project of Dreamliner 787 is a valuable lesson that any firms should 
learn (see Greising & Johnsson 2007 among others for more details). 
It is important to note that developing visibility is a capability that other mechanisms may not be 
able to substitute for. First, a long relationship with a supplier alone may not be enough to ensure 
lower supplier risk for a buyer. Usually a long relationship means the relationship is stable and 
working with the supplier is still considered valuable for a buyer that it may not want to change 
yet. However, even after controlling for relationship duration, visibility is still significantly 
related to supplier risk. This result means that visibility into a supplier thus is important for the 
buyer regardless the fact that it has a short or long relationship with the supplier. 
Second, despite the market conditions surrounding the supplier, visibility is still the key to ensure 
a lower supplier risk. Results from this study seem to show that there may be still elements in the 
macro environment that managers in a buying firm may not be able to control for or at least they 
feel that they cannot control for. Huge disruptions that rarely happen such as the earthquake in 
Japan in 2011 may be uncontrollable, nor predictable. Still many other disruptions and/or their 
consequences can be mitigated proactively or at least, the impacts of the rare events may be 
lessened if a buying firm could gain adequate visibility into its supplier. 
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Third, developing trust through supplier’s goodwill may not help nor substitute for visibility in 
mitigating supplier risk. In many instances, a supplier is benevolent and does not have any intent 
to cheat or take advantage of the buyer. However, many other factors may involve and operate 
that possibly cause disruptions for the supplier and then ripple through to the buyer. Gaining 
visibility thus is not about if a firm wanted to trust its supplier or not. It is about mitigating the 
potential disruption risk from the supplier. 
The last factor that has been controlled for in the model is supplier’s substitutability. Data 
analysis, however, showed that this factor is not significantly related to supplier risk. The 
implication for a buyer then is that we may no longer be able to depend on the old-fashioned 
approach that the U.S. manufacturing usually follows: using multiple sources for a needed item. 
This is because using multiple sources may not reduce the disruption risk from a particular 
supplier as specified in this study result. Increasing the number of suppliers may even hamper 
visibility into each supplier because the supply base becomes more complex to manage. 
Moreover, given the accelerating failure rate of suppliers due to the recent economic slowdown 
(McKinsey & Company Operations Extranet 2010), it cannot be guaranteed that a buyer can turn 
to other suppliers when one supplier fails to supply the needed item. Note that, however, this 
observation does not recommend buyers to use a single-source approach. In some cases, some 
alternative sources for a needed item may be necessary. The key here is to gain visibility into the 
suppliers that a buyer is sourcing from to prevent possible disruptions and mitigate their 
subsequent losses. 
Moreover, the model in this study also provides some pathways for buying firms to develop 
visibility into its suppliers. Visibility can be developed through investing in developing 
absorptive capacity and IT integration. Thus to gain visibility, a buying firm may invest in 
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training its boundary employees to be able to value and assimilate the external knowledge related 
to the supplier and the item sourced. Aligning and integrating the information systems with the 
supplier are also recommended because such alignment can facilitate information exchange 
between the firms. Note that, however, the model results seem to show that developing 
absorptive capacity for employees is more important than the IT systems themselves. It should 
be remembered that whatever systems can be, they are designed by people and the information 
exchanged via the systems must be and can only be for the institutionalized and standardized 
ones. Investing in training employees for higher absorptive capacity, however, may be costly and 
a continuing job because in a changing environment, knowledge can be obsolete very soon. 
Also for the above reason, it is not recommended that a buyer should develop visibility into just 
any suppliers. Developing such capability is costly and time-dependent. A buyer thus should 
consider the cost-benefit balance for gaining visibility. When a sourced item is strategically 
important, gaining visibility to lower supplier risk may be worthwhile. 
From practical point of view, managers in a buyer may use the measurement scales developed in 
this study to measure the degree of visibility and perceived supplier risk by surveying their 
boundary employees. These measurement scales have been proved to have reliability and 
validity and thus could be used to monitor the current status of risk and visibility when a buying 
firm is dealing with its supplier. Because disruptions could occur any time and a reliable supplier 
today may not guarantee disruptions will not happen in the future, measuring the degrees of 
visibility and risk should be done on a regular basis, especially for the strategically important 
items.  
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Even though the model in this study takes a buyer’s perspective, it has implications for suppliers. 
Thus some recommendations can also be made for suppliers who are doing business with 
international buyer. For example, as visibility is very important for a buyer to reduce the supplier 
risk, it is important for a supplier to help a buyer gain its visibility too. This is because a buyer 
that perceives high risk from its supplier may consider change its supplier and go for an 
alternative (Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 2010). Moreover, helping a buyer to gain transparency into 
the supplier’s operation and capabilities can help the buyer foster capability and performance 
improvement for the supplier (Joshi 2009).  
But should a supplier disclose full information, even the most sensitive, to any buyers? The 
simple answer is no even though the model in this study cannot help answer the question directly 
because it was only examined from a buyer’s perspective. Lessons from fostering bilateral 
strategic relationships, however, seem to show that if a supplier considers a buyer as a strategic 
partner, it may be worthwhile to disclose sensitive information. Of course, disclosing such 
sensitive information can be a matter of relationship evaluation in terms of not only the power-
dependence structure but also the trust sentiment over a partner (Frazier 2009). Moreover, in 
exchange, the supplier may require the same degree of information sharing from its buyer 
because transparency may be and should be a balanced and bilateral issue that no side could do 
to force the other to disclose information unilaterally (Lamming et al 2005).  
Besides other mechanisms, the least a supplier can do to help its buyer gaining visibility, as the 
model in this paper suggests, is to align and integrate its IT system with the buyer’s. Such 
alignment will help facilitate information sharing in an efficient and speedy manner. The supplier 
may also facilitate its buyer to absorb new knowledge related to the item it is providing. 
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5.4. Limitation and Future Research 
Though most of the hypotheses are supported and the study provides a useful perspective in 
mitigating supplier risk, this study has several shortcomings that should be addressed in future 
research. The limitations for this study will be discussed in terms of both the methodological 
design and theoretical framework. 
Methodologically, this study involves the collection of perceptual data from a single source at a 
particular point in time. Thus it may entail several methodological limitations. For example, the 
use of single data source for both dependent and independent variables may create a common 
method bias. This limitation has been somewhat addressed in this study by using key informant 
method. The informants here are at a high level of management and work with the supplier for a 
certain period of time. Thus they could have good knowledge about the relationship with the 
variables and can answer the questionnaire adequately. Moreover, methods have been carried out 
to reduce the potential for common method bias by separating the dependent and independent 
variables and by adding a marker variable for testing such bias. Still, to address these concerns 
further, additional research should consider using other source of data such as archival measures 
and in-depth examination of the firms studied. Dyadic data and/or multiple informants within an 
organization can also be considered to provide a triangulated view on the variables examined. 
Another methodological limitation is the use of cross-sectional data to test cause-and-effect 
relationships. This violates a key condition for establishing cause and effect, namely the cause 
must exist before the effect. However, this is a common practice in our field because surveying 
managers become more challenging and costly. Moreover, the model in this study has been 
subjected to theoretical lens to provide the logics for cause-and-effect relationships. Still, 
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additional studies should consider using experimental and quasi-experimental methods or 
longitudinal data to facilitate temporal separation between cause and effect variables. 
Small sample size is another limitation of this study. Although most of the hypotheses were 
supported and the measurement items seem to be reliable and valid, small sample size may lower 
the power to detect high-order relationship (J. C. Cohen, Jacob; Cohen, Patricia; West, Stephen 
G; Aiken, Leona S; 2003). In fact, this study employed PLS with bootstrapping method to 
calculate t-values more accurately for the path estimates. To some extent, the method can 
mitigate the limitation of small sample size when relationships are tested. Still, replication 
research with larger sample size may be needed to further confirm results in this study.  
In addition to the methodological limitations, future studies should attempt to deepen the extant 
knowledge about supplier risk in several theoretical aspects. First, in this study only the 
disruption risk is examined. Even though it is the focus of this study and motivated by some 
observations about the recent phenomenon, it represents only one type of supplier risk. Other 
types of risks from suppliers such as relational risk, IT system risk, and social corporate risk 
(Spekman & Davis 2004) could be examined in their relationships or interaction with the 
disruption risk in the future studies. 
Second, this study identified and tested the model for some key information-based capabilities 
including visibility, absorptive capacity, and IT integration. Examining these information-based 
capabilities is appropriate given the nature of supplier risk is uncertainty which is information-
related. Other control variables have also been used and the model provided a substantial 46 
percent of explained variance for the variable of supplier risk. Still other variables may be 
considered to increase further the explained variance in additional studies. 
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Third, in this study only goodwill trust is examined as a moderator on the relationship between 
visibility and supplier risk. Although the focus on goodwill trust is appropriate in light of the 
attempt to identify an informal substitute for visibility in mitigating supplier risk, other 
components of trust may be considered in future research including ability and honesty. Future 
research should examine how different components of trust may influence or moderate the 
pathways to perceived supplier risk. 
Fourth, while visibility has been identified and proved to be the key capability to mitigate 
supplier risk, in this study, only two key information-based potential capabilities have been 
examined as the antecedents to visibility. Although examining absorptive capacity and visibility 
is appropriate because they represent the groups of factors that may influence visibility. Given 
the fact that visibility can be a bilateral issue which involves both sides in a relationship, other 
factors as antecedents to visibility may be considered in additional research. These include, for 
example, other IT resources or capabilities such as IT advancement and internal IT integration 
(Wu et al 2006). With data from the supplier side, other relational variables such as supplier’s 
trust and commitment on buyer can also be included in future studies. 
As a conclusion, this study provides a useful framework and a valuable perspective for 
mitigating supplier risk. In general, data collected for this study provided support for the model 
proposed. Future research, however, can capitalize on the limitations of this study to design 
better studies to understand supplier risk. This is an important and interesting phenomenon. The 
mere fact that disruptions from global suppliers become more and more prominent recently while 
many managers still pay little attention to these, at least in our sampling frame of U.S. 
manufacturers, makes it a very interesting and worthwhile topic for further research.
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GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY CIBER 
BENCHMARK SURVEY OF LEADING-EDGE PRACTICES IN  
MITIGATING GLOBAL PROCUREMENT RISKS 
 
Please briefly describe the key item (i.e., equipment, components, etc.) that this key foreign supplier sells 
to your firm:                            __.  
 
 
 
Please indicate the degree of criticality of the key item for your  
manufacturing process: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
 
 How substitutable is the key supplier of the key item to your firm? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
A. For each of the following questions, otherwise indicated, please mark the number that best 
describes your answer on the scale from 1= Strongly Disagree to 7= Strongly Agree. 
I. Doing Business with this Key Supplier 
 
 
 
1 In doing business with our key supplier, we rely on our familiarity of 
the business culture in our key supplier’s market. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2 We commit resources to acquire new knowledge from our key 
supplier. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3 We commit resources to understand our key supplier’s processes. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4 We invest in training our employees to make better use of knowledge 
of our key supplier. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please answer all questions in this survey as they relate to your most important foreign 
supplier (we refer to this as a key supplier). This should be an independent foreign firm that 
is supplying a critical and frequently-purchased product to your company. We refer to this 
product as the key item. This key item likely represents an important purchase in terms of 
business volume and/or criticality. Please respond to all questions in the context of the 
key foreign supplier and the key item. 
Moderately 
Critical 
Extremely 
Critical 
Easily 
Substitutable 
Non-
Substitutable 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Agree 
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II. Key Supplier’s Business Environment 
How would you describe the business environment in the key supplier’s territory with regard to the 
key item?  
 
Stable    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Volatile 
 
Certain  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Uncertain 
 
Changes slowly  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Changes rapidly 
 
Predictable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unpredictable 
 
Stable market 
conditions     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Erratic market conditions 
 
 
III. Information Technology (IT) Systems: 
 
 
 
 
 
1 My firm’s IT system is compatible with our key supplier’s IT system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2 My firm’s IT system is aligned with our key supplier’s.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3 My firm and our key supplier have invested in our IT systems to make 
them interoperable.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4 Both my firm and our key supplier work together to integrate our IT 
systems. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5 
IT advances for supply chain communication system are well aligned 
between my firm and our key supplier in order to achieve the best 
supply chain performance. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Agree 
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IV. Perceptions of the Key Supplier: 
 
 
 
1 If our firm required assistance, our key supplier would do its best to provide it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2 Our key supplier is interested in our firm’s well being, not just its own. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3 In times of difficulty (e.g. shortages), our key supplier has “gone out 
on a limb” for us. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4 Our key supplier tends to be candid in our dealings with it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5 We would characterize our key supplier as being fair in its dealing 
with us. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
6 Overall, our key supplier keeps its commitments. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Supplier’s operational information relates to process issues on the supplier’s side including delivery 
schedules, production and operation schedules, and logistic arrangements.  
Please answer the following questions with regard to the key supplier and the key item. 
 
 
 
1 We believe that our operational information about our key supplier is 
accurate. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2 Overall, information regarding our key supplier’s operations is 
available to us in a timely manner.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3 The operational information we have about our key supplier is relevant 
to our operation. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4 The operational information we have about our key supplier is useful 
to improve our performance. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5 Our key supplier shares with us the information regarding its process issues in a timely manner. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
  
Strongly 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Agree 
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Supplier’s strategic information relates to resource, commitment, and relatively irreversible intentions 
and actions of the supplier.  
Please answer the following questions with regard to the key supplier and the key item.  
 
 
 
1 We have a good understanding of the resource and capabilities of our key supplier. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2 We believe that the strategic information we have about our key 
supplier is accurate. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3 The strategic information we have about our key supplier is up-to-date. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4 The strategic information we have about our key supplier is relevant to 
our business. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5 We have access to long-term plans of our key supplier in a timely 
manner. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
6 The strategic information we have about our key supplier is useful for improving our performance. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
With regard to the key supplier and the key item, to what extent would you agree with the following 
statements? 
 
 
 
1 We fear that potential disruptions from our key supplier may result in significant losses for us. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2 We fear that sourcing the item from our key supplier may expose us to 
significant losses. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3 We fear that disruptions in our key supplier’s business environment 
may result in significant losses for us. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4 We fear that our key supplier’s vulnerabilities may expose us to 
significant loss. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5 We fear that our key supplier may expose us to potential disruptions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Agree 
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With regard to the key supplier and the key item, to what extent would you agree with the following 
statements? 
 
 
 
1 We don’t have workable plans to cope with potential disruptions to the key item availability. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2 Our key supplier does not have strong controls for unexpected events.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3 In case of disruptions, we have limited legal grounds to force our key 
supplier to address our claims. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4 Our key supplier’s performance is resilient to volatile changes in its business environment.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
With regard to the key item purchased from the key supplier, to what extent would you agree with 
the following statements? 
 
 
 
1 There is a high possibility of untimely delivery of the key item. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2 There is a high possibility of cost overruns for the key item. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3 Our key supplier is not reliable in providing the key item. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4 Our key supplier is financially stable. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5 Our key supplier is not capable of providing the key item with 
consistent quality. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
6 Our key supplier does not have the technological capability to ensure 
stability in the supply of the key item. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
 
  
Strongly 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Agree 
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With regard to the relationship-specific performance, how would you agree with the following 
statements? 
Our firm has realized the following performance outcomes as a result of our interactions with this 
key supplier:  
 
 
 
1 Improved asset management. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2 Increased productivity. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3 Lower operating costs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4 Improved production planning. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5 Improved resource control. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
6 Increased flexibility. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
B. Finally, with our full respect to confidentiality, we seek your opinion on the impact of the key 
supplier on your firm.  We are not asking for accounting data, just some rough indicators. 
1. Do you have a formal, signed contract with the key supplier? ____  yes   ____ no.    
2. If yes, how frequently do you renew the contract? _________________. 
3. Please name the country from which the key item is sourced?_________________. 
4. How long has your firm been buying from this key supplier? _______________ year(s). 
5. During the past year, approximately what percentage of your firm’s total procurement budget was 
allocated to purchases from this key supplier?  __________  %. 
6. What percentage of cost of the final product is accounted for by this key item? _________ %. 
7. How would describe the market of the final product you mentioned in the above question? 
 
Stable    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Erratic 
 
Certain  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Uncertain 
 
Predictable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unpredictable 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Agree 
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8. Which industry does your firm operate in?  _________________________________. 
9. About how many non-administrative employees are there in your division or business unit in the 
U.S.A.?____________employees. 
10. About how many non-administrative employees does your firm employ worldwide? 
___________employees. 
11. Please estimate the approximate total sales of your firm last year:  $____________________. 
12. Please state your current title in the firm: _______________________. 
13. How long have you been working for your current firm? _____________ years. 
14. Your opinions are important to us. Feel free to give us any comments that you may have:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As a token of appreciation, we will be happy to share with you the summary of the research findings. 
Please indicate your email address where you would like to receive the summary report:  
 
___________________________________________________________________. 
 
Thank you so much! Your opinions are important to us. 
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS RESEARCH AND 
EDUCATION (CIBER) 
 A National Resource Center Designated by the U.S. Department of Education 
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APPENDIX B. ITEM INTER-CORRELATIONS 
# Items 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
1 
We commit resources to acquire 
new knowledge from our key 
supplier. 
1.00 
                      
2 We commit resources to understand 
our key supplier's processes. 0.66 1.00                      
3 
We invest in training our employees 
to make better use of knowledge of 
our key supplier. 
0.54 0.50 1.00 
                    
4 My firm’s IT system is compatible 
with our key supplier’s IT system. 0.08 0.03 0.24 1.00                    
5 My firm’s IT system is aligned with 
our key supplier’s. 0.19 0.11 0.32 0.84 1.00                   
6 
My firm and our key supplier have 
invested in our IT systems to make 
them interoperable. 
0.07 0.05 0.26 0.74 0.80 1.00 
                 
7 
Both my firm and our key supplier 
work together to integrate our IT 
systems. 
0.11 0.06 0.23 0.73 0.82 0.91 1.00 
                
8 
IT advances for supply chain 
communication system are well 
aligned between my firm and our 
key supplier in order to achieve the 
best supply chain performance. 
0.18 0.17 0.24 0.74 0.73 0.68 0.69 1.00 
               
9 Supplier Environment – Stable/Volatile 0.02 -0.29 -0.12 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.03 1.00               
10 Supplier Environment – Certain/Uncertain -0.02 -0.31 -0.21 -0.16 -0.15 -0.10 -0.05 -0.14 0.87 1.00              
11 Supplier Environment –Predictable/ Unpredictable -0.04 -0.22 -0.15 -0.18 -0.14 0.04 -0.02 -0.13 0.63 0.63 1.00             
12 
We believe that our operational 
information about our key supplier 
is accurate. 
0.20 0.19 0.13 0.25 0.33 0.20 0.13 0.30 -0.25 -0.32 -0.12 1.00 
           
13 
Overall, information regarding our 
key supplier’s operations is 
available to us in a timely manner. 
0.39 0.55 0.32 0.13 0.25 0.15 0.11 0.28 -0.16 -0.22 0.00 0.67 1.00 
          
14 
The operational information we 
have about our key supplier is 
useful to improve our performance. 
0.28 0.38 0.44 0.26 0.38 0.32 0.31 0.31 -0.16 -0.16 -0.07 0.29 0.53 1.00 
         
15 
We have a good understanding of 
the resource and capabilities of our 
key supplier. 
0.31 0.55 0.31 0.22 0.27 0.16 0.11 0.23 -0.14 -0.19 -0.04 0.49 0.61 0.52 1.00 
        
16 
We believe that the strategic 
information we have about our key 
supplier is accurate. 
0.39 0.47 0.24 0.21 0.31 0.15 0.15 0.22 -0.13 -0.18 0.00 0.59 0.67 0.52 0.67 1.00 
       
17 
The strategic information we have 
about our key supplier is relevant to 
our business. 
0.30 0.48 0.29 0.07 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.19 -0.18 -0.14 0.00 0.54 0.68 0.64 0.76 0.76 1.00 
      
18 
If our firm required assistance, our 
key supplier would do its best to 
provide it. 
0.01 0.21 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.05 -0.26 -0.32 -0.08 0.58 0.50 0.15 0.31 0.26 0.27 1.00 
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# Items 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
19 
Our key supplier is interested 
in our firm’s well being, not 
just its own. 
0.23 0.33 0.30 0.20 0.36 0.28 0.24 0.25 -0.11 -0.24 -0.12 0.62 0.58 0.29 0.38 0.46 0.41 0.68 1.00 
    
20 
In times of difficulty (e.g. 
shortages), our key supplier 
has “gone out on a limb” for 
us. 
0.16 0.27 0.15 0.18 0.28 0.24 0.21 0.24 -0.09 -0.12 -0.09 0.56 0.63 0.44 0.40 0.36 0.39 0.68 0.77 1.00 
   
21 
Our key supplier does not 
have strong controls for 
unexpected events. 
-0.27 -0.47 -0.26 -0.17 -0.26 -0.12 -0.13 -0.17 0.27 0.27 0.31 -0.28 -0.46 -0.28 -0.41 -0.38 -0.37 -0.36 -0.39 -0.37 1.00 
  
22 
Our key supplier is not 
capable of providing the key 
item with consistent quality. 
-0.31 -0.45 -0.13 -0.12 -0.09 -0.01 -0.02 -0.16 0.30 0.22 0.26 -0.29 -0.40 -0.28 -0.43 -0.37 -0.36 -0.30 -0.19 -0.31 0.47 1.00 
 
23 
Our key supplier has the 
technological capability to 
ensure stability in the supply 
of the key item (reverse). 
-0.29 -0.49 -0.36 -0.12 -0.17 -0.06 -0.04 -0.11 0.46 0.46 0.32 -0.30 -0.44 -0.20 -0.43 -0.32 -0.34 -0.30 -0.29 -0.22 0.50 0.70 1.00 
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APPENDIX C. MODEL TEST RESULTS FOR SAMPLE SIZE OF 66 
Table C-1. Structural Path Results 
  
Control Variable 
Only Model 
Theoretical Variable 
Only Model Full Model 
Independent 
Variables Visibility 
Perceived 
Supplier 
Risk 
Visibility 
Perceived 
Supplier 
Risk 
Visibility 
Perceived 
Supplier 
Risk 
Theoretical Variables 
      
Absorptive Capacity     0.507**   0.488**   
t-value     6.176   4.317   
IT Integration     0.201*   0.197*   
t-value     2.524   2.191   
Visibility       -0.489**   -0.316* 
t-value       4.768   2.304 
Control Variables 
      
Supplier’s Market 
Dynamism -0.267 0.265*     -0.074 0.240* 
t-value 1.558 2.157     0.538 1.992 
Relationship Duration   -0.330**       -0.314** 
t-value   3.326       3.475 
Supplier’s 
Substitutability   -0.056       -0.028 
t-value   0.522       0.280 
Goodwill Trust   -0.289**       -0.111 
t-value   2.587       0.995 
R-square 7% 37% 35% 24% 35% 43% 
* significant at 0.05 level 
    ** significant at 0.01 level 
    N = 66; Bootstrapping = 500 
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Table C-2. Mediation Test Results 
Independent Variables 
Perceived Supplier Risk as Dependent Variable 
Without-Mediator 
Model 
With Mediator 
Model 
Full Mediation 
Model 
Main Model Variables 
Absorptive Capacity -0.289** -0.201   
t-value 2.880 1.507   
IT Integration 0.018 0.044   
t-value 0.177 0.470   
Visibility   -0.224 -0.316* 
t-value   1.304 2.304 
Control Variables 
Supplier’s Market Dynamism 0.214* 0.217* 0.240* 
t-value 2.045 1.979 1.992 
Relationship Duration -0.304** -0.299** -0.314** 
t-value 3.468 3.359 3.475 
Supplier’s Substitutability -0.030 -0.018 -0.028 
t-value 0.286 0.176 0.280 
Goodwill Trust -0.223 -0.122 -0.111 
t-value 1.911 1.007 0.995 
* significant at 0.05 level 
** significant at 0.01 level 
N = 66; Bootstrapping = 500 
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Table C-3. Supplier's Market Dynamism as Moderator 
Independent Variables Paths to Visibility Model 1 Model 2 
Absorptive Capacity 0.488** 0.450** 
t-value 4.317 4.614 
IT Integration 0.197* 0.205** 
t-value 2.191 2.579 
Supplier’s Market Dynamism -0.074 -0.175 
t-value 0.538 1.557 
Absorptive Capacity X Supplier's 
Market Dynamism   -0.304* 
t-value   2.061 
R-square 35% 43% 
* significant at 0.05 level 
** significant at 0.01 level 
N = 66; Bootstrapping = 500 
 
Table C-4. Supplier's Market Dynamism as Moderator 
Independent Variables Paths to Visibility Model 1 Model 2 
Absorptive Capacity 0.488** 0.501** 
t-value 4.317 4.955 
IT Integration 0.197* 0.160 
t-value 2.191 1.697 
Supplier’s Market Dynamism -0.074 -0.102 
t-value 0.538 0.832 
IT Integration X Supplier's 
Market Dynamism   -0.229 
t-value   1.264 
R-square 35% 40% 
* significant at 0.05 level 
** significant at 0.01 level 
N = 66; Bootstrapping = 500 
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Table C-5. Goodwill Trust as Moderator 
Independent Variables 
Paths to Perceived Supplier 
Risk 
Model 1 Model 2 
Visibility -0.316* -0.153 
t-value 2.304 1.131 
Goodwill Trust -0.111 -0.126 
t-value 0.995 1.066 
Visibility x Goodwill Trust   0.306 
t-value   0.986 
Supplier’s Market Dynamism 0.240* 0.343** 
t-value 1.992 2.980 
Relationship Duration -0.314** -0.289** 
t-value 3.475 3.123 
Supplier’s Substitutability -0.028 -0.005 
t-value 0.280 0.047 
R-square 43% 49% 
* significant at 0.05 level 
** significant at 0.01 level 
N = 66; Bootstrapping = 500 
  
118 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Amit, R., & Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1993), "Strategic Assets and Organizational Rent," Strategic 
Management Journal, 14 (1), 33-46. 
Anand, G., & Ward, P. T. (2004), "Fit, Flexibility and Performance in Manufacturing: Coping 
with Dynamic Environments," Production & Operations Management, 13 (4), 369-385. 
Anderson, J. C., & Gerbing, D. W. (1988), "Structural Equation Modeling in Practice: A Review 
and Recommended Two-Step Approach," Psychological Bulletin, 103 (3), 411-423. 
Anderson, J. C., & Narus, J. A. (1990), "A Model of Distributor Firm and Manufacturer Firm 
Working Partnerships," Journal of Marketing, 54 (1), 42-58. 
Armstrong, J. S., & Overton, T. S. (1977), "Estimating Nonresponse Bias in Mail Surveys," 
Journal of Marketing Research, 14 (3), 396-402. 
Arrow, K. J. (1965), Aspects of the Theory of Risk Bearing. Helsinki: Yijo Jahnssonis Saatio. 
Barney, J. (1991), "Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage," Journal of 
Management, 17 (1), 99. 
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986), "The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social 
Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations," Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173-1182. 
Barratt, M., & Oke, A. (2007), "Antecedents of Supply Chain Visibility in Retail Supply Chains: 
A Resource-Based Theory Perspective," Journal of Operations Management, 25 (6), 
1217-1233. 
Bello, D. C., Chelariu, C., & Zhang, L. (2003), "The Antecedents and Performance 
Consequences of Relationalism in Export Distribution Channels," Journal of Business 
Research, 56 (1), 1. 
119 
 
 
 
Bello, D. C., & Gilliland, D. I. (1997), "The Effect of Output Controls, Process Controls, and 
Flexibility on Export Channel Performance," Journal of Marketing, 61 (1), 22-38. 
Bergen, M., Dutta, S., & Walker Jr, O. C. (1992), "Agency Relationships in Marketing: A 
Review of the Implications and Applications of Agency and Related," Journal of 
Marketing, 56 (3), 1-24. 
Bharadwaj, A. S. (2000), "A Resource-Based Perspective on Information Technology Capability 
and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation," MIS Quarterly, 24 (1), 169-196. 
Blackhurst, J., Craighead, C. W., Elkins, D., & Handfield, R. B. (2005), "An Empirically 
Derived Agenda of Critical Research Issues for Managing Supply-Chain Disruptions," 
International Journal of Production Research, 43 (19), 4067-4081. 
Bresman, H., Birkinshaw, J., & Nobel, R. (2010), "Knowledge Transfer in International 
Acquisitions," Journal of International Business Studies, 41 (1), 5-20. 
Byrne, P. M. (2007), "Impact and Ubiquity: Two Reasons to Proactively Manage Risk," 
Logistics Management, 46 (4), 24-25. 
Chin, W. W. (1998), "The Pls Approach to Sem," in Modern Methods for Business Research, 
Marcoulides, G. A., ed. eds. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Choi, T. Y., & Krause, D. R. (2006), "The Supply Base and Its Complexity: Implications for 
Transaction Costs, Risks, Responsiveness, and Innovation," Journal of Operations 
Management, 24 (5), 637-652. 
Chopra, S., & Sodhi, M. S. (2004), "Managing Risk to Avoid Supply-Chain Breakdown," MIT 
Sloan Management Review, 46 (1), 53-62. 
120 
 
 
 
Christopher, M., & Lee, H. (2004), "Mitigating Supply Chain Risk through Improved 
Confidence," International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 34 
(5), 388-396. 
Churchill Jr, G. A. (1979), "A Paradigm for Developing Better Measures of Marketing 
Constructs," Journal of Marketing Research (JMR), 16 (1), 64-73. 
Cohen, J. C., Jacob; Cohen, Patricia; West, Stephen G; Aiken, Leona S; (2003), Applied Multiple 
Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences. Mahwah, N.J. ;. L. 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1990), "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on 
Learning and Innovation," Administrative Science Quarterly, 35 (1), 128-152. 
Collis, D. J. (1994), "Research Note: How Valuable Are Organizational Capabilities?," Strategic 
Management Journal, 15 (ArticleType: primary_article / Issue Title: Special Issue: 
Competitive Organizational Behavior / Full publication date: Winter, 1994 / Copyright © 
1994 John Wiley & Sons), 143-152. 
Coombs, C. H. (1983), Psychology and Mathematics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Crawford, S., Mccabe, S., Couper, M., & Boyd, C. (2002, August 25-28). Improving Response 
Rates and Data Collection Efficiencies. Paper presented at the International Conference 
on Improving Surveys, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
Das, T. K., & Bing-Sheng, T. (1998), "Between Trust and Control: Developing Confidence in 
Partner Cooperation in Alliances," Academy of Management Review, 23 (3), 491-512. 
Das, T. K., & Teng, B.-S. (2001), "Trust, Control, and Risk in Strategic Alliances: An Integrated 
Framework," Organization Studies, 22 (2), 251. 
121 
 
 
 
Day, G. S. (1994), "The Capabilities of Market-Driven Organizations," Journal of Marketing, 58 
(4), 37. 
Dowling, G. R. (1986), "Perceived Risk," The Concept and Its Measurement, 3 (3), 193-210. 
Dowling, G. R., & Staelin, R. (1994), "Model of Perceived Risk and Intended Risk-Handling 
Activity," Journal of Consumer Research, 21 (1), 119-134. 
Dyer, J. H., & Nobeoka, K. (2000), "Creating and Managing a High-Performance Knowledge-
Sharing Network: The Toyota Case," Strategic Management Journal, 21 (3), 345. 
Dyer, J. H., & Singh, H. (1998), "The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy and Sources of 
Interorganizational Competitive Advantage," Academy of Management Review, 23 (4), 
660-679. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989), "Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review," Academy of 
Management Review, 14 (1), 57-74. 
Ellis, S. C., Henry, R. M., & Shockley, J. (2010), "Buyer Perceptions of Supply Disruption Risk: 
A Behavioral View and Empirical Assessment," Journal of Operations Management, 28 
(1), 34-46. 
Fishburn, P. C. (1977), "Mean-Risk Analysis with Risk Associated with Below-Target Returns," 
American Economic Review, 67, 116-126. 
Fornell, C., & Larcker, D. F. (1981), "Evaluating Structural Equation Models with Unobservable 
Variables and Measurement Error," Journal of Marketing Research, 48, 39-50. 
Frazier, G. L. (2009), "Physical Distribution and Channel Management: A Knowledge and 
Capabilities Perspective," Journal of Supply Chain Management: A Global Review of 
Purchasing & Supply, 45 (2), 23-36. 
122 
 
 
 
Frazier, G. L., Maltz, E., Antia, K. D., & Rindfleisch, A. (2009), "Distributor Sharing of 
Strategic Information with Suppliers," Journal of Marketing, 73 (4), 31-43. 
Frishammar, J., & Sven Åke, H. (2005), "Managing External Information in Manufacturing 
Firms: The Impact on Innovation Performance," Journal of Product Innovation 
Management, 22 (3), 251-266. 
Ganesan, S. (1994), "Determinants of Long-Term Orientation in Buyer-Seller Relationships," 
Journal of Marketing, 58 (2), 1. 
Gates, D. (2008). Latest Delay of Boeing 787 Pushes Back First Delivery to Third Quarter of 
2009. Retrieved from seattletimes.nwsource.com 
Gefen, D., Rigdon, E. E., & Straub, D. (2011), "An Update and Extension to Sem Guidelines for 
Administrative and Social Science Research," MIS Quarterly, 35 (2), 3-14. 
Gefen, D., Straub, D. W., & Boudreau, M. C. (2000), "Structural Equation Modeling and 
Regression: Guidelines for Research Practice," Communications of the Association for 
Information Systems, 4 (7), 1-77. 
George, G., Zahra, S. A., Wheatley, K. K., & Khan, R. (2001), "Effects of Alliance Portfolio 
Characteristics and Absorptive Capacity on Performance a Study of Biotechnology 
Firms," Journal of High Technology Management Research, 12 (2), 205-226. 
Geyskens, I., Steenkamp, J.-B. E. M., Scheer, L. K., & Kumar, N. (1996), "The Effects of Trust 
and Interdependence on Relationship Commitment: A Trans-Atlantic Study," 
International Journal of Research in Marketing, 13 (4), 303-317. 
Gilliland, D. I., & Bello, D. C. (2002), "Two Sides to Attitudinal Commitment: The Effect of 
Calculative and Loyalty Commitment on Enforcement Mechanisms in Distribution 
Channels," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 30 (1), 24-43. 
123 
 
 
 
Giunipero, L. C., & Eltantawy, R. A. (2004), "Securing the Upstream Supply Chain: A Risk 
Management Approach," International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics 
Management, 34 (9), 698-713. 
Gosain, S., Malhotra, A., & El Sawy, O. A. (2004), "Coordinating for Flexibility in E-Business 
Supply Chains," Journal of Management Information Systems, 21 (3), 7-45. 
Greising, D., & Johnsson, J. (2007). Behind Boeing's 787 Delays: Problems at One of the 
Smallest Suppliers in Dreamliner Program Causing Ripple Effect. Retrieved from 
www.chicagotribune.com 
Griffith, D. A., & Lusch, R. F. (2007), "Getting Marketers to Invest in Firm-Specific Capital," 
Journal of Marketing, 71 (1), 129-145. 
Griffith, D. A., Myers, M. B., & Harvey, M. G. (2006), "An Investigation of National Culture's 
Influence on Relationship and Knowledge Resources in Interorganizational Relationships 
between Japan and the United States," Journal of International Marketing, 14 (3), 1-32. 
Grover, V., & Saeed, K. A. (2007), "The Impact of Product, Market, and Relationship 
Characteristics on Interorganizational System Integration in Manufacturer-Supplier 
Dyads," Journal of Management Information Systems, 23 (4), 185-216. 
Gustin, C. M., Daugherty, P. J., & Stank, T. P. (1995), "The Effects of Information Availability 
on Logistics Integration," Journal of Business Logistics, 16 (1), 1-21. 
Hair, J. F., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L., & Black, W. C. (1998), Multivariate Data Analysis. 
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Hallikas, J., Karvonen, I., Pulkkinen, U., Virolainen, V.-M., & Tuominen, M. (2004), "Risk 
Management Processes in Supplier Networks," International Journal of Production 
Economics, 90 (1), 47-58. 
124 
 
 
 
Hallikas, J., Virolainen, V.-M., & Tuominen, M. (2002), "Risk Analysis and Assessment in 
Network Environments: A Dyadic Case Study," International Journal of Production 
Economics, 78 (1), 45-55. 
Harland, C., Brenchley, R., & Walker, H. (2003), "Risk in Supply Networks," Journal of 
Purchasing & Supply Management, 9 (2), 51. 
Heide, J. B., & John, G. (1992), "Do Norms Matter in Marketing Relationships?," Journal of 
Marketing, 56 (2), 32-44. 
Heide, J. B., & Miner, A. S. (1992), "The Shadow of the Future: Effects of Anticipated 
Interaction and Frequency of Contact on Buyer–Seller Cooperation.," Academy of 
Management Journal, 35 (2), 265–291. 
Hendricks, K. B., & Singhal, V. R. (2003), "The Effect of Supply Chain Glitches on Shareholder 
Wealth," Journal of Operations Management, 21 (5), 501-522. 
Hendricks, K. B., & Singhal, V. R. (2005a), "Association between Supply Chain Glitches and 
Operating Performance," Management Science, 51 (5), 695-711. 
Hendricks, K. B., & Singhal, V. R. (2005b), "An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Supply 
Chain Disruptions on Long-Run Stock Price Performance and Equity Risk of the Firm," 
Production & Operations Management, 14 (1), 35-52. 
Hoek, R. I. V. (1998), "Logistics and Virtual Integration," International Journal of Physical 
Distribution & Logistics Management, 28 (7), 508-523. 
Hult, G. T. M., Ketchen, D. J., Cavusgil, S. T., & Calantone, R. J. (2006), "Knowledge as a 
Strategic Resource in Supply Chains," Journal of Operations Management, 24 (5), 458-
475. 
125 
 
 
 
Hultman, J., & Axelsson, B. (2007), "Towards a Typology of Transparency for Marketing 
Management Research," Industrial Marketing Management, 36 (5), 627-635. 
Hunt, S. D., & Morgan, R. M. (1995), "The Comparative Advantage Theory of Competition," 
Journal of Marketing, 59, 1-15. 
Jarvis, C. B., Mackenzie, S. B., Podsakoff, P. M., Mick, D. G., & Bearden, W. O. (2003), "A 
Critical Review of Construct Indicators and Measurement Model Misspecification in 
Marketing and Consumer Research," Journal of Consumer Research, 30 (2), 199-218. 
Jean, R.-J. B., Sinkovics, R. R., & Cavusgil, S. T. (2010), "Enhancing International Customer–
Supplier Relationships through It Resources: A Study of Taiwanese Electronics 
Suppliers," Journal of International Business Studies, 41 (September), 1218–1239. 
Jemison, D. B. (1987), "Risk and the Relationship among Strategy, Organizational Processes, 
and Performance," Management Science, 33 (9), 1087-1101. 
Joshi, A. W. (2009), "Continuous Supplier Performance Improvement: Effects of Collaborative 
Communication and Control," Journal of Marketing, 73 (1), 133-150. 
Katsikeas, C. S., Skarmeas, D., & Bello, D. C. (2009), "Developing Successful Trust-Based 
International Exchange Relationships," Journal of International Business Studies, 40 (1), 
132-155. 
Khan, O., & Burnes, B. (2007), "Risk and Supply Chain Management: Creating a Research 
Agenda," International Journal of Logistics Management, 18 (2), 197. 
Kim, D., Cavusgil, S. T., & Calantone, R. J. (2006), "Information System Innovations and 
Supply Chain Management: Channel Relationships and Firm Performance," Journal of 
the Academy of Marketing Science, 34 (1), 40-54. 
126 
 
 
 
Klein, R., & Rai, A. (2009), "Interfirm Strategic Information Flows in Logistics Supply Chain 
Relationships," MIS Quarterly, 33 (4), 735-762. 
Klein, S., Frazier, G. L., & Roth, V. J. (1990), "A Transaction Cost Analysis Model of Channel 
Integration in International Markets," Journal of Marketing Research (JMR), 27 (2), 196-
208. 
Kleindorfer, P. R., & Saad, G. H. (2005), "Managing Disruption Risks in Supply Chains," 
Production & Operations Management, 14 (1), 53-68. 
Knemeyer, A. M., Zinn, W., & Eroglu, C. (2009), "Proactive Planning for Catastrophic Events in 
Supply Chains," Journal of Operations Management, 27 (2), 141-153. 
Knight, R., & Pretty, D. (1996). The Impact of Catastrophes on Shareholder Value. Oxford. 
Kobrin, S. J. (1979), "Political Risk: A Review and Reconsideration," Journal of International 
Business Studies, 10 (1), 67-80. 
Lamming, R. C., Caldwell, N., & Harrison, D. (2004), "Developing the Concept of Transparency 
for Use in Supply Relationships," British Journal of Management, 15 (4), 291-302. 
Lamming, R. C., Caldwell, N., Phillips, W., & Harrison, D. (2005), "Sharing Sensitive 
Information in Supply Relationships: The Flaws in One-Way Open-Book Negotiation 
and the Need for Transparency," European Management Journal, 23 (5), 554-563. 
Lamming, R. C., Caldwell, N. D., Harrison, D. A., & Phillips, W. (2001), "Transparency in 
Supply Relationships: Concept and Practice," Journal of Supply Chain Management: A 
Global Review of Purchasing & Supply, 37 (4), 4-10. 
Lane, P. J., & Lubatkin, M. (1998), "Relative Absorptive Capacity and Interorganizational 
Learning," Strategic Management Journal, 19 (5), 461-477. 
127 
 
 
 
Laudon, K., & Laudon, J. (2009), Management Information Systems. Upper Saddle River: 
Prentice Hall. 
Lee, H. L., & Padmanabhan, V. (1997), "Information Distortion in a Supply Chain: The 
Bullwhip Effect," Management Science, 43 (4), 546. 
Lee, H. L., Padmanabhan, V., & Seungjin, W. (2004), "Information Distortion in a Supply 
Chain: The Bullwhip Effect," Management Science, 50 (12), 1875-1886. 
Lee, H. L., Padmanabhan, V., & Wang, S. (1997), "The Bullwhip Effect in Supply Chains," 
Sloan Management Review, 38 (3), 93-102. 
Lee, H. L., So, K. C., & Tang, C. S. (2000), "The Value of Information Sharing in a Two-Level 
Supply Chain," Management Science, 46 (5), 626. 
Lindell, M. K., & Whitney, D. J. (2001), "Accounting for Common Method Variance in Cross-
Selectional Research Designs," Journal of Applied Psychology, 86 (1), 114-121. 
Lui, S. S., & Ngo, H.-Y. (2004), "The Role of Trust and Contractual Safeguards on Cooperation 
in Non-Equity Alliances," Journal of Management, 30 (4), 471-485. 
Lyles, M. A., & Salk, J. E. (2007), "Knowledge Acquisition from Foreign Parents in 
International Joint Ventures: An Empirical Examination in the Hungarian Context," 
Journal of International Business Studies, 38 (1), 3-18. 
Manuj, I., & Mentzer, J. T. (2008), "Global Supply Chain Risk Management," Journal of 
Business Logistics, 29 (1), 133-113+. 
March, J. G., & Shapira, Z. (1987), "Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking," 
Management Science, 33 (11), 1404-1418. 
Markowitz, H. M. (1952), "The Utility of Wealth," Journal of Political Economy, 60, 151-158. 
128 
 
 
 
Mascarenhas, B. (1982), "Coping with Uncertainty in International Business," Journal of 
International Business Studies, 13 (2), 87-98. 
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995), "An Integrative Model of Organizational 
Trust," The Academy of Management Review, 20 (3), 709-734. 
McEvily, B., & Marcus, A. (2005), "Embedded Ties and the Acquisition of Competitive 
Capabilities," Strategic Management Journal, 26 (11), 1033-1055. 
McEvily, B., Perrone, V., & Zaheer, A. (2003), "Trust as an Organizing Principle," Organization 
Science, 14 (1), 91-103. 
Mcginnis, M. A., & Kohn, J. W. (1993), "Logistics Strategy, Organizational Environment, and 
Time Competitiveness," Journal of Business Logistics, 14 (2), 1-23. 
McKinsey & Company Operations Extranet. (2010). Risky Business: Managing Supplier 
Defaults.  
Miller, K. D. (1992), "A Framework for Integrated Risk Management in International Business," 
Journal of International Business Studies, 23 (2), 311-331. 
Mitchell, V.-W. (1995), "Organizational Risk Perception and Reduction: A Literature Review," 
British Journal of Management, 6 (2), 115-133. 
Mohr, J. J., Fisher, R. J., & Nevin, J. R. (1996), "Collaborative Communication in Interfirm 
Relationships: Moderating Effects of Integration and Control," The Journal of Marketing, 
60 (3), 103-115. 
Mohr, J. J., Fisher, R. J., & Nevin, J. R. (1999), "Communicating for Better Channel 
Relationships," Marketing Management, 8 (2), 39-45. 
Mohr, J. J., & Nevin, J. R. (1990), "Communication Strategies in Marketing Channels: A 
Theoretical Perspective," Journal of Marketing, 54 (4), 36-51. 
129 
 
 
 
Mohr, J. J., & Sohi, R. S. (1995), "Communication Flows in Distribution Channels: Impact On," 
Journal of Retailing, 71 (4), 393-416. 
Mohr, J. J., & Spekman, R. (1994), "Characteristics of Partnership Success: Partnership 
Attributes, Communication Behavior, and Conflict Resolution Techniques," Strategic 
Management Journal, 15 (2), 135-152. 
Moore, G. C., & Benbasat, I. (1991), "Development of an Instrument to Measure the Perceptions 
of Adopting an Information Technology Innovation.," Information Systems Research, 2 
(3), 192-222. 
Moorman, C., Zaltman, G., & Deshpande, R. (1992), "Relationships between Providers and 
Users of Market Research: The Dynamics of Trust within and between Organizations," 
Journal of Marketing Research (JMR), 29 (3), 314-328. 
Morgan, R. M., & Hunt, S. D. (1994), "The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship 
Marketing," Journal of Marketing, 58 (3), 20-38. 
Nonaka, I. (1994), "A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation," Organization 
Science, 5 (1), 14-37. 
Noordewier, T. G., John, G., & Nevin, J. R. (1990), "Performance Outcomes of Purchasing 
Arrangements in Industrial Buyer-Vendor Relationships," Journal of Marketing, 54 (4), 
80-93. 
Nooteboom, B., Berger, H., & Noorderhaven, N. G. (1997), "Effects of Trust and Governance on 
Relational Risk," Academy of Management Journal, 40 (2), 308-338. 
Nunnally, J. C., & Bernstein, I. H. (1994), Psychometric Theory. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Ouchi, W. G. (1979), "A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational Control 
Mechanisms," Management Science, 25 (9), 833–848. 
130 
 
 
 
Peck, H. (2006), "Reconciling Supply Chain Vulnerability, Risk and Supply Chain 
Management," International Journal of Logistics: Research & Applications, 9 (2), 127-
142. 
Petersen, B., Pedersen, T., & Lyles, M. A. (2008), "Closing Knowledge Gaps in Foreign 
Markets," Journal of International Business Studies, 39 (7), 1097. 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. (1978), "The External Control of Organizations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective," in New York: Harper and Row Publishers. 
Phan, T. T. A., Baughn, C. C., Ngo, T. M. H., & Neupert, K. E. (2006), "Knowledge Acquisition 
from Foreign Parents in International Joint Ventures: An Empirical Study in Vietnam," 
International Business Review, 15 (5), 463-487. 
Podsakoff, P. M., Mackenzie, S. B., Jeong-Yeon, L., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003), "Common 
Method Biases in Behavioral Research: A Critical Review of the Literature and 
Recommended Remedies," Journal of Applied Psychology, 88 (5), 879. 
Powell, T. C. (1992), "Organizational Alignment as Competitive Advantage," Strategic 
Management Journal, 13 (2), 119–134. 
Pratt, J. W. (1964), "Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large," Econometrica, 32, 122-136. 
Rai, A., Patnayakuni, R., & Seth, N. (2006), "Firm Performance Impacts of Digitally Enabled 
Supply Chain Integration Capabilities," MIS Quarterly, 30 (2), 225-246. 
Rebolledo, C., Halley, A., & Nagati, H. (2009), "The Effects of Absorptive Capacity on 
Operational Performance within the Context of Customer-Supplier Relationships," 
Supply Chain Forum: International Journal, 10 (2), 52-62. 
Rindfleisch, A., & Heide, J. B. (1997), "Transaction Cost Analysis: Past, Present, and Future 
Applications," Journal of Marketing, 61 (4), 30. 
131 
 
 
 
Ringle, C. M., Wende, S., & Will, S. (2005). Smartpls 2.0 (M3) Beta (Version M3). Hamburg: 
http://www.smartpls.de. 
Robson, M. J., Katsikeas, C. S., & Bello, D. C. (2008), "Drivers and Performance Outcomes of 
Trust in International Strategic Alliances: The Role of Organizational Complexity," 
Organization Science, 19 (4), 647-665. 
Sahin, F., & Robinson, J. E. P. (2002), "Flow Coordination and Information Sharing in Supply 
Chains: Review, Implications, and Directions for Future Research," Decision Sciences, 
33 (4), 505-536. 
Sahin, F., & Robinson, J. E. P. (2005), "Information Sharing and Coordination in Make-to-Order 
Supply Chains," Journal of Operations Management, 23 (6), 579-598. 
Saparito, P. A., Chen, C. C., & Sapienza, H. J. (2004), "The Role of Relational Trust in Bank-
Small Firm Relationships," Academy of Management Journal, 47 (3), 400-410. 
Seville, E., Brunsdon, D., Dantas, A., Le Masurier, J., Wilkinson, S., & Vargo, J. (2008), 
"Organisational Resilience: Researching the Reality of New Zealand Organisations," 
Journal of Business Continuity & Emergency Planning, 2 (3), 258-266. 
Shapira, Z. (1995), Risk Taking: A Managerial Perspective. New York: Russel Sage Foundation. 
Shrout, P. E., & Bolger, N. (2002), "Mediation in Experimental and Nonexperimental Studies: 
New Procedures and Recommendations," Psychological Methods, 7 (4), 422-445. 
Simonin, B. L., & Özsomer, A. (2009), "Knowledge Processes and Learning Outcomes in Mncs: 
An Empirical Investigation of the Role of Hrm Practices in Foreign Subsidiaries," Human 
Resource Management, 48 (4), 505-530. 
Snyder, L. V., Atan, Z., Peng, P., Rong, Y., Schmitt, A. J., & Sinsoysal, B. (2010). Or/Ms 
Models for Supply Chain Disruptions: A Review.Unpublished manuscript. 
132 
 
 
 
Sobel, M. E. (1982), "Asymptotic Confidence Intervals for Indirect Effects in Structural 
Equation Models," in Sociological Methodology, Leinhardt, S., ed. eds. San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass. 
Spekman, R. E., & Davis, E. W. (2004), "Risky Business: Expanding the Discussion on Risk and 
the Extended Enterprise," International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics 
Management, 34 (5), 414-433. 
Srivastava, R. K., Fahey, L., & Christensen, H. K. (2001), "The Resource-Based View and 
Marketing: The Role of Market-Based Assets in Gaining Competitive Advantage," 
Journal of Management, 27 (6), 777-802. 
Srivastava, R. K., Shervani, T. A., & Fahey, L. (1998), "Market-Based Assets and Shareholder 
Value: A Framework for Analysis," Journal of Marketing, 62 (1), 2– 18. 
Stiglitz, J. E. (2000), "The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century 
Economics," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (4), 1441-1478. 
Straub, D. W., Hoffman, D. L., Weber, B. W., & Steinfield, C. (2002), "Toward New Metrics for 
Net-Enhanced Organizations," Information Systems Research, 13 (3), 227-238. 
Stump, R. L., & Heide, J. B. (1996), "Controlling Supplier Opportunism in Industrial 
Relationships," Journal of Marketing Research, 33 (4), 431-441. 
Swafford, P. M., Ghosh, S., & Murthy, N. (2008), "Achieving Supply Chain Agility through It 
Integration and Flexibility," International Journal of Production Economics, 116 (2), 
288-297. 
Swaminathan, J. M., & Tayur, S. R. (2003), "Models for Supply Chains in E-Business," 
Management Science, 49 (10), 1387-1406. 
133 
 
 
 
Szulanski, G. (1996), "Exploring Internal Stickiness: Impediments to the Transfer of Best 
Practice within the Firm," Strategic Management Journal, 17, 27-43. 
Taleb, N. N. (2007), The Black Swan : The Impact of the Highly Improbable. New York: 
Random House. 
Tang, C. S. (2006a), "Perspectives in Supply Chain Risk Management," International Journal of 
Production Economics, 103 (2), 451-488. 
Tang, C. S. (2006b), "Robust Strategies for Mitigating Supply Chain Disruptions," International 
Journal of Logistics: Research & Applications, 9 (1), 33-45. 
Tippins, M. J., & Sohi, R. S. (2003), "It Competency and Firm Performance: Is Organizational 
Learning a Missing Link?," Strategic Management Journal, 24 (8), 745– 761. 
Von Hippel, E. (1994), ""Sticky Information" and the Locus of Problem Solving: Implications 
for Innovation," Management Science, 40 (4), 429-439. 
Wagner, S. M., & Bode, C. (2006), "An Empirical Investigation into Supply Chain 
Vulnerability," Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 12 (6), 301-312. 
Wagner, S. M., & Bode, C. (2008), "An Empirical Examination of Supply Chain Performance 
Along Several Dimensions of Risk," Journal of Business Logistics, 29 (1), 307-325. 
Wallace, J. (2008). Boeing Jet Production Will Be Slow to Restart. Retrieved from Seattlepi.com 
Wang, E. T. G., & Wei, H.-L. (2007), "Interorganizational Governance Value Creation: 
Coordinating for Information Visibility and Flexibility in Supply Chains," Decision 
Sciences, 38 (4), 647-674. 
Ward, P., & Zhou, H. (2006), "Impact of Information Technology Integration and Lean/Just-in-
Time Practices on Lead-Time Performance," Decision Sciences, 37 (2), 177-203. 
134 
 
 
 
Wareham, J., Mathiassen, L., Rai, A., Straub, D., & Klein, R. (2005), "The Business Value of 
Digital Supply Networks: A Program of Research on the Impacts of Globalization," 
Journal of International Management, 11 (2), 201-227. 
Werner, S., Brouthers, L. E., & Brouthers, K. D. (1996), "International Risk and Perceived 
Environmental Uncertainty: The Dimensionality and Internal Consistency of Miller's 
Measure," Journal of International Business Studies, 27 (3), 571-587. 
Wernerfelt, B. (1984), "A Resource Based View of the Firm," Strategic Management Journal, 5, 
171-180. 
Williamson, O. E. (1991), "Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete 
Structural Alternatives," Administrative Science Quarterly, 36 (2), 269-296. 
Williamson, O. E. (1993), "Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization," Journal of Law 
and Economics, 36 (1), 453-486. 
Wu, F., Yeniyurt, S., Kim, D., & Cavusgil, S. T. (2006), "The Impact of Information Technology 
on Supply Chain Capabilities and Firm Performance: A Resource-Based View," 
Industrial Marketing Management, 35 (4), 493-504. 
Yates, J. F., & Stone, E. R. (1992a), "Risk Appraisal," in Risk-Taking Behavior, Yates, J.F., ed. 
eds. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Yates, J. F., & Stone, E. R. (1992b), "The Risk Construct," in Risk-Taking Behavior, Yates, J.F., 
ed. eds. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Zahra, S. A., & George, G. (2002), "Absorptive Capacity: A Review, Reconceptualization, and 
Extension," Academy of Management Review, 27 (2), 185-203. 
Zander, U., & Kogut, B. (1995), "Knowledge and the Speed of the Transfer and Imitation of 
Organizational Capabilities: An Empirical Test," Organization Science, 5 (1), 76-92. 
135 
 
 
 
Zhou, H., & Benton Jr, W. C. (2007), "Supply Chain Practice and Information Sharing," Journal 
of Operations Management, 25 (6), 1348-1365. 
Zsidisin, G. A. (2003), "A Grounded Definition of Supply Risk," Journal of Purchasing & 
Supply Management, 9 (5/6), 217-224. 
Zsidisin, G. A., & Ellram, L. M. (2003), "An Agency Theory Investigation of Supply Risk 
Management," Journal of Supply Chain Management: A Global Review of Purchasing & 
Supply, 39 (3), 15-27. 
Zsidisin, G. A., Melnyk, S. A., & Ragatz, G. L. (2005), "An Institutional Theory Perspective of 
Business Continuity Planning for Purchasing and Supply Management," International 
Journal of Production Research, 43 (16), 3401-3420. 
Zsidisin, G. A., Ragatz, G. L., & Melnyk, S. A. (2005), "The Dark Side of Supply Chain 
Management," Supply Chain Management Review, 9 (2), 46-52. 
  
  
136 
 
VITA 
Hung Vu Nguyen was born in 1977 in Hanoi, Vietnam. Having grown up in a developing 
economy like Vietnam, Hung has developed his passion for understanding the thriving business 
and marketing practices in the country and other developed nations even though his early focus 
was on mathematics. After graduated from the top business school in Vietnam, Hanoi Foreign 
Trade University, in 2000, Hung joined several companies including Vietnam 
Datacommunication Company, Acorn Marketing and Research Consultants Limited, and 
Hyundai Pentatel Inc. with various positions including economics-news editor, marketing 
consultant executives, and marketing director. With experience and access to the world business 
from the companies, Hung was encouraged to further follow his academic career in marketing 
and international business science. He attended an MBA program in University of North 
Alabama in 2006 and finished his degree with distinction within one year. Such achievement 
together with a high score in the GMAT exam has helped him earn a place in the Ph.D. program 
in Marketing in J. Mack Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University, since 2007.  
During the journey in Georgia State University, Hung has made several other academic 
achievements including top student in the Ph.D. comprehensive exam and several publications in 
international journals such as journal of international consumer studies, journal of global 
academy of marketing science, and journal of financial services marketing. Even though the 
focus of his dissertation is on global supply networks, Hung has worked with his colleagues on 
other areas such as born-global firms and small and medium enterprises in developing countries 
for the near future publications. With his expertise in business and marketing science together 
with the strength in quantitative methods, Hung has also served as a reviewer or ad-hoc reviewer 
137 
 
 
 
for various journals and associations including Journal of International Business Studies, 
International Business Review, Journal of International Marketing, Academy of International 
Business (AIB), Journal of International Consumer Studies, Industrial Marketing Management, 
and Management International Review. Moreover, during the program in Georgia State 
University, Hung has experienced in teaching business students with several marketing 
principles classes which further shaped his research interest in marketing and international 
business. 
Hung’s research interests include business-to-business marketing, global networks, and firms in 
developing countries. He can be contacted at his permanent address in Vietnam at #64, 75 
Giaiphong Street, Hanoi, Vietnam. His contact email address is nguyen.vdh@gmail.com. 
